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ABSTRACT 
Persistence of cultural heritage in a multicultural context: 
Examining factors that shaped voting preferences in the 2016 election.  
By 
Anna M. Schwartz 
Adviser: Dr. Kristen Gillespie-Lynch 
 
The prevailing discourse about the myth of the “melting pot” of American culture implies 
that heritage cultures are eliminated in favor of a homogenous “American” norm.  However, this 
myth belies the persistence of our cultural heritage in forming our attitudes, morals, and habitual 
patterns of thought, each of which shape how we participate in our democracy through voting. 
By contextualizing voting predictors such as authoritarianism, social dominance, and sexism in 
developmental and ecological theories, this dissertation shows how they are shaped by culture 
and transmitted through consumption of media and interaction with members of one’s 
community and family. In an effort to model voting preferences using psychological constructs 
rather than demographic proxies such as race, gender or age, political scientists Feldman and 
Stenner (1997) have identified authoritarian parenting attitudes as a key parameter that predicts 
voting preferences for conservative candidates. Other scholars have identified additional 
parameters, such as hostile sexism (Glick and Fiske, 1996) and social dominance orientation 
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) while scholars such as Graham et al. (2011) have 
drawn together these separate predictors into a comprehensive, multidimensional measure of 
political ideology situated in the literature on moral development, yet scholars have neglected the 
role of culture in shaping our voting preferences and the psychological constructs which underlie 
and drive them. While psychological constructs pinpoint the mechanisms for people’s voting 
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behavior rather than essentializing behavior to demographic groups, most of the literature on 
voting preferences categorizes the predictors as personality or individual difference variables, or 
not at all. Integrating three theories on cultural ecology (Bronfenbrenner, Greenfield and 
Hofstede) with Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory, this dissertation seeks to open a 
dialogue about the tensions between individual differences variables and cultural variables, and 
how they both contribute to shaping outcome behaviors such as taking a moral stance and then 
voting in accordance with it. This work assembles the threads from recent research to create a 
model which predicts voting decisions, contextualized in a multicultural environment, to tease 
out the role of culture as a contributor. Using an extensive online survey, we replicated findings 
from prior literature which indicated that hostile sexism (but not being a man), authoritarian 
parenting attitudes, and a social dominance orientation predicted voting preferences for Donald 
Trump compared to Hillary Clinton. A new predictor, heritage-culture individualism, was 
developed for this dissertation and significantly predicted participants’ preference for Donald 
Trump. Given ongoing debate in cross-cultural psychology about the degree to which culture can 
be studied as an individual difference or as characteristic of one’s heritage countries, we 
compared individual difference measures of cultural values with the mean cultural value 
orientation of one’s heritage country or countries. Findings suggest that the impact of heritage 
cultures, or the values, norms, and rules brought by our ancestors from our heritage countries and 
regions, is a significant component that shapes voting decisions while individual difference 
cultural variables are less predictive. Taken together and situated in theoretical perspectives, 
these findings suggest that voting preferences are shaped by cultural values, and prompts 
scholars to recast previous predictors, such as authoritarianism, as having a larger component of 
culture than previously acknowledged. This novel finding speaks to a broader debate in cross-
vi 
 
cultural psychology by providing support for Hofstede’s assertion that cultural values represent 
coherent wholes that are more than the sum of the values of the people comprising them. It 
suggests a model which combines elements of Hofstede’s, Greenfield’s, and Bronfenbrenner’s 
theories of cultural ecology. With a better understanding of where identities, values, and ideas 
come from, we believe that interventions aimed at persuading voters can be more pluralistically 
sensitive to different ideologies while still increasing awareness of social justice issues. 
 
 
Keywords: culture, ecology, identity, morality, voting, polarization, individualism, media 
literacy. 
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Overview 
The ideals upon which the United States of America was founded, including democracy, 
freedom and equality, are not only cultural values intended to guide Americans in their voting 
decisions but cultural values that emerged from the particular ethos of the Enlightenment. 
However, modern day polling analyses of how people make their voting decisions have focused 
on demographics (what gender are you? What race?) or, at best, personality variables. Culture is 
mentioned as ineffable and indefinable quantity that indirectly may shape some of our thought 
processes. In this dissertation, I will argue for a stronger emphasis on culture as a shaper of 
voting preferences and other moral decisions. I believe that an understanding of culture as 
habitual sets of related thoughts that shape our expectations and interpretations of the world, 
from how our romantic partners ought to behave to whom we should endorse as a political leader 
for our entire nation, is a useful frame for viewing how people make moral decisions, especially 
about voting. The responses we have to others’ behavior are shaped by culture, and in the context 
of voting decisions for a national election, such as the 2016 presidential election, culture may be 
guiding our expectations in profound and yet as-yet-unexpected ways. While previous research 
has identified psychological variables such as hostile sexism and authoritarian parenting attitudes 
as strong predictors of electoral preferences, not enough has yet been done to interpret these 
findings theoretically. This dissertation will add to the evidence that not only are these variables 
increasingly relevant predictors of presidential voting preferences and psychological in nature, 
but they are rooted in and shaped by our heritage cultures. American culture, as such, and the 
idea of the melting pot, is over-emphasized in our narrative of coming together as one nation, 
whereas the reality is more likely to be a mosaic of cultures that perpetuate down generations 
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from our founding ancestors and situate us all as multi-generational immigrants. Americans 
generate new layers of meaning to add to their cultures, and these shared meanings bind us 
together, but they do not replace or eradicate the older systems of meaning that were there in our 
heritage environments, even after many generations; they have just been ignored and deemed 
irrelevant for too long. 
A central paradox of our time is that many Americans do not identify as immigrants, and 
even fear immigrants, although they themselves are descended from immigrants. Prior research 
indicates that fear of immigrants, and of other aspects of social change, shapes our political 
decisions, but is rarely studied in a context where multi-generational immigrants are interacting 
with newer immigrants in high proportions at school, although most students then return to their 
families at night. The dissociations afforded by understanding how immigrants of different 
generations view and understand each other is invaluable to understanding the role of culture in 
shaping our ideals for how our society ought to run. In addition to participants of different 
generations in the United States, the context in which data was collected, students in Introduction 
to Psychology at the College of Staten Island, affords a view of different political ideologies in 
contact. Similarly, racial, religious and socio-economic differences occur across the population, 
all of whom come together to study and go home to families and neighborhoods at night. Does 
this multicultural context alter the predictions of previous research based on more homogenous 
populations (large scale studies have included heterogeneous participants, but they are rarely 
living in contact with one another, a unique affordance of a megapolis like New York City with a 
rural borough, like Staten Island)? What new pieces can be pulled out of this puzzle because of 
the complex diversity of the sample?  
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Hostile sexism and authoritarianism are two of the most replicated characteristics that 
have been found to predict voting preferences in presidential elections, so they are likely to be 
tied to voting preferences in this election. These characteristics, which reflect a desire for stable 
hierarchies, have been associated with prejudicial values against many types of diversity and 
with conservative political stances. Recent research demonstrates that fear-inducing events, such 
as terrorist attacks, can activate latent authoritarian tendencies and contribute to “unexpected” 
outcomes of elections in which voters lean towards candidates who appear strong on defense. 
However, prior research has not fully addressed whether hostile sexism or authoritarianism are 
cultural variables or personality variables. The current research situates them as two cultural 
variables, likely tied to heritage traditions in different communities, and posits a third cultural 
variable that is relevant to presidential elections: heritage individualism.  Prior research has not 
assessed heritage ideals of societal structure, such as individualism, in the context of voting 
decisions, nor has it situated constructs such as authoritarianism as heritage ideals of societal 
structure. Given the degree to which immigration was a central aspect of the discourse 
surrounding the 2016 presidential election (and other recent elections around the world), a 
primary aim of this dissertation was to evaluate if our cultural heritage continues to shape how 
we relate to others and make political decisions even after our families have lived for generations 
as Americans. 
A final dimension of culture that requires greater attention in research is the role of the 
internet media in disseminating information, and connecting us, culturally, across previously 
unimaginable distances. If the purpose of this data set is to look at multiculturalism and its role in 
shaping our cultural values, then to ignore the internet and its role in shaping our cultural values 
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is pennywise and pound-foolish. Ongoing debate about what constitutes “fake news” and how it 
can be deployed to shape political decision-making has made it essential to understand how 
voters consume information in the brave new world of digital media.  
Understanding a system of thought that drives important decision making - like who to 
vote for - and is generalizable across cultures has proved fraught. The cross-cultural validity of 
theories that attempted to establish universal claims about the trajectories of development, such 
as for moral development, has been called into question (Gilligan, 1977; Dien, 1982). As the 
world becomes increasingly interconnected and more people are living with transnational 
identities, traveling great distances regularly, intermarrying with other groups, cultures, 
ethnicities, and speakers of other languages, people must navigate the accompanying 
complexities of merging their cultures with those of intimate partners, neighbors and 
increasingly complex communities (Hong & Cheon, 2017). 
In looking at what leads people to decide who to vote for, we cannot ignore the role of 
culture, identity and ethical systems in perpetuating discriminatory attitudes based on gender, 
race and immigration status, nor of the importance of confronting xenophobia, which persists in 
our society, even in a broadly multicultural city. With better understanding of how changing 
ecological contexts can have an impact on cultural values, we can alter discriminatory 
assumptions which are deeply and implicitly embedded in the cultural values through 
participatory, agentic and collaborative contexts. 
Another aspect of understanding multiculturalism is trying to understand how groups 
with differing values and practices co-exist in the tight spaces of New York City, where issues 
are never as simple as two groups but expand across dimensions including heritage countries, 
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multi-ethnic and multi-racial families and neighborhoods, and vast political and class differences 
in addition to the standard-issue nationwide diversity topics of tolerance of religion, disability 
status, developmental/age differences, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation. This 
milieu provides an almost inundating amount of complexity to account for, tempered only by the 
focus on one critical lens, the moral-political decision of who to vote for on November 8th, 2016. 
Some cross-cultural researchers, such as Hofstede, have represented the United States (as 
well as other countries, particularly large ones) as one monoculture, yet many Americans might 
argue that the experience of being American includes many sub-cultures which have oriented 
around political, religious, socio-economic and racial identities, and that these complex identities 
are crucially important to understand what have been referred to as the “Culture Wars” between 
(ostensibly) “liberal, educated elites” on the coasts and “values-oriented, Christian, working 
class, everyday Americans” in more rural areas (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).  
Voting in a democracy is the critical aspect that drives the structure of our society. 
Citizens vote to elect lawmakers who: a) write laws and b) elect judges to interpret those laws, 
all of which shapes the legal bones of our society. Indeed, voting is an activity which is intended 
to shape our country according to our ideals of what is good and what will benefit our society, 
although we may interpret “goodness” in different ways. What values are we expressing in the 
voting booth? How have these values come to polarize us so strongly when most of us vote with 
the intention of doing good? Are there values that unite us as well as divide us?  
Most surveys surrounding voting decisions are interested in predicting who voters prefer 
quickly and simply, such as by using demographic predictors like gender or race (e.g. women 
above the age of 65 will vote for Hillary), based on the assumption that who we are defines our 
values. There may be less concern for unpacking the psychological motivations driving voters 
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making a decision of who to vote for, of whether or not to vote at all. The most recent election 
cycle, by contrast, has unleashed newfound energy into the arena of this post-hoc analysis as so 
many pollsters, such as Nate Silver, predicted that Hillary Clinton had a 64% chance of winning 
in the week leading up to the election, leading to many people being surprised by the eventual 
outcome of Donald Trump winning. Subsequent talk attempting to grapple with and comprehend 
the unexpected outcome talked of a media bubbles driven by social media (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017), lack of or presence of education (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg & McKee, 2017), and of 
culture wars (Goren & Chapp, 2017).  
So, how do we choose whom to vote for? How do we choose which cultural values we 
want our representatives to espouse as they elect other officials, enact laws, appoint judges? 
Some explanations have been based on demographics: women vote this way and white men that 
way, blacks another way and Latin@s yet another (Hansen & Ha, 2016). But what is it about 
these categories that drives voting behaviors? Are there differences in ability to consume media 
critically that explain the red/blue divide? Is exposure to greater diversity what leads urban 
voters to vote more progressively? Just exactly what are the deeper values, the ones tied to our 
identities and to the cultures in which we spend our lives immersed, that help us make a decision, 
alone, in the voting booth, let alone show up to vote at all. 
In this work, to better understand the underlying construct that drive us to make 
important decisions, I have chosen the context of voting:  a concrete, real-world decision 
involving moral beliefs, cultural values, and ideals of how our society should function and how 
we should each be situated within society’s structure. By choosing this context, I can discuss the 
affordances of different attributes contextually, which narrows but also concretizes the 
discussion of behaviors and beliefs to a specific historical time and place. 
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The research questions for this dissertation (described under Research Questions in this 
chapter), ask which overarching contributors may be shaping voting decisions and aims to begin 
a conversation about the role that identity, immigration, and ecology play in shaping a decision 
like who to vote for.  In the process of exploring these ideas, I hope to pose broader questions 
about theoretical underpinnings of what culture is and how culture shapes personality and 
identity. Finally, I hope to be able to discuss how culture and the ecologies that shape it can 
contribute to prejudices that emerge as moral ideologies about what is “right” and therefore what 
political platforms to endorse. 
Over the past few decades, some researchers have begun to identify constructs that better 
predicted the shocking electoral upsets of Brexit, the 2016 US Presidential election and the 
general rise of populism (De la Torre & Lemos, 2016; Nicoli, 2014; Pappas, 2014; Samet, 2013), 
yet questions remain unanswered.  Some of the constructs that have been identified are: 
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and sexism.  
 Previous research has found that sexism predicts populist voting patterns, but is this 
sexism held by men against women, or is it held by both genders depending on your 
enculturation experiences and cultural background (i.e. growing up in a “red” environment) 
(Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2017)? These findings beg the question of the role of identity versus 
culture in driving voting patterns. For example, some research points to sexism, which could be 
either cultural (if both men and women harbor sexist sentiments) or perhaps identity-based (if 
gender is a better predictor of voting patterns than holding sexist attitudes). To understand 
identity, we can look at how race and gender predict voting preferences. 
Other researchers have developed similar concepts, such as Graham et al., (2011), who 
combined many of these concepts into one measure with 5 dimensions that purports to measure 
8 
 
the 5 underlying psychological constructs that shape political preferences: they refer to these as 
our moral foundations. Recent works by MacWilliams (2016) and Taub (2016) have found 
relationships between fear of terrorist threats and discomfort with progressive social changes can 
alter voting patterns in people and convert liberals into authoritarian voters, while one researcher 
has suggested that the opposite is true – by making conservative voters feel safe you can 
liberalize their ideology, at least temporarily (Bargh, 2018; Napier, Huang, Vonasch & Bargh, 
2017). 
Authoritarianism has been tied to broad cultural values from political preferences about 
governance to opinions about how rear a child. When researchers identify successful precursors 
of voting behavior such as authoritarianism and social dominance, I wonder whether the 
underlying state is a matter of individual differences or is determined by cultural norms. For 
example, when we speak about parenting style, there are suggestions that parenting styles are 
heavily shaped by group norms. This research question sets out to try and identify, empirically, 
threads of evidence to help us understand the role of individual variability versus cultural 
variability in the values we have about how much control an authority figure ought to have, 
whether parent or politician. This is a central debate in the literature concerning individualism 
and collectivism already (Huang, 2015; Santrock, 2007; Snarey & Keljo, 1991; Tamis-LeMonda, 
Way, Hughes, Yoshikawa, Kalman & Niwa, 2008), and I propose that it is also important for 
understanding authoritarianism, social dominance, sexism, and morality in general.  
For example, authoritarianism straddles an individual differences approach as well as a 
culturally shaped approach. MacWilliams’ doctoral work analyzed authoritarianism as a cultural 
variable to show that entire cultures can develop authoritarian leanings (2016). By contrast, 
previous work viewed authoritarianism less as a dimension of cultural variability and more as a 
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personality trait. An important goal of developing the research in this field of psychology is to 
tease apart the contributions of individuals’ personality characteristics and identities from the 
contributions of their cultures to their values. For example, if sexism predicts populist leanings, 
is that because men are likely to be more sexist based on their gender identities or because both 
men and women can be enculturated to hold particular values about gender roles? If culture 
shapes gender roles, then how can sexism be examined outside of its cultural context? 
 It is important to remember that there is some continuity of effect here.  The purpose of 
this work is to examine the drivers of political preferences. If the drivers that are identified, such 
as authoritarianism and hostile sexism, are partly cultural, then one’s culture is driving one’s 
voting preferences, supporting the idea of “culture wars” and demanding more nuanced 
understanding of the subcultures within the United States. 
It is important to highlight here that culture and personality differences are only two of 
the crucial ingredients in driving a person’s political preferences. Culture is sometimes thought 
of as determined by exposure to a homogenous set of values in one’s primary group of 
membership, but experiences with outside groups can be just as important. It is imperative that 
we keep in mind the way information is passed nowadays through communication networks 
supported by the internet, and what groups various media sources are trying to represent in their 
reporting. This is an ecological aspect of the world that has changed since much of the research 
on authoritarianism was done: the internet has afforded a level of daily global interconnectedness 
that allows multicultural exposure in ways never possible (Verboord, 2016). Many researchers 
have wondered if multicultural exposure, either by living in a multicultural neighborhood, 
attending multicultural schools or interacting with other cultures through the internet, can reduce 
outgroup prejudices that may also contribute to populist sentiments (Hong & Cheon, 2017).  Can 
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positive contact with other groups reduce prejudice alone? The answer has proven more complex 
than expected (Verboord, 2016).  How do crucial voting decisions get made in a multicultural 
geographical location, in a globally connected, digital era? 
 In understanding multiculturalism, it is important to recognize that America is a nation 
almost entirely made up of relatively recent immigrants (as compared with other nations around 
the world, and with the exception of Native Americans). A lot of the narrative of “American” 
identity gets wrapped up in the process of Americanization, including an entire field of research 
on acculturation processes and attitudes about biculturalism and multiculturalism. This narrative 
can sometimes lead us, as American scholars, to neglect or even actively deny that people who 
are multi-generational immigrants to America may also be maintaining significant aspects of 
their cultural heritages in our research perspectives. Identity divides that label some people as 
“Americans” and others as “Immigrants” may have been an underlying cause of some of the 
polarized sentiments during and after the election (Goren & Chapp, 2017). This identity divide 
drove arguments about how incoming waves of immigrants should be treated. Thus, identity may 
be important in political voting preferences. 
 As mentioned above, many of the fields of research studying immigration experiences 
start from a premise that Americans exist as a homogenous group, and that, therefore, some 
process must convert immigrants into Americans. Acculturation research claims that the 
influence of our heritage cultures diminishes in multicultural contexts, eventually disappearing 
almost completely after several generations (Harker. 2001). However, my position deviates from 
this point of view both theoretically and empirically. A central assumption of this dissertation is 
that acculturation work has missed important socio- and psychological aspects of the experience 
of being transnational after multiple generations. I believe that a theoretical shift is needed, from 
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viewing acculturation processes as something that immigrants pass through in the first three 
generations, to an ongoing process we are all, still, undergoing, with repercussions to our 
identities and intergroup processes. Instead, I see that immigrants and their descendants (or in 
some cases, sub-cultures embedded in the dominant culture) occupy a permanent state of 
transnational and transcultural connections between heritage(s) and host(s), situated in social co-
construction of culture. An important aspect of this theoretical perspective is that the 
transmission and interpretation do not have to be accomplished at a conscious level.  Instead, like 
most culture, it can also be perpetuated through habitual, repeated examples of culturally-
influenced behaviors that the learner absorbs through constant exposure to the community 
(which includes local contact with the local community and large-scale contact with the society 
through media and the internet). 
 In these times of growing polarization, both sides want to characterize their opponents as 
lacking moral fiber and engage in hurling accusations of oppression or moral turpitude at one 
another (Willis, 2017). The conclusion that polarization is increasing has been demonstrated by 
research on the polarizing “echo-chamber” created by social media “likes,” (Del Vicario et al., 
2016a, b).  The emerging structure of information-sharing in the social media paradigm (which 
allows for viral events and instant feedback through likes, shares and clicks) has led to concerns 
about the way information (and disinformation, such as fake news) is shaping our beliefs and our 
ability to evaluate information and sources critically. Once we have formed an opinion, some 
research suggests that corrective information does not always lead to rectification of the 
mistaken opinion or belief (Flynn, Nyhan & Reifler, 2017; Nyhan, 2010). Given the global 
increases in polarization of values in the context of current populist movements (De la Torre & 
Lemos, 2016; Nicoli, 2014; Pappas, 2014; Samet, 2013), I hope to try and examine cultural 
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factors that have been identified as varying between geographically and politically separate 
groups in relation to voting preferences. For example, I wonder how cultural values to prioritize 
individualistic ideals relate to voting-decision contexts. How do variable cultural values emerge 
from a multi-cultural, rather than a more culturally homogenous, environment? To accomplish 
this, I focused on students at the College of Staten Island because of the wide cultural variety in 
the population. While most City University of New York campuses have strong elements of 
diversity, no others represent political diversity as well as cultural diversity. Residents of Staten 
Island were over 300% more likely to vote for Donald Trump than the average resident of NYC, 
and almost 600% more likely to vote for Donald Trump than residents of Manhattan or the 
Bronx (Ali, 2016). Yet the College of Staten Island mixes the conservative viewpoints of Staten 
Island residents with the strong progressive viewpoints of most of the rest of New York City: one 
third of the participants were from Staten Island, the rest were from other (majority progressive) 
boroughs of NYC.  
 One of the most entrenched accusations between “red” and “blue” voters regards 
educational levels, with “blue” voters accusing “red” voters of being uneducated and rural and 
red voters reacting by calling “blue” voters educated elitists (Election Poll Data, 2008; Graham, 
Nosek & Haidt, 2012).  Is there truth to the idea that red voters simply lack awareness and 
knowledge of political issues? Or is it more likely that both sides are equally aware of political 
facts? The difference between these two perspectives is the possibility that differences in belief 
are not rooted in education, but in other differences, perhaps ecological differences, in the way 
“red” voters and “blue” voters’ environments are socially organized.  
Rationale for sample population.  
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New York City is primarily known as a heavily progressive region, like most urban 
regions in the United States.  However, the borough of Staten Island is just as well known for 
being a conservative enclave within the city boundaries, in defiance of most urban voting norms. 
This divide provides the strongest rationale for collecting data at the College of Staten Island, 
which includes students from all 5 boroughs, but at least 66.0% are from Staten Island, and 
49.6% of the sample are white. Residents of Staten Island were three times as likely to vote for 
Donald Trump as residents of NYC overall (Ali, 2016), creating political diversity within the 
sample, and pitting people with opposing ideologies against each other in direct contact. 
Additionally, New York City is, by some measures, the most diverse city on the planet 
(http://elalliance.org/), particularly in terms of migrant communities.  
Because this work is looking at cross-cultural differences, care should be taken to capture 
the historical impact of immigration on New York City as an example of how multiculturalism 
might operate at the psychological level.  One aspect of multiculturalism is how individuals and 
communities negotiate identities and cultural practices between cultural influences from the 
heritage culture (e.g. Italy) and the host culture (e.g. the US). While it is expected that an 
immigrant maintains a shared identity with the heritage country, acculturation studies have tried 
to understand how specific groups identities shift over multiple generations, although few 
account for the types of extreme multiculturalism found in modern-day NYC (Ali, 2016; 
http://elalliance.org/). NYC has many people who are some combination of: immigrants, children 
of immigrants, and descendants of immigrants whose families have lived in this country for 5 or 
more generations (such as descendants from Irish, Italian, English, Scottish, and German 
immigrants who migrated to the United States in the 19th Century and who may not feel very 
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strong ties to the countries from which their ancestors emigrated) (“United States Census Bureau 
QuickFacts Richmond County (Staten Island Borough), New York”).  
Despite feeling disconnected or not knowing their cultural roots explicitly, people whose 
families have been in the US for multiple generations may still have picked up cultural norms 
from their parents and grandparents, even after generations during which their families were 
living in the USA. It is also an empirical question of how well people do know their heritage 
background after generations living in the USA, and how those identities, shaped in other places, 
are transmitted through generations. For example, it is well documented that Italian Americans 
often identify with particular city-regions from which their ancestors originated and Italian 
Americans often settled and associated only with others of their same city-origin, creating 
enclaves around New York City that belie the idea that a unified, nationalistic heritage origin of 
“Italian American” is the primary identity of Americans of Sicilian, Neapolitan, Calabrian, or 
Barresi descent (Luconi, 2004). 
Structure.  
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I will review some constructs that have been found by 
previous researchers to predict voting patterns, including measures of sexism, knowledge of 
current politics, authoritarianism, and demographics such as race, gender and immigration status 
(Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewska & Winiewski, 2017). Additionally, some researchers (Louis, 
Esses & Lalonde, 2013) have proposed that underlying fear of immigrants has been found to 
predict anti-immigrant voting patterns. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the immediate environment in which the transmission of 
cultural values occurs, especially those that might contribute to our voting decisions: the 
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family.  One of the strongest predictors that social scientists have found that predict voting 
decisions emerged from an intersection of political science studies of political systems 
converging with developmental theories of parenting, suggesting that the relationships and 
values we hold about the family system end up writ large across the political decisions and 
structures of our society. 
 Chapter 2 will look at the literature on the emerging science of how digital worlds are 
(re)shaping our political systems, from how they provide intercontinental cultural exchanges to 
how social media has been weaponized as a cybertool to shape and drive votes through values, 
misinformation (fake news) and creating self-isolating filter bubbles through both algorithms and 
our own preferences. These theories are starting to be addressed by a set of educational theories 
called New Media Literacies, aimed at measuring how people process digital information such as 
news, how it shapes their views and values, and what educational interventions can do to 
enhance critical consumption of information on the wild frontiers of the internet where 
information is unvetted by publishers, newspapers, universities or other institutions dedicated to 
the verification of things disseminated on a mass scale.   
Chapter 3 elaborates on some of the theories attempting to understand the dimensions of 
societal organization structures that exist around the globe, usually represented in research as 
dichotomies (although this is limiting). We will focus on the history of the dichotomy of 
individualism and collectivism. This spectrum began as a way for Europeans to capture their 
own sense of difference from other regions of the world, particularly East Asia, and yet has 
continually and productively intrigued researchers as a framework for characterizing cultural 
dimensions: this framework was initially referred to as individualism and collectivism, but later 
was renamed and reworked into various other dichotomies with different underlying theoretical 
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assumptions.  The variations are of an ecological nature, specifically attempting to explain how a 
group of people organizes itself and the psychological constructs perpetuate those principles of 
self-organization. One main proposal, which is novel to this dissertation, is that these 
organizational differences provide ecologies which shape voting patterns, over and above 
extreme multicultural contact in communities like New York City. 
In Chapter 4, I will review theories of how culture shapes values, and how cultural values 
can change because of ecological bidirectional pressures to discuss how cultural values, afforded 
by the ecologies of different American communities, may be shaping voting decisions. This 
ecological perspective is especially crucial when trying to understand voting decisions in 
multicultural contexts where the different members have come together from a multitude of 
diasporas and transnational origins, as well as different political backgrounds.  
In Chapter 5, I will begin to integrate the work summarized in chapter 1 and in chapters 3 
and 4, pulling together political science predictors of voting patterns, developmental theory about 
parenting styles, and adding in the thread of culture, ecologies and cross-cultural differences to 
our discussion of voting preferences and their predictors. 
In Chapter 6, I move on to addressing how identities lead us to prefer certain candidates 
over others, and how threats to our identity may be driving forces that override other concerns, 
such as our own political interests. This is particularly essential to analyzing voting decisions as 
a product of culture in multicultural environments where people have multiple identities based 
on race, national heritage, and gender, providing a tension between the identity of the heritage 
country or countries and the identity of the destination.  
 In Chapter 7, I will review acculturation theory and how work on this theory can 
contribute to a discussion of how identities and values shape our voting decisions. Acculturation 
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theories view the process of immigrants changing their cultures towards an “American” norm 
after migrating from a heritage country to a destination country. Acculturation models frame the 
heritage culture’s influence on a person as one that attenuates as the host culture grows and takes 
over the more generations there are in between the person and their most recent ancestor from 
the heritage culture. Acculturation research usually finds that by the third generation, immigrants 
have “Americanized,” thoroughly (Berry, 2005; Berry & Sabatier, 2010), but the current 
dissertation project proposes that this is not the case. Instead, while some aspects do change, and 
while surface-level identities are acquired, deeper cultural values are maintained, demonstrating 
the resistance of cultural patterns to change in transnational contexts. In fact, I propose that 
people maintain transnational contacts based on their heritage identities over many generations, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, while also participating in the larger “American” culture 
— this applies to Americans of European descent as well. Finally, I propose that these heritage 
values may have an impact on voting decisions just as other cultural influences will also have an 
impact, despite assimilation claims. 
In Chapter 8, I will discuss some of the complexities of America as a society of 
immigrants through the lens of contact theory. NYC has diversity not just in cultures but also in 
generations, with recent immigrants (referred to herein as Zeroth Generation), as well as 10th 
generation or descendants of pre-revolutionary immigrants. In New York City, issues are never 
as simple as two groups negotiating how to coexist, but expand across dimensions including 
immigration statuses, languages, heritage countries, religions, political, and class differences. 
Then there are mixed families: mixed race, inter-ethnic, mixed religion, or any mix of the 
dimensions of diversity. In addition to all of this, there are the standard-issue nationwide 
diversity topics of tolerance of disability status, developmental/age differences, gender, gender 
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identity, and sexual orientation that occur across every other dimension of difference. This 
complexity provides an almost inundating amount of complexity to account for, tempered only 
by the focus on one critical lens, the moral-political decision of who to vote for on November 8th, 
2016.  
 In Chapter 9, all the threads introduced in will begin to draw together as the details of the 
methodology are presented in Chapter 9, Methods, Chapter 10, Results, and Chapter 11, 
Discussion. Finally, I will end with a conclusion and discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the current research in Chapter 12.  
Research Questions 
Research Question 1: What best predicts voting preferences? 
What are the best predictors for modeling the values that explain voting preferences in 
the 2016 election?  
1a: I hypothesize that constructs identified in previous research, including 
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and hostile sexism, will replicate as predictors of 
voting preferences in the 2016 election. 
1b: I hypothesize that certain roles and experiences, such as being non-white, being an 
immigrant, and being a woman, will align voter preferences with liberal policies.  
Research Question 2: New predictors of voting preferences: Deepening our 
understanding of the role of old and new culture. 
 While authoritarianism and sexism have been found in prior research to predict voting 
preferences, there are larger theoretical questions which are driving the current research. Why 
are some people more authoritarian and sexist? Answers to this question provide both basic 
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scientific knowledge about the nature of decision making and prejudice, but also actionable 
recommendations for how to redress these issues in our society. Starting from a standpoint that 
most drivers underlying voting preferences are shaped by the values of those around us, or our 
culture(s), I make two hypotheses about the role of culture in the 2016 election. 
2a: I hypothesize that values from the heritage cultures of current Americans will shape 
people’s voting preferences, even in geographical separation from the heritage culture’s original 
environment. 
2b: I hypothesize that media literacy will play a role in voting preferences through 
people’s sense of agency in searching out solutions to current problems, and their capacity to 
accommodate corrective information to misinformation. 
Research Question 3: The Melting Pot Myth: The role of heritage culture in the 
shaping of multigenerational transnational identities. 
Is the myth of the Americanization/Assimilation/Acculturation overemphasized? 
Acculturation research assumes a gradual diminishment and vanishing of heritage culture 
through the process of assimilation over multiple generations. What connections do people have 
to their heritages, even after many generations? How are their heritage values reflected in their 
voting habits?  
How many Americans know about their cultural origins explicitly and to what degree of 
specificity? I predict that at least half of multi-generational Americans will be able to name their 
heritage cultures and nations, and at least a third will be able to name heritage cities. 
Acculturation research predicts full assimilation with no cultural differences after about three 
generations (Berry, 2005).  
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3a: I hypothesize that ethnic identity plays a long-term role in the identity of most 
Americans. 
3b: I hypothesize that in the absence of an ethnic identity, people adopt an alternate 
identity, such as race. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I gave an overview of what topics will be covered in this dissertation. 
First, I gave a statement of the overall problem, followed by a rationale for having conducted this 
research. I then gave a detailed summary of the topics that will be covered in each chapter and 
how they related to the overarching topic and rationale. I explained my rationale for using the 
sample population which was selected for this research and then stated my 3 main research 
questions. In the next chapter, we will begin a more detailed look at the literature that has 
previously looked at some of these questions, starting with the literature that has examined the 
central research question of this dissertation: what predicts voting preferences. 
 
  
21 
 
1. What Predicts Voting Decisions: The Intersection of Parenting Styles and 
Politics 
Authoritarianism 
In the Aaron Sorkin political drama from 1998-2004, The West Wing, a democratic 
candidate is frustrated by how the issues important to him are not driving up polling numbers.  
The chief of the campaign explains about the “mommy problem”: “When voters want a national 
daddy, someone tough and strong, they vote Republican.  When they want a mommy to give 
them jobs, health care policy equivalent of matzo-ball soup, they vote Democratic,” (Attie, 
2005). 
As we saw above, the Mommy Problem has gone from West Wing fantasy to reality in 
the 2016 election. As is often the case with the West Wing, life followed art so precisely, that the 
writers’ intuitive joke of calling it the “Mommy Problem” relates, all too literally, to 
psychological research on parenting styles (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). 
Authoritarianism is a psychological construct which was successfully used as a predictor 
of who would vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 election (Taub, 2016), and has been used as a 
predictor for conservative voting for the past three decades. It began as an answer to 
understanding how democracies voted fascist leaders into power during the 20th century, but it 
may be unknown because the measures designed to capture it focused on statements endorsing 
fascism. Finally, one researcher (Feldman, 2003) connected authoritarianism in politics, known 
as authoritarianism to developmental research on parenting styles (such as Baumrind, 1991; 
Maccoby, 1992), suggesting that the root of that desire to vote for a fascist was in a general 
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belief about strong, controlling authority figures which would also be evident in people’s ideals 
for parenting authority.  
Feldman (2003) then took this inter-disciplinary idea and created a 4-item scale, which 
was used to predict Trump’s election in March 2016 (MacWilliams, 2016a; Taub, 2016). In the 
political context of the 2016 election, authoritarianism is generally used to capture attitudes of a) 
desire for order, and b) a fear of outsiders.  
The scale that predicted this outcome includes four questions, each with two forced 
choice answers that ask things like: “Please tell me which one you think is more important for a 
child to have: obedience or self-reliance?” MacWilliams, a graduate student who was doing 
research on the prevalence of authoritarian parenting styles among African Americans, pondered 
the surprising results of the Republican primaries and caucuses. As far back as 2009, researchers 
Hetherington and Weiler (2016) realized that the GOP, by positioning itself as the party of 
traditional values and law and order, had unknowingly aligned itself with a large, bipartisan 
swath of Americans with authoritarian tendencies. 
MacWilliams shows how African American culture has staunch authoritarian tendencies, 
which have developed out of, he claims, ecologies of oppression that favored authoritarian 
parenting techniques in promoting survival (2016b). According to MacWilliams, African 
Americans make their decision to vote, or abstain, based on psychological tensions between, a) 
policies aimed at reducing racism and oppression of African Americans, which usually align 
their vote with the Democrats, or b) authoritarian tendencies, meaning that the GOP could easily 
convert African American voters by eliminating racist policies from its platform. 
 Social Dominance Orientation and Latent Authoritarianism 
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MacWilliams’s (2016) findings offered a context in which to explore the interaction 
between the political realities of a group of Americans and how their conceptualization of 
authority, at a cultural level, may lead to internal tensions when at the ballot box. MacWilliams 
focused on these tensions within the African American cultural community. His research shows 
how parenting attitudes, as exemplars of how a community conceptualizes of and enacts 
authority, are integral to our political viewpoints, like the joke about the “Mommy Problem.” 
Other research has done so previously, identifying an interaction between the perception of threat 
and what has been termed “latent authoritarianism,” (Stenner, 2005). As Jonathan Haidt sums up: 
“In case of moral threat, lock down the borders, kick out those who are different, and punish 
those who are morally deviant.”  The idea of punishing those who are morally deviant is highly 
related to descriptions of a “tight” society, where there are complex rules in place to guide 
behavior and adherence to norms is strongly enforced (Gelfand et al., 2011). In a “tight” society, 
norm-violators receive strong punishments such as ostracization, or worse, and they are 
considered a threat to the flourishing of the community’s cohesion and functionality.  In a related 
sense, the most treasured qualities for authoritarians are those which reduce chaos and bring 
order to the world through structured hierarchies that are protective. Hetherington and Suhay 
(2011) found a distinction between physical threats such as terrorism, which could lead non-
authoritarians to behave like authoritarians, and more abstract social threats, such as eroding 
social norms or demographic changes, which do not drive authoritarianism but do cause a similar 
type of reaction referred to as Social Dominance Orientation (Taub, 2016; Thomsen et al., 2010). 
Social dominance orientation (SDO), or a preference for hierarchical social structures wherein 
some groups wield power over others and has tied authoritarian beliefs and SDO to feelings of 
threat (Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewska & Winiewski, 2017; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Thomsen et 
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al., 2010). However, while research on voters who endorsed Brexit in the UK were found to 
independently believe in both authoritarian values and social dominance hierarchies, it is 
possible that social dominance can also present as a facet of authoritarianism, where the 
relationship between these two constructs is more tightly overlapping in other cultural contexts 
such as the USA.  
Understanding factors that contribute to discriminatory attitudes is crucial for developing 
interventions to promote greater acceptance of diversity. Prior literature has tied authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation to prejudicial, anti-immigrant sentiments, and documented the 
activation of both by perceived threats to different aspects of the self, but few clear 
recommendations for how to target anti-immigrant attitudes have emerged. Although contact 
with diverse others often predicts reduced prejudice, in some contexts, contact may spark fear 
and resentment leading to heightened anti-immigrant attitudes. Stereotypes about Latin@ 
immigrants “taking jobs from Americans” or Muslims and Syrian refugees being “terrorists” 
may activate latent authoritarian sentiments, provoking anti-immigrant attitudes by distributing 
the fear of specific criminal behaviors on whole demographics. For example, some of the current 
political rhetoric seeks to distribute fear of terrorism by attributing it to Muslims or Arabs as a 
group, rather than focusing fear of terrorism on the individuals who carry out acts of terrorism. 
By repeatedly suggesting that all Muslims are terrorists, some politicians are seeking to use fear 
to activate authoritarian tendencies, ignoring the fact that some of the most serious terrorist acts 
in the history of this country have been committed by people with no connections to Islam — e.g. 
the Sandy Hook shooting of 2012 (Esposito, Smith & Ng, 2012), the Oklahoma City bombing in 
1995 (Thomas, 1997) or the Las Vegas shootings of 2017 (Bui, Zapotosky, Barrett & Berman, 
2017). 
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Research on attitudes towards immigrants has homed in on other determinants of 
prejudice, in addition to authoritarian beliefs, such as social dominance orientation. These 
findings have been replicated across cultures. However, discussions about whether 
authoritarianism and SDO are inherited, unchangeable personality traits, culturally entrained 
beliefs, or early predispositions that contribute to the development of beliefs (Altemeyer, 1998; 
Duckitt, 2001) highlight the danger of considering authoritarianism or SDO as personality 
characteristics that lead invariably to racism, because this implies that large regions of the United 
States, and most white people, are irrevocably racist. To view a large group this way is to scuttle 
opportunities to effect change that might be productive, both in terms of electoral math and 
societal progress. To view prejudice as learned is to hope that there are actionable pathways to 
remedy the situation in the future, although it can also lead to reductionist ideas that 
conservatives simply lack education, which is an oversimplification (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg 
& McKee, 2017). 
Some researchers have suggested that many people are latent authoritarians, holding 
underlying viewpoints of the world that people should behave in predictable ways, only 
demonstrating their authoritarian beliefs when circumstances make them feel threatened 
(Hetherington & Weiler, 2016). In the case of the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit 
vote, the spate of terrorist attacks coupled with the remarkable leaps of progress made to change 
social norms (awarding rights and respect to LGTBQ individuals, and creating pathways to 
citizenship for undocumented immigrants, or even attempting to break glass ceilings such as 
installing a woman in the white house as President) could create psychological discomfort that 
provoked a shift within people towards authoritarianism, where social change alone might have 
been tolerated, or terrorism alone, but not both together. 
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Case Study: Fear Underlies Authoritarianism and SDO, but Fear of Whom? 
A careful examination of diversity is also relevant when considering how attitudes 
towards different groups may differ. Here we selected a case-study to use as an example of this 
type of analysis: in studying anti-immigrant prejudices, researchers have typically considered 
attitudes towards “immigrants” and “refugees” generally or by specifying one group, often 
Muslims (e.g., Berg, 2015; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Crowson & Brandes, 2017; Esses, Medianu 
& Lawson, 2013; Pettigrew, 2017; Tannenbaum et al., 2015, Thomsen et al., 2008). However, 
dominant in-groups have varying attitudes towards different minorities depending on the national 
context in which the groups live. For example, Whites in the US may have a hierarchy of threat, 
preferring to limit immigration from Latin America before Asia (Alba, Rumbaut & Marotz, 
2005), but this research was likely done with data that predates 2001, the fulcrum point at which 
high-profile anti-Muslim sentiment exploded across the media. In the US, prior to 2001, anti-
immigrant rhetoric may have been most heavily focused on migrants arriving from Latin 
America due to the geography and political history of the United States, which is more accessible 
to migrants from Latin America. Europe, on the other hand, is more accessible to immigrants 
from Muslim-majority countries in the Near East, Far East Asia and North Africa. Therefore, 
researchers in European countries and Australia have been primarily concerned with rising anti-
Muslim sentiments (see Abu-Rayya & White, 2010; Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewska & 
Winiewski, 2017; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke & Buxant, 
2009). Since 9/11, however, Muslims in the US have increasingly become targets of anti-
immigrant sentiments due to decreasing stability in the Middle East, which has fostered violent 
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terrorists who target not only their own countries but also Western nations in shocking, high-
profile attacks on civilians which may activate latent authoritarian. 
Most previous research on anti-immigrant sentiment, authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation (SDO) has examined dynamics between Americans and “Immigrants” 
(non-specifically), or perhaps between Whites and a specific immigrant group. However, a study 
by Craig and Richeson artfully compared Americans’ attitudes (84% Whites from a Midwestern 
University) towards immigration policies in the US to immigration policies in Israel and 
Singapore and found that SDO predicted anti-immigrant attitudes in all scenarios whereas 
authoritarianism only predicted anti-immigrant sentiment in the policies which affect domestic 
US policies. Similarly, Thomsen et al., found that Whites with stronger SDO ideologies 
perceived more victimization from Latinos than did Latinos from Whites, or Whites with low 
SDO, suggesting that one mechanism of SDO is to perceive the other group as a threat (2010). 
Despite a few exceptions, little research has examined what might motivate reactions to 
different immigrant groups within the United States – as mentioned above, most papers with 
anti-Muslim specificity used samples in the EU or Australia, not in the US. While racial 
Whiteness has been used as a predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes in many studies, there are 
other demographic qualities, such as whether one is an immigrant oneself, which may be equally 
important.  
Methodological Note 
A methodological issue that has been unaddressed in previous research is whether 
participants are answering survey items as they think researchers want them to, possibly because 
of shame in their beliefs or fear of criticism or judgment. In two major recent votes, Brexit in the 
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UK, and the election of Donald Trump in America, the polls seemed to fail to capture existing 
sentiments, leading to outcomes that had been rated with low probabilities. Subsequent research 
demonstrated connections between authoritarianism and social dominance and both the Brexit 
vote and the election of Donald Trump. Yet ongoing research into authoritarianism and its 
relationship to prejudice have mostly failed to include measures of social desirability as a control 
variable (e.g., Bilewicz et al., 2017; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; 
Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Louis, Esses & Lalonde, 2013), although some have addressed the 
issue, even in very early research (Batson, Naifeh & Pate, 1978). It is worth considering that all 
self-report research on sensitive issues should include social desirability checks. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed a summary of the history of development, theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical findings of research from sociology, political science and 
psychology which has attempted to identify the underlying psychological constructs that are 
driving voting behavior, including authoritarianism and social dominance, and their relationship 
to fear. 
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2. New Media Literacy, False News, Social Media, and the 2016 Election 
False News and the Bubble 
Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018) have been able to show that false news travels greater 
distances, with greater velocity, and becomes more entrenched then fact-based news by 
surveying the trajectories of 126,000 stories retweeted on Twitter between 2006 and 2017. This 
piece of data confirms our worst fears about the 2016 election, that false news stories can be 
disseminated through the mechanism of people sharing them on social media. However, people 
have previously treated the dissemination of misinformation as a problem of simple 
misinformation, whereas the information impacts the minds of the humans who consume it, 
altering beliefs or re-enforcing them, and interacting with people’s natural tendencies to accept 
or reject information depending on the authority they invest in the source and the threat that the 
new information provides to their identities. At the heart of this topic is the nature of democracy. 
The internet has brought us closer to a true democracy than ever before in history: a world where 
there are fewer inhibitions to the dissemination of information across large swathes of population 
due to the removal of cost of distribution (i.e. from printing on paper). 
As far back as 1998, before Twitter, Facebook, the iPhone and even before Google (by 
four months), researchers were concerned about the way information was being disseminated in 
digital spaces. Some early data scientists were optimistic that “the Net,” as it was called back 
then, would democratize information, wresting it away from elites and putting it in the hands of 
the people, who would build a utopian community with it. Others feared that populists, as they 
were called even back then, would erode the control of information flow by journalists, 
newspapers, and political parties (Bimber, 1998) in a way that would restructure the foundations 
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of our society. Today, we no longer ask somebody to look something up, we ask them to 
“Google” it, (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). We no longer use programs on our computers, 
we use apps. The lexicon has been changed by the burgeoning use of the internet and the mobile 
devices through which we access it (Lenhart et al., 2015; Rideout, 2015). In this environment, 
where children and adolescents who are alive today have grown up with no memory of pre-
digital, pre-touchscreen days, where youth rely on social interactions through digital, social 
medias, there is no evidence of systemic instruction in how to safely consume information 
gleaned from the internet and social media across the country (Powers, 2017). 
News Media Literacies 
While most research on media literacy in children and adolescents has focused on the 
risks of the internet from porn, privacy, and cyber-bullying (Powers, 2017), there is increasing 
concern about the way that information masquerading as fact is consumed, and the strength of 
people’s able to critically winnow reliable information from the chaff of false news. This is 
termed media literacy, or sometimes new media literacy (e.g. Literat, 2014) or news media 
literacy (e.g. Hornik & Kajimoto, 2014), to distinguish it from research on older forms of 
communication.  
There is little consensus on how best to measure if someone has it, and even less on what 
“it” exactly is (Powers, Brodsky, Blumberg & Brooks, 2018), other than the ability not to get 
bamboozled by online information. Renee Hobbs has proposed that media literacy taps three 
different abilities: the ability to identify the motivations of authors to persuade, the power of their 
messages to express intentional points of view, and the way that messages can present altered 
information through the omission or phrasing of that information (Hobbs, 2006). 
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Growing bodies of research suggest that mere exposure to the internet, like mere 
exposure to diverse others, is insufficient to develop critical thinking about information 
disseminated on the internet (Powers et al., 2018). Educational initiatives are needed, like that 
developed by Stonybrook University’s News Literacy curriculum, which was designed to 
increase news literacy, civic engagement, and improve the quality of media consumption 
(Weber, 2012). 
One thing that is notable when reading research on media literacy is that no researchers 
view media literacy as one thing. Instead it is usually conceptualized of as a combination of self-
report of one’s beliefs about one’s ability to detect unreliable information with tasks that directly 
measure behaviors (Literat, 2014; Powers, 2017; Weber, 2012), as inconsistencies between self-
report measures and behavioral tasks have been found in previous research (Powers et al., 2018). 
Educating students in New Media Literacy (NML, or media literacy for new medias) is 
crucial, not only to the development of critical thinking skills but to protect democracy. Two 
national studies, one in the US (Stanford History Education Group, 2016) and one in the UK 
(OFCOM, 2016) have demonstrated that many students, from elementary school to college, 
struggle to evaluate the quality of information widely available on the internet. The stakes of 
teaching students to parse cues that reveal how information is generated and stored have never 
been higher than in the current era of viral, false news, yet measuring NML skills is still a 
science in its infancy, with many researchers attempting to generate measures that will accurately 
assess critical NML skills.  
NML draws from both prior media literacy research and from other educational domains 
which target goals such as critical thinking (Fleming, 2014; Hobbs, 2013; Weber, 2012). 
Although assessment of and education in NML is rooted in educational goals of improving 
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student critical thinking, information processing skills, and metacognitive awareness, NML has 
often been relegated to schools of journalism (Weber, 2012), rather than explicitly included in 
mainstream educational goals. There is little evidence that explicit instruction about the internet 
and social media use exists in US schools. For example, despite documents like the Social Media 
Guidelines provided by the New York City Department of Education (NYC DOE, 2013), there is 
no mandate that requires its use in NYC schools. 
In addition to the lack of explicit and systematic teaching about media literacy in schools, 
researchers have found that people often react to corrective information debunking false beliefs 
by increasing their belief in erroneous stories (Jern, 2014; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Slater and 
Rouner, 1996, Tillema, 2000). Effective media literacy training, rooted in accurate assessment of 
NML, may help students avoid feedback loops wherein initial acceptance of erroneous 
information limits their openness to accurate new information. 
Conclusion 
 Many Americans, and people from all over the world have become concerned about the 
role of new technologies in our lives, especially the consumption of information that is organized 
by the democratic principles of the internet. Information used to be controlled more by elites and 
specific organizations whose mandate and responsibility it was to vet information – publishing 
houses, newspapers, academia. Now, the internet has allowed anyone to put their thoughts out 
there, including those with nefarious intent. The result of this naturalistic experiment is that 
nefarious interests are out there, disseminating false news, and most people help that 
misinformation spread (Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, 2018). While many researchers have sought to 
frame this problem in terms of education and literacies, it is yet to be determined whether 
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targeted media literacy education can improve circumstances. It is also yet to be determined how 
the spread of misinformation reinforces people’s preconceived prejudicial notions, or whether it 
can be used as a tool to reduce prejudice. In short, the internet is clearly a tool of democracy, and 
has the power to alter or reinforce the beliefs of large swathes of people, suggesting that it is a 
pathway for the dissemination of cultural values, not just simple information.  
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3. Dimensions and Measurement of Cultural Variation in Society’s Self-
Organization 
Ecology is a term used to indicate that an organism in an environment interacts with the 
environment and that there is a bidirectional influence between organism and environment, such 
that the ecology is dependent on the presence of both. While individual people live in their 
cultural environments, culture itself exists in a larger ecological macro-context subject to 
ecological pressures (Mufwene, 2001). If we consider culture at this level, we can see how there 
are dimensions that can capture the types of variability possible between cultures in differing 
contexts and with differing histories such that some variables operate like a continuum along 
which a culture can vary. Just as a person may have high openness, a culture may have high 
individualism.  Many researchers have proposed alternative concepts around which to base their 
continuums. In this chapter, I will summarize some of the spectrums that researchers have 
identified for understanding cultural-level variability.  
The spectrums can have differing names according to different theories, although many 
of them have a great deal of overlap. On the other hand, researchers using the same names 
sometimes have different conceptualizations. Additionally, constructs with similar names are 
often measured differently, and so, in many ways, may lack any reasonable assumption of 
equivalency. Understanding the theoretical overlap and differences between constructs is 
important in understanding how these constructs may be operating as cultural shapers of values 
that lead to voting decisions.  
Research shows that culture tends to be discernibly different when measured at the level 
of countries or nations, but some researchers have called into question the reason for these 
differences. Greenfield has pointed out that cultural differences may result from ecological 
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structures in which a culture exists, such as high population density, urban environments versus 
low population density rural environments. Park, Joo, Quiroz and Greenfield added that socio-
demographics may be confounded with empirically identified national-level differences (2015). 
In other words, the context of one person — such as living in a household where three generations 
cohabit — can shape their values separately from culture. There can also be variation in the 
expression of individualistic and collectivistic values within a person, elicited by the demand 
characteristics of the context in which they are in at a given moment (e.g. at school or at home). 
One of the most intriguing thoughts that emerges from reading Park et al. is that heritage cultures 
can resist ecological changes on the cultural, family or individual level if the heritage values 
confer adaptive advantages. Is it possible that there is something about the American context 
which makes preserving heritage cultural differences an advantage? For example, by maintaining 
heritage cultural differences, people can connect with sub-communities in large urban American 
cities, providing them with a network of support and an identity. Even the quality of otherness 
can be a source of inspiration for new ideas that may be valuable to members of other cultures. 
In addition to intrapersonal and inter-contextual cultural variation within a heritage 
cultural group or within a nation, there can also be macroscopic cultural patterns measurable at 
the national level. These macroscopic patterns may be held together by the laws and government 
at the national level. One possible explanation for cohesion at the national level is that laws and 
institutions within a given country operate in a given way, ecologically shaping the way that 
culture operates. Conversely, the culture of a nation must be homogenous enough to allow for 
the formation of laws. Countries that lack this consensus may fail to maintain their legal 
cohesion (e.g. Yugoslavia). Another reason could be that groups that live in proximal contact 
with one another or share dimensions of identity, such as religious affiliations, may endorse 
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similar values, and therefore laws, and therefore, emerge with somewhat similar ecologies, and 
therefore cultures. These shared cultures can be geographically dispersed and transnational, such 
as shared values among Catholics in Ireland, the US or in Spain.  Or these shared values can 
connect us through languages such as when Anglophone countries, such as the US, the UK, 
Australia and South Africa have high individualism scores (Hofstede, 1983) and yet are 
distributed across four continents.  
While there has been a great deal of focus on the individualism/collectivism divide 
between East Asia and the European-derived West, it is notable to remember that empirical 
measures of individualism have identified some of the strongest exemplars of national-level 
collectivism in South America, whereas Japan and South Korea have been undergoing cultural 
shifts towards collectivism in recent decades, just as the US underwent a shift towards 
individualism during the Industrial Revolution (Greenfield, 2013). In the paragraphs below, I 
will briefly summarize some spectrums used for cultural comparison, and address how each 
might be related to voting preferences. 
Hofstede 
One of the earliest researchers who worked on identifying dimensions of cultural 
variation is Geert Hofstede, a Dutch psychologist who began his work in the late 1960s, who is 
most notable for developing cultural dimensions theory. Using the nation as the unit of analysis, 
and norming his original work using industrial/organizational samples from the same large 
multinational corporation (IBM Computers), Hofstede identified six dimensions of cultural 
variation along which national cultures vary independently, each dimension operating freely of 
the other dimensions, and taken together, providing a profile of the culture. The six dimensions 
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are: Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, Long Term 
Orientation, and Indulgence vs. Restraint.  Those who are familiar with the popular idea of 
individualism as a dichotomy that splits East from West may notice that only the word 
Individualism is used here, and that its usage is not accidental, but stems from the fact that 
Hofstede measured individualism and its absence, not the presence of collectivism.   
Hofstede initiated research on categorizing cultures as varying along a spectrum, and 
while there are critiques of his work, a long line of scholarship has emerged from the idea that 
societies encode their principles of self-organization and cohesion in cultural values, and that 
these values create a deep structure (Greenfield, 2009).  This deep structure could be shaping 
overall preferences and values which are related to our expectations for how our government 
should be run, and this may have an impact on voting preferences. One question I hope to 
address in this dissertation is whether a culture is passed down over generations, or whether a 
culture is something that is always defined by the ecologies in which it currently exists. 
Critiques of Hofstede and Other Early Research on Individualism and Collectivism 
The Three Fallacies 
Hofstede measured the degree to which Individualism was present in the organizational 
structures of workplaces in different countries around the world, but he did not seek to measure 
what was there in its absence. The lack of a complimentary, opposing construct in the structure 
of Hofstede’s theory has been criticized by subsequent researchers, and is a possible limitation of 
his work. This limitation, along with critiques by Brendan Sweeney (Heffernan, Morrison, Basu 
& Sweeney, 2010), point out that Hofstede may have participated in three of the main fallacies 
associated with cultural dichotomization: Essentialism, Racialization, and Determinism. 
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The fallacy of essentialism refers to the idea that if you view culture as deterministic, you 
may assume that it defines a person’s essence or essentialize them. Racialization is a fallacy that 
assumes that genetic population differences — detectable via visible phylogenetic physical 
differences in appearance (e.g. skin color, shapes of facial features) — are the cause of group 
differences rather than cultural differences.  The problem with racialization is that people have 
evolved distinctive physical differences in geographic isolation, and it is very difficult to be 
treated as an insider in many cultures when you neither look like the local population, nor have a 
known history as descended from the local population.  Even if a person grew up in one of the 
cultures, the other members of the culture might be likely to treat them as an outsider from birth, 
meaning that their enculturation experiences would be different from that of a person genetically 
embedded in the culture. Racialization is the idea that race is a thing internal to a person, rather 
than a perceptual cue which, over time and historical circumstance, has led one group of similar-
looking people to treat another group differently, so that each group develops a self-concept as 
distinct from one another within one society (Arnett, 2003).  
The fallacy of determinism is that people have used culture to predict outcomes as if it 
defines someone else and they cannot escape.  The deterministic fallacy (McSweeney, 2013) 
questions how powerful cultural values are in predicting outcomes - among the things which they 
fail to take into consideration are personality differences that might lead to greater or weaker 
resistance to following norms, and only account for a few percent of the variance between 
cultures.  
These fallacies are important in exploring the role of culture and the role of various 
segments of our population in making voting decisions. My theoretical perspective is that 
cultural tendencies towards conservation compete with ecological pressures in changing the 
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overall nature of a culture, and that within this large-scale tug-of-war there are many other 
dimensions of intersectionality in our identities that may play a role in voting preferences and 
even in the expression of “cultural” variables. Likewise, variables which have been attributed to 
personality factors may have more of a cultural role than expected, a proposition which needs 
further empirical testing. 
Triandis: Adding Collectivism and a Vertical/Horizontal Dimension 
Triandis objected to the lack of theoretical specificity or operational definitions of either 
individualism or collectivism in previous research, as well as the lack of existing measures’ 
ability to measure orientations to individualism/collectivism at the level of a single psyche.  He 
has contributed a lot of work to the field of cultural psychology by trying to flesh out the 
concepts and measures of individualism and collectivism. Triandis integrated a second 
dimension of cross-cultural variation: in addition to individualism and collectivism, he 
constructed his scale to also measure tolerance for inequality, which he characterized as a 
spectrum where high tolerance for inequality, or verticality, was at one end and an emphasis on 
equality, or Horizontality, were at the other end (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Hofstede, by way of 
comparison, created four and later added two more dimensions of cultural variability including 
one called Individualism, and another called Power-Distance (Hofstede, 1983; 2003). Power-
Distance also aims to capture how a society tolerates hierarchical inequality. Like Hofstede, 
Triandis sought to characterize the constructs that clustered together to form an individualistic 
society rather than a collectivistic one. Unlike Hostede, Triandis paid attention to defining 
collectivism actively, rather than passively as the absence of individualism.  
Subsequent researchers have raised the point that these constructs are considered to be 
spectrums because of nothing more than the fact that one occurs in China and the other in the US 
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(Taras et al., 2014), and somehow calling it a spectrum creates a sense of universality in the 
expression of the human psyche through culture. However, others have asked the following 
question: perhaps individualism and collectivism represent two independent constructs? Taras et 
al. describe how different groups of researchers can be categorized into two groups: researchers 
who view individualism and collectivism as a single bi-dimensional spectrum, and those in the 
family of Triandis and Gelfand (1998) or Markus and Kitayama (1991) who conceptualize of the 
two as orthogonal. 
Triandis knitted concepts from previous theories into his definition of individualism.  For 
Triandis, then, Individualism is defined as: a sense of personal identity (Erikson), self-
actualization (Maslow), internal locus of control (Rotter), and post-conventional principled moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg) (Triandis, 1995). This last comment should be noted, as there is clear 
enmeshing between Kohlberg’s post-conventional morality and westernized culture - particularly 
individualism - already noted as far back as the 1980s (Hofstede, 1988; Tamai & Lee, 2002).  
Triandis also points out that all humans live in groups, but the way the person responds to 
the group and its needs may differ, such that individualists may have more in-group identities 
with less loyalty to any given in-group, dropping and switching if the cost becomes higher, 
where a collectivist would tolerate much greater cost before abandoning the in-group (Hui 
&Triandis, 1985). Triandis must be given credit for ascribing positive meaning to collectivism 
rather than leaving members of societies which have value-patterns of more collectivistic 
behaviors in a vacuum as “other,” subject to being racialized, essentialized, and determined. 
Markus and Kitayama: Independence/Interdependence 
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Markus and Kitayama (1991; 2003; 2014) proposed a spectrum called 
Independence/Interdependence. Both Hofstede and Triandis were raised in individualistic 
cultures and their theories and the way those theories are described is individualistic. Markus and 
Kitayama departed from this tradition by incorporating in the theoretical design, the research 
team, and its inspiration, perspectives from people who grew up in collectivistic environments.  
Another departure was to structure their theory around self-construals, based on identity and self-
perceptions. By centralizing their theory on self-perceptions, they attempt to avoid the fallacy of 
essentializing the “other.” Their theory attempts to explain how one orients and positions oneself 
in the group, as a single unit or as an interdependent member of the group. This theory added 
significantly more psychological explanation to how the spectrum worked at the level of the 
person and their internal mental states.  
Specifically, the conceptual orientation of independence and interdependence has to do 
with the view of the self in the group, either emphasizing separateness (independence) or 
connectedness (interdependence).  These self-construals are assumed to align with individualism 
and collectivism such that individualistic cultures will have people whose self-construal is more 
likely to be independent (Singelis, 1994). Their theory addresses the question of how the values 
of a culture bind and order society and encourage and coordinate prosocial behavior. How are 
they experienced and enacted by members of a culture?  
If Neisser’s (1988) theory is from the perspective of the individual looking out at their 
position relative to others, and Bronfenbrenner’s is perhaps looking down on the person as they 
are situated within a nested framework of environmental levels of influence (Rosa & Tudge, 
2013), then Independence/Interdependence theorizes about the intersection between those two 
perspectives. 
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have summarized the history and structure of theories that have 
attempted to identify universal deep structures that underlie cultural differences. Over the past 
few decades, many researchers have confronted this idea, and in the next chapter, we shall see 
how the idea of a universal deep structure of culture was developed into a larger theory about the 
nature of cultural change and the way culture shapes us as we change during the process of 
developing. While these ideas are broad, they are relevant here because understanding the role of 
voting predictors, such as authoritarianism, requires an understanding of the dynamic nature of 
culture and its influence on us. This is especially true when considering whether or not 
authoritarianism, or sexism, or social dominance, are values expressed at multiple levels 
throughout a person’s ideology. For example, if authoritarianism in parenting is linked to 
authoritarianism in voting, then there may be cultural values underlying that linkage.  
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4. Cultural Ecologies 
Ecological Theories in Cultural Psychology: How do Values and Norms Impact Voting? 
If the overall goal of this research is to understand the pathway of choices and reasoning 
that leads a person to choose whom to vote for, in this case in the 2016 presidential election, then 
a significant component of that decision, I hypothesize, comes from cultural factors such as 
norms, values, beliefs, and stories that are passed around a community. These norms, values, and 
rules are transmitted to children through their parents, their friends, and community members via 
stories and social learning. In this chapter, I will specifically address the set of theories that seem 
most promising to serve as a basis for describing the contributions of culture to the process of 
deciding who to vote for. 
Patricia Greenfield (2000) posits the existence of a “deep structure” of culture which is 
framed around some version of the individualistic/collectivistic spectrum. My definitions of 
individualism and collectivism are as follows: Individualism and collectivism are each a set of 
values, norms, and rules that help to give structure to the way a society self-regulates its 
members’ adhesions, cooperations and the tensions between members’ needs and the needs of 
the larger group. Individualism, as distinct from collectivism, is a type of system where the 
members’ needs receive high deference and priority, resulting in a more egocentric style of 
cognition. Collectivism is a type of system where the group’s needs receive higher deference and 
priority, resulting in a more collaborative style of cognition where the ego is subsumed by in-
group identity. These definitions, of course, leave room for a great deal of variation, especially in 
the level of “group” which is being referred to (family? society?).  
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Greenfield’s theory suggests that the ecological needs of a society drive its internal 
principles of self-organization, which, in turn, become enshrined in cultural values. If 
collectivism and Individualism are truly the roots of the deep structure of human societies, a 
possibility which has become more likely in the light of recent work on how parenting styles 
translate to political values (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), then Greenfield’s idea 
that all cultures exist on a spectrum of balancing (or not) the needs of individual and group are 
important to consider in any study of psychology. I believe, in light of Greenfield’s writing, that 
culture is an inescapable force in the formation of all humans.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to draw connections between ecological 
theories of culture and the way cultural values, norms and rules can shape voting decisions. First, 
I will review the literature that shows how ecological contexts shape the way a culture self-
organizes into an individualistic, egocentric-emphasizing society or into a collectivistic, 
collaborative, self-inhibiting society. Then, I would like to connect ecological contexts through 
the way they shape culture, to habitual cultural norms that were discussed above, such as 
authoritarianism. 
Theory of Social Change and Human Development: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
Researchers have identified how values and norms respond to constraints — which are at 
least partially driven by economic contexts (Park, Joo, Quiroz & Greenfield, 2015). Greenfield 
theorized that the process of industrialization drives migration to urban environments, and urban 
environments foster individualism and materialism, a psychological self-awareness and a sense 
of the unique self. By analyzing the words employed in publications scanned by Google into 
Google Books through the Google NGram viewer, Greenfield (Greenfield, 2013) identified a 
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shift in ideology in literature and publications in both British and American books from 1800 to 
2000, from a focus on the ecological typology of gemeinschaft (or community) to gesellschaft 
(society) model. Gemeinschaft ecologies are rural, subsistence-based, employ simple 
technologies and education is often accomplished at home, focusing on practical skills. 
Gesellschaft is an ecological system that represents the industrialized urban environment with 
formal education, a commercial economy, complex technology and the possibility of 
accumulating great wealth for some members of the society. Over the past 200 years, the 
proportion of US citizens living in rural areas as opposed to urban ones has gone from being 
above 90% to almost 20%, with urban environments now containing the remaining 80% of the 
population as of 2000. 
To draw a connection between this work and the context of voting, there is ample 
research that shows how population density is inversely proportional to one’s likelihood to vote 
conservatively, suggesting very strong linear ties between the way Greenfield’s theory about the 
impacts of ecology on culture would lead to voting preferences (McKee, 2008; Scala, Johnson, 
Rogers, 2015). 
Many have criticized such work as enhancing a racist focus on the “other” as non-western 
(Greenfield, 2000) - particularly non-industrialized and formerly colonial regions of the world. In 
this dissertation, I am hoping to apply the idea of individualism and collectivism to sub-cultures 
within the United States, using it as a new predictor of voting patterns. The theoretical 
motivation to use individualism in predicting voting patterns inside the US is that individualism, 
at least according to Greenfield, would be higher in urban residents than rural residents. Many of 
the affordances of gesellschaft focus on the way societies in regions with higher population 
density, such as most of New York City, need to organize themselves, and the values which are 
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endorsed for residents of the city by the needs and affordances of a city. Conversely, in areas 
with lower population density, such as Staten Island, for example, the affordances of a 
gemeinschaft community would shape residents’ behavior towards collectivistic values. 
However, while Greenfield’s work emphasizes the fluctuating nature of culture in response to 
ecologies such as population density, I propose that there is a tension on people to adhere to their 
culture and resist change from ecological pressures.  
Park, Joo, Quiroz and Greenfield elaborated on the idea that individuals within a society 
can vary in their degree of adherence to individualism and collectivism depending on a variety of 
ecological and sociodemographic factors (2015). This idea is problematic for cultural-level 
measures and theories such as Hofstede’s national-level measures of relatively stable cultures. 
However, research on implicit bias suggests that it is not abnormal for both of these perspectives 
to hold truth in them. Payne, Vuletich and Lundberg (2017) attempt to grapple with 
inconsistencies in research on implicit bias.  While cross-sectional research on children and 
adults shows that implicit biases are learned early, implicit bias within a person can fluctuate 
longitudinally over weeks.  Community levels of bias are strongly associated with disparities and 
discrimination, yet individual differences, such as in personality traits, are also weakly predictive 
of results on an implicit association test. These conundrums highlight the complexity of how 
culturally shaped attributes are constantly in flux and yet highly stable. 
The Gemein/Gesellschaft distinction seeks to identify the underlying drivers of cultural 
differences such as individualism and collectivism, but fails to explain why cultural values 
sometimes prevail in defiance of ecological pressures. For example, Park et al. (2015) compared 
European American and Korean Americans with Koreans living in rural and urban settings in 
Korea. Park et al. studied how Korean culture has changed over the past four decades as a 
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function of access to technology such as computers and the internet. They compared cultural 
change among rural and urban Koreans to cultural change among Koreans who had immigrated 
to Los Angeles and found that Koreans living in America experienced a “freezing” of their 
culture as it was at the time of emigration. The study showed how ecological factors such as 
access to technology can lead to cultural change that mimics urbanization adaptations, even 
when the actual population density remains low, as it did in Korea (2015). This suggests that the 
intensity of contact with others is a factor that leads to cultural change, whether that contact 
occurs as a result of living in densely populated urban environments or as a result of access to 
contact with others through communicative technologies afforded by the internet.  
In addition, the differences between Americans and Koreans on measures of 
individualism varied by setting intra-individually, such that individualism was strongest in the 
context of the school domain, where no differences were found between European Americans 
and Korean Americans. Most importantly, in contrast with predictions from Greenfield’s theory 
of social change and human development, the rural/urban divide did not result in differences on 
measures of individualism. The authors suggest that this may be due to a high level of 
technology and education in rural Korean homes, which may be allowing a sense of 
connectedness to vast human populations that was previously only achievable in an urban 
environment. The predictions of researchers such as Bimber, as far back as 1998, that the rising 
presence of the internet in our lives may be reshaping cultures, are supported by this work. 
However, Park et al., have added an additional mechanism of explanation: the internet is 
reshaping culture by reducing the impact of population density differences on our experiences. 
Therefore, the impact of cultural values is likely something that is transmitted across 
generations, and highly variable at fine grains of analysis, such as at the individual or intra-
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individual level, yet broad measures, such as Hofstede’s continue to capture something. The 
question then becomes, how does the tension between a tendency for cultural conservation of 
values and continuity and the need to adapt to changing ecologies play out over time? And how 
do these tensions apply to voting decisions within the US?  In Greenfield’s analysis of Google 
NGram, some of the words whose use has declined in English since 1800 are “obliged,” and 
“duty.”  Meanwhile, “choose” and “decision” have picked up steam during the period of 
industrialization in the US/UK and are intuitively aligned with the individualistic sensibilities 
that urbanites possess in the US (which often overlap with political liberalism).  
Zeng and Greenfield used Ngram to analyze change over the past 40 years in China and 
the USA, since China has rapidly undergone industrialization, to see what would happen to the 
“collectivistic” values of obligation and obedience in China that Greenfield saw decline between 
1800 and 2000 in the US and UK. Words indexing adaptive individualistic values increased in 
frequency in China between 1970 and 2008 (2015). In contrast, words indexing less adaptive 
collectivistic values either decreased in frequency over this same period or else rose more slowly 
than words indexing contrasting individualistic values. This work raises two points: 1) the model 
of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft positively contributes to the developing ideas of cultural 
differences such as individualism and collectivism, and these older works may benefit from the 
re-interpretation of their results based on this new paradigm; and 2) the shift that Greenfield 
found in the US and the UK did not occur in China the same way it did in the US, so there are 
factors beyond ecology at work, which I will term, for now, tendencies towards conservation. 
Indeed, the tendencies towards conservation were also seen by Park et al. in the Korean-
American mothers who lived in LA and preserved the values and norms of Korea at the time that 
they left, separated from the ecological drivers of the shifts that had occurred between the 1980s 
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Korea that they left, and Korea as it existed decades later, at the time of the research, having 
been heavily influenced by internet exposure (2015).  
Bioecological Systems Theory, Theory of Social Change/Human Development and 
Modeling Cultural Identity: The Individual embedded in the group 
Bioecological systems theory of Urie Bronfenbrenner (Rosa & Tudge, 2013), an earlier 
ecological theory of culture’s role in human development, is a natural fit for situating such an 
investigation of how the “deep structure” (as in Greenfield’s Theory of Social Change and 
Human Development) of society is transmitted across levels of social organization, since the 
deep structure assumes a framework for the developmental contexts in which people learn as 
they grow. 
Bronfenbrenner’s theory differs from Greenfield’s in its emphasis on bidirectional 
influences. He developed a theory, influenced by Vygotsky social co-constructivism, in which 
the individual was at the center of a set of nested circles of bidirectional influence. From the 
perspective of a given individual, their immediate interactions (known as proximal processes), 
were with members of their families, communities, schools, etc. - the real people they interact 
with on a daily basis.  He termed each of these settings (e.g. the family home) a microsystem.  
The microsystems in which one is embedded interact with one another in what Bronfenbrenner 
termed the mesosystem. The exosystem is a larger network of interactions in which the 
individual does not directly partake (Rosa & Tudge, 2013).  Examples might be the work 
environment of the individual’s parent - the work environment affects the parent and the parent 
affects the individual child.  Another example might be the legislator who drafts laws about 
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whether a child is required to attend school or not.  The child is not interacting with the 
legislature but may still feel the effects of that group’s acts. 
Such a framework, I propose, may be very useful in understanding the underlying 
processes which converge each time one makes a voting decision, as the proximal processes that 
form our moral compasses are likely forged in the larger societal values in which we are 
immersed since birth. Bronfenbrenner considered the contexts in which a person spends time - 
particularly within the family, as well as personal characteristics of the individual and the 
historical time period in which a person lives - to be drivers of how a person develops (Rosa & 
Tudge, 2013). Bronfenbrenner’s theory asks that researchers study: a) the settings in which a 
developing individual spends time, b) the relations with others in those settings, c) the individual 
characteristics of the person, d) their development over time, e) the historical time in which they 
live, and, finally, f) the mechanisms that drive development, also known as proximal processes.  
The current research has collected data, which at least nominally addresses each of these goals 
except (d). 
Bronfenbrenner’s motivation for creating his theory has been described as a sense of 
frustration at the state of research in the 1970s, which regularly lacked a sense of ecological 
validity and did not consider any system of values (Rosa & Tudge, 2013). The idea of ecological 
validity emerged from criticism of early psychological work which attempted to control for as 
much variability as possible by testing one specific thing in the laboratory at the expense of 
understanding the complexity of humans in situ. Ecological validity is, therefore, the study of 
psychological factors in their normal environment, not in an artificial, laboratory-based setting. 
As Bronfenbrenner was participating in the revolutionary upending of psychological research 
values in the 1970s counter-cultural movements through focusing on ecological validity, he was 
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also viewing the role of psychological research in society differently: rather than suggesting that 
social policy be informed by research, he suggested research should take social policy into 
account by design. 
These three levels are all concrete and thus differ from the final levels.  The macrosystem 
consists of what might be termed culture: sets of values, norms, and rules that may permeate all 
the other levels and be transmitted through each level, guiding the behavior of all members of the 
system, or at least, those who are aware of its norms and values. Each of these levels changes 
with time, which is why Bronfenbrenner amended his earliest models to include a chronosystem 
enveloping the other levels (Rosa & Tudge, 2013). 
 
Figure 1: Model of Bronfenbrenner’s Model of Bioecological Systems Theory 
Wikimedia Commons. Hchokr, 2012, Used under the Creative Commons Attribution-
Share Alike 2.0 generic license. 
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The concept of the chronosystem is relevant to Greenfield’s deep structure of 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, of the theory of social change and human development as most of 
the active research on this theory uses cultural change to understand the ecological contexts 
which shape a cultural system (Greenfield, 2009). In other words, change is used to understand 
the parameters of the system, and especially to understand what is cultural and what is related to 
individual differences between people.  Without observations of change, we would have no way 
of disentangling these parameters. The sort of contrast provided by capturing change in culture 
can, perhaps, also be glimpsed by using a different, synchronous method: by asking immigrants 
to the US about their experiences with their multiple cultures in contrast with cultural norms in 
the heritage culture, we can distinguish between personal acculturative change from navigating 
transnational contact rather than societal-level change as an entire culture changes under pressure 
from large-scale economic changes that exert ecological pressures on the culture. 
For example, the internal ecology of a country can change based on temporary 
circumstances such as fluctuations in the financial markets: Park, Twenge and Greenfield found 
that American undergraduates’ values changed between cohorts as a function of an economic 
recession that occurred between 2008 and 2010 (2014; 2017). They also compared college 
students’ values prior to the Great Recession (2004-2006) with the values of students whose 
undergraduate years occurred during the Great Recession (2008-2010). The Great Recession 
created a useful context in which to study individualism and collectivism because society-wide 
financial hardship could encourage a change in cultural attitudes towards greater acceptance of 
emerging adults’ dependence on family financial support. This shift towards collectivism, if 
found, would represent an example of the vacillation between individualism and collectivism 
that occurs despite a general trend towards continuously increasing individualism as 
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industrialization and technological advancements increase. The shift suggests that when entire 
populations shift how they endorse certain values, it may be related to recent, profound 
ecological changes and represent cultural change. Park, Twenge and Greenfield found that 
cultural shifts did occur in college students’ values associated with the financial crises leading to 
1) greater community mindset including concern for community programs and the environment, 
2) greater materialism and 3) more negative self-views as they struggled with economic 
obstacles.  
Taken together, work in this field suggests several factors that can impact cultural values 
directing social organization, such as economic pressures and the intensity of contact with others 
through either urban environments or digital communication technologies. When cultures change 
because of ecological factors, not only do they shift the social organizational habits of members 
of their population, but the accompanying justifications, norms, values and ideals of “good” 
behavior – that is to say, social organization.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I summarized major theories of how culture is situated in contextual 
ecologies that shape it. These theories are important for later discussion of the way voting 
preferences may be shaped by culture. 
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5. Parenting Styles Situated in the Deep Structures of Cultural Ecology 
In this section, I will begin to draw the theories that have been discussed so far together 
and towards the goal of understanding how they work in the context of shaping our voting 
decisions.  As we saw in chapter 1, political science research on why people vote for fascists 
merged with parenting research to create a powerful predictor of voting preferences called 
authoritarianism. In chapter 3 I described how cultures have been characterized as varying along 
a spectrum, and in chapter 4, how that spectrum has been characterized as a deep organizational 
structure of culture and society.  I would now like to use parenting theory to review research on 
the mechanism of cultural transmission, which is likely to occur partly through exposure to 
media, described in chapter 2, and partly to the patterns observed socially and co-constructively 
in the family. 
Parenting style research emerged from a desire to understand causative relationships 
between parent behaviors and children’s mental health outcomes later in life, and much research 
has addressed, and shown, that children parented authoritatively — with boundaries and yet also 
with empathy and dialogue — have better outcomes in life (Maccoby, 1992). However, when 
parenting styles are viewed from a cultural perspective, the picture becomes murkier. Two 
questions emerge from this line of inquiry: 1) how do parents from different points on the 
individualism/collectivism spectrum socialize their children to participate in the larger cultural 
patterns of behavior, and 2) does one culture normalize different responses for the same 
behaviors than another (e.g. the idea of emerging adulthood and becoming an adult may be more 
individualistic, or, certain parenting styles may be harmful to the emergence of an individualistic 
adult but helpful to the emergence of a collectivistic adult). For example, researchers studying 
Jewish and Arab Israeli adolescents found that Arab adolescents’ experience of closeness to their 
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parents was positively and significantly correlated with the number of rules laid out by the 
parents, but number of rules had no relationship with Jewish Israeli’s sense of closeness to their 
families (Snarey & Keljo, 1991). 
The idea of authority as the glue that binds a society is a final way of conceptualizing the 
spectrums of culture. “Authority as structure” is a further step toward fitting the different 
theories into an overall ecological perspective: let us consider how ideas like collectivism and 
individualism (and the other similar terms) all translate into the most essential microsystem of 
all, the family unit.  When one considers whether authority is expected to be autonomous or 
imposed at the familial level, one may automatically envision different types of parenting styles. 
Maccoby defines four types of parenting styles as: Authoritative, Authoritarian, Indulgent and 
Neglectful (1992). The first two are demanding, while the latter two are undemanding. On a 
different dimension, Authoritative and Indulgent are responsive while Authoritarian and 
Neglectful are unresponsive.  Thus, authoritarian parenting is demanding but unresponsive 
(Maccoby, 1992). 
The parenting style considered ideal by canonical researchers such as Baumrind (1991) or 
Maccoby (1992) is termed authoritative, although it is important to remember that the theorists 
are Westernized and the empirical support for them comes from participants living and growing 
up in Western, industrialized countries.  In this type of parenting, the child is given space to 
develop autonomy, while there are clear limits and boundaries in place that define appropriate 
behavior, although the parent and child participate in a give-and-take as well. The parents 
provide encouragement, and will listen to children, expecting the child to listen to them as well. 
The very description of this type of ideal parenting and its goals of self-reliance, independence 
and individual align with many of the values of an individualistic society.  In short, parents who 
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adopt this parenting style are employing ideal strategies to prepare their offspring for American 
society, particularly white American society. 
On the other hand, the parenting style described as Authoritarian/Totalitarian is 
characterized by Maccoby and Martin as demanding but unresponsive, rather than demanding 
and responsive.  Authoritarian/totalitarian parenting styles are often endorsed by groups that are 
more collectivistic, supporting what I have been suggesting, which is that both authoritarianism 
and collectivism are culturally learned and evolved as part of the need for human societies to 
self-regulate and maintain cohesion through the values that members hold. For example, one 
might describe an idealized version of a progressive American government as an Authoritative 
government that will have clear standards for its citizens, monitor the limits that it sets, and also 
allow citizens to develop autonomy. It also expects mature, independent, and age-appropriate 
behavior from its citizens. Punishments for misbehavior are measured and consistent, not 
arbitrary or violent. Often behaviors are not punished but the natural consequences of the 
citizen’s actions are explored and discussed - allowing the person to see that the behavior is 
inappropriate and not to be repeated, rather than not repeated to merely avoid adverse 
consequences.  Simply substitute the word child for citizen, and one can see how the philosophy 
of authority is echoed between the levels of organization of family (microsystem) and 
government (exosystem) through the values of the macrosystem. 
Authoritarian parenting is described as restrictive, non-responsive parenting style where 
children are expected to follow instructions and obey rules without any explanations. It has been 
associated with negative mental health outcomes and delayed development of agency (Maccoby, 
1992). However, other research has shown that characteristics of an authoritarian style are 
notable in Asian cultures, but in those contexts, they are associated with positive outcomes 
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(Santrock, 2007). Ethnic Minority style differs from strict authoritarian parenting by being highly 
responsive towards children’s needs, while also differing from authoritative parenting by 
maintaining high demands, and not placing children’s needs as a priority. This style promotes 
high demandingness and high responsiveness together to produce high academic performance in 
children (Huang, 2015).  
Situating Parenting Theory in Ecological Theories of Culture 
The perception that Authoritarianism is a cultural variable is not new, but neither is it yet 
universal. Tamis-LeMonda et al. viewed it as an expression of cultural individualism and 
collectivism at the familial level (2008). MacWilliams (2016) conducted research on 
authoritarianism in politics, not only as a cultural variable, characterizing the cultural tendencies 
of African Americans as authoritarian, but as an ecological cultural variable, shaped by historical 
process of oppression and inequality over centuries. Given the nature of authoritarianism, as a 
variable tied to the self-organizing principles of a society and the role of authority, obedience, 
and top-down rule as a cultural convention in a society, it is worth considering its role as a 
cultural variable, and as such, one that is subject to ecological shaping. This cultural 
authoritarianism, MacWilliams argues, would lead African Americans to vote for conservatives 
(MacWilliams, 2016), just as other researchers have identified high authoritarianism as a 
predictor of political alignment with conservative ideologies.  
MacWilliams argue that African Americans do not vote for Republicans in higher 
numbers because liberal policies are often focused, to some degree, at improving the treatment 
and opportunities of people of color. For MacWilliams, this pits African Americans’ racial 
identities against their cultural tendencies. When the issue at hand engages African Americans’ 
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authoritarian tendencies, authoritarianism can trump cultural identity. According to 
MacWilliams, the profound orientation towards authoritarianism, is essentially a cultural value 
shaped by ecological pressure on African Americans through slavery, Jim Crow and the ongoing 
asymmetrical violence experienced by the Black community in America. He points out that 
Black Americans have, uniquely among American sub-demographics, experienced ongoing 
threats of physical and psychological violence through our 400-year national history in the USA. 
MacWilliams’s work demonstrates how long-term threat can become an ecological factor 
shaping cultural change for an endogenous group within the United States (in the case of African 
Americans). As other work has demonstrated that perceived threat from violence can activate 
latent authoritarians (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), MacWilliams’ work suggests that perceived 
threat of violence can ecologically shape stable cultural values.  
One interesting connection that can be made between this research and other work on 
culture, is with research which suggests that authoritarian differences between nations are a 
function of the way parents socialize their offspring towards that nation’s cultural requirements 
for participation in society, and how these socialization techniques, which are adaptive in the 
heritage culture, can lead to intergenerational conflict when immigrants apply them to their 
children growing up in America (Lansford, 2016).  
The divide between individualism and collectivism flexes around a fulcrum of authority: 
authority to make decisions and judgments, whether that authority is internally and 
autonomously situated or external and deferential to the collective. Additionally, childhood and 
adolescence are crucial periods for the crystallization of these cultural tendencies, as emerging 
adults become responsible for how their decisions shape their society. Both theories allow for 
space to consider how cultural values can be passed to the emerging generation. Both theories 
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also provide opportunities to describe how changes to the ecology of the system can alter those 
values in the process of transmission through parenting, as well as interactions with the larger 
community, or even through the media. 
Conclusion 
In the section above, theories of how cultural differences occur on a spectrum were 
discussed, and one of the main methods of analysis was to analyze differences at the level of 
comparing different groups such as nations, since overall trends of a group may differ. However, 
any given member of the group, chosen at random, may not differ from a randomly selected 
member of a group whose overall means are different. This analysis might be thought of as being 
done at the level of the macrosystem, but as we have seen, political scientists and other social 
scientists are trying to understand how the values of the macrosystem percolate through the 
society. Developing theoretical and methodological ways to understand the contributions of 
cultural conservation, ecological pressures on culture and individual differences is important for 
disentangling voting preferences in the 2016 election.   
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6. Social Identity Theory, Belief Change Resistance and Politics 
Identity can also play a role in the way we express the values of the culture(s) we develop 
within. While it is important to understand how we learn to be a part of our culture or cultures 
through social co-constructivism, our individual expressions of culture will be shaped by our 
individual roles in our microsystem environments. Indeed, this is one of the critiques leveled at 
Hofstede’s cultural spectrums by Markus and Kitayama:  Hofstede failed to take into account 
how our self-perceptions and identities contribute to how our culture is expressed. In this 
chapter, I would like to take a look at how identity may interact with culture through a review of 
the Social Identity Perspective, which can be broken down into social identity theory and self-
categorization theory. One of the strengths of using this particular identity theory in this research 
is that it attempts to address how we each “wear multiple hats,” shifting between various 
identities. This concept is useful for understanding voting preferences because if you might have 
a woman who is second generation and white, which of her identities is most likely to predict her 
voting decision: gender, immigration status or race? 
Social Identity Theory 
Identity research has come a long way to understanding, from the perspective of one 
person, how one self-construes one’s membership in various specific groups. The complexity of 
how one feels that they belong to different slices of larger groups is the purview of Social 
Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). SIT specifically addresses how the 
values inherent in the macrosystem translate into interpersonal interactions between members of 
groups, and how we manage the different definitions we have of ourselves based on the context. 
Perhaps in the context of a bar, we might consider ourselves first and foremost by our 
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gender/sexual orientation, whereas when filling out a census form, we may consider how we 
align racially with other Americans, yet on holidays, perhaps we are a member of our family, or 
perhaps we are a practitioner of our religion. Who we are speaking to in the moment and the 
needs of the moment determine which identity is most salient for us in that moment, according to 
SIT. Later, Turner added Self-Categorization Theory, which, together with the earlier Social 
Identity Theory, comprise Social Identity Perspective (SIP) (Turner, 1978; 1982). 
SIP clarifies how bioecological systems translate into real-world problems such as 
prejudice and belief change (Turner, 1978; 1982). In addition to SIT asking researchers to 
conceptualize of social identities as plural, sliding in and out of prominence depending on the 
situation, it also comprises a spectrum of focus between a holistic representation of the self 
(perhaps the Conceptual Self of Neisser, 1988) and specific group identities that are most salient 
in each moment.  This theoretical piece may help to explain de-individuation events where a 
person behaves in ways that are outside of and perhaps contrary to their normal behavioral 
patterns (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973), such as fans at a football game taking off their 
shirts, painting their faces and bodies, and running screaming onto the field – all behaviors that 
are associated with the temporarily salient identity of football fan, not the holistic identity of a 
given person.  In fact, Henri Tajfel conceptualized stereotyping (i.e. putting people into groups 
and categories) as based on a normal cognitive process: the tendency to group things together. In 
doing so, we tend to exaggerate 1) the differences between groups, 2) the similarities of things in 
the same group. Thus, in-group bias is the tendency to favor individuals that are part of our 
group over members outside of our group, now that we have developed mental categories of self 
and other (Turner, 1978; 1982). A corollary to in-group bias is that you will see the rich detail of 
those close to you but are more likely to simplify members of other groups, where you do not 
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know any or many members of that group well enough to see that group’s internal complexity, is 
out-group homogeneity: the tendency to view people from the out-group as highly similar.  
We have prototypical ideas of what people look like who belong to other groups so take a 
moment and imagine a Muslim woman and keep her image in your head. Was she an African 
Muslim? Or perhaps an Indonesian one? Many Americans are likely to imagine a prototypical 
Muslim woman as a white middle eastern woman wearing a hijab, although depending on the 
news cycle, one might imagine women from other parts of the world, other cultures within the 
Islamic world. Out group stereotypes emerge from our need to form positive social identities for 
ourselves and to define those identities in terms of how we differ from others.  This need to have 
a positive social identity may be part of what drives political divides in the US right now – we 
vote with our sub-cultures to be a part of the community and to demonstrate that we belong to 
that community by espousing the ideals of that community. We view others, outside our bubble 
and across the divide as unimaginably different from us. 
Self-Categorization Theory 
Self-Categorization Theory, by contrast, adds an exploration of what it means to be a 
“group”: “What is a psychological group?” “How are people able to act psychologically in a 
collective way as group members?” “How do we manage many identities?” (Turner and 
Reynolds, 2001). The focal point of this part of SIP is that, while we all want to be part of a 
group, this does not mean we have to be in order to put down other groups. However, it does 
relate to the discussions presented in earlier chapters about the human need to participate in a 
larger organizational structure. 
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Social Identity Perspective in a Multicultural Context 
Researchers have successfully applied SIP to show how managing multiple identities 
may affect other cognitive processes, especially for individuals who have to manage multiple 
identities within a category of identity, such as multi-racial or multi-ethnic identities.  Sarah 
Gaither (2015) experimentally induced some multi-racial and some monoracial people to reflect 
on their racial identit(ies) and then asked them to complete a task measuring creativity 
afterwards. Multiracial participants who had been primed were compared to multiracial people 
who had not been primed and demonstrated statistically significant increased creativity, while 
monoracial people who were primed did not differ from monoracial people who had not been 
primed.  However, monoracial people are not doomed to be less creative, as monoracial people 
experienced a similar, statistically significant increase in creativity when asked to think about 
multiple (non-race based) social identities they experienced. This idea is not new (e.g. see Hui & 
Triandis, 1985) but it empirical support has been scant until recently. One component mentioned 
by Gaither is that shifting among one’s multiple identities is not limited to cultural and/or 
linguistic identities of acculturation, but within that, there are dimensions which are always 
present and which are often treated differently in differently cultures, such as how men and 
women are treated, how LGTBQ members of society are treated, how people of different ages 
are treated, and how people of differing statuses within a given society are treated, such as 
differing SES or differing physical or mental abilities. While these dimensions are always 
present and represent important dimensions of identity, they also interact with culture where 
different cultures hold different attitudes towards each one of these dimensions of identity. 
Identity and Ecological Systems Theory 
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In considering how the self is conceptualized in relation to other aspects of the 
environment and experience, Markus and Kitayama (1991; 2003; 2014) fit better with a 
Neisserian view of ecological systems (1988), rather than a Bronfenbrennerian one. Ulric Neisser 
conceptualized of five kinds of self-knowledge: the ecological self, interpersonal self, extended 
self, private self and the conceptual self.  Neisser’s theory has a lot of overlap with 
Bronfenbrenner’s, but has two important differences (1988). The ecological self seems to 
encapsulate Bronfenbrenner’s conceptualization of the physical sense of self, that the skin is a 
line of demarcation separating one’s body from external elements, whereas the interpersonal self, 
as a concept, allows for more interactivity and interdependence than Bronfenbrenner’s 
description of the individual at the center of a series of spheres of influence, which emphasizes 
the individuality of the person, and less the interaction they have across various levels. The 
extended-self captures the role of time, as does the chronosystem, but the chronosystem 
encapsulates each and all levels of Bronfenbrenner’s theory, allowing for change throughout the 
system, whereas, by virtue of the focus on self-construals, Neisser’s extended self can only focus 
on the perception of the self as continuous in time.  
However, Neisser’s addition of the private self (conscious experiences not shared with 
others) and the conceptual self (self-concept or, perhaps, identity), which are only possible in a 
system of self-construal and not possible in a system of ecological circumstances, adds a 
pronounced flavor of psychology to the way we can study how people situate themselves in 
society and culture (Neisser, 1988). In fact, it almost seems as if this is a necessary component of 
a bioecological systems theory, connecting the microsystem to the internalization of the 
microsystem within the person in different ways and helping to connect the bioecology to 
theories of identity formation. 
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Self-construals are important for understanding voting behavior as a culturally influenced 
behavior in multicultural contexts. For example, multicultural contexts provide opportunities for 
people from different cultures to intermix, leading to relationships and, often, multicultural 
families. The transmission of cultural values from parent to child is even more complex in 
multicultural families where there are differing and overlapping micro-environments within the 
home, each generated by different parents. As more families negotiate multiple cultural systems 
within their family unit, and situate themselves in the larger cultural narrative, the importance of 
understanding value transmission through Bronfenbrenner’s system levels becomes increasingly 
urgent, especially given the added dimension of changing cultures and having this additional 
dissonance: a kind of conflict where the parents are parenting what they learned in one culture, 
but their children are perceiving and experiencing it in a different culture, or one parent is 
parenting what they learned in their culture, and the other parent is parenting a different thing 
that they learned in another culture, while the child is living in yet another culture, can lead to 
conflict at worst and is complex at best. This idea, of the tensions on actors in culturally diverse 
societies as they are socialized into both the mainstream culture (e.g., via schools) and their 
ethnic/racial cultures (e.g., via families and neighborhoods) is called cultural discontinuity (Tyler 
et al., 2008; Vargas & Kemmelmeier, 2013). 
7. America’s Promise as a Society of Immigrants: Acculturation Theory, and the 
Melting Pot 
Acculturation models and identity 
Acculturation theory attempts to address the transitional identity processes between 
heritage countries and host countries, particularly over multiple generations. First, I will present 
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a brief overview of acculturation theory, and then an equally brief consideration of its 
applicability to the complexities of the NYC context in which this research was conducted. 
As mentioned above, acculturation theory contributes to our understanding of how 
Americans, as immigrants, situate their own identity at the crossroads of their cultures, whether 
their heritage culture(s) or their host culture(s). Berry (2005) describes three methodologies for 
assessing this information, from scales to vignettes, all of which ask respondents how they 
acculturate, or how value their various cultural communities and contexts. Acculturation is 
described, by Berry (2005), as having two dimensions out of which four patterns emerge. 
Dimension 1 can be described as the range of attitudes towards one’s heritage cultural identity, 
and dimension 2 concerns the desire to have contact with members of the larger (current) society. 
These two, 2-dimensional scales result, when crossed, in four possible outcomes, (1) 
assimilation, (2) integration, (3) separation and (4) marginalization. Assimilation refers to the 
individual’s wish to participate in the larger society without maintaining the heritage society. 
Integration, on the other hand, embraces both heritage culture and larger society. Separation 
indicates a desire to focus on maintaining heritage culture without participation in the larger 
society, and marginalization represents a rejection of both heritage culture and the larger society.  
Alternate models of acculturation have attempted to capture the attitudes of specific 
groups that have large-scale representation in the United States, such as Latin@s or Asians or 
even, specifically, Mexicans or Chinese. Acculturation, or the idea that everyone must establish 
an attitude towards the cultures with which they are in contact, is valuable, but some critiques 
have been leveled at acculturation (for a dialogue, see Rudmin, 2008; Berry 2009), and there are 
a few concerns yet unmentioned with the theory.  Acculturation is a useful way to understand a 
person’s attitudes towards two cultures, but it should be elaborated to address multi-cultural 
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environments. In addition, acculturation uses a model that somewhat vaguely refers to one’s 
attitudes towards one’s own culture, without specifying what that means.  Most immigrants come 
from nations which are, themselves, multicultural with internal conflicts between groups, and 
they arrive in New York with those complex identities, not simply “I am Mexican.” According to 
an ethnologue of languages, Mexico has at least 287 distinct languages spoken within the nation, 
68 of which are officially recognized by the government (Lewis, Simons & Fennig, 2013). Other 
countries with strong representation of immigrants in NYC have intricately complex ethno-
linguistic diversity within the nation (see figure 2 for an example: a map of complex ethno-
linguistic diversity in Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin). 
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Figure 2: A map of linguistic and ethnic diversity in Nigeria, illustrating the complexity 
within a nation that is not represented in national means such as Hofstede’s scale. A 
Linguistic map of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Benin. Ulamm, 2007, Wikimedia Commons. 
Used under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 generic license. 
 
Underlying drivers for cultural differences, therefore, may be tied to explicit self-
identities, as suggested by acculturation literature. A given person must make the choice to align 
themselves with one culture, another, or multiple cultures, and this choice may contribute to how 
that person views political values and chooses candidates when voting. Acculturation is an aspect 
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of identity that tries to capture the flux of options available to those living in multicultural 
environments, although it tends to focus on the development of the attitudes of people who are 
exposed to and need to navigate identities that demand more than one cultural self-construal. 
However, one failing of acculturation is that it focuses on immigrants as the only group to face 
this decision. In NYC, there is a large, non-immigrant group whose members face constant 
tensions between identifying with their group and with the dominant white culture, and that 
group is African Americans, who have a distinct culture that evolved within the US and does not 
exist elsewhere. This very fact disrupts some of the acculturation theory, which assumes a 
monoculture at the destination of the immigrant, but it also forces us to consider that recent 
immigrants are not the only people who have to navigate complex dual identities. 
Acculturation and the Negotiation of Differing Values for People Living in Multicultural 
Contexts 
Research on acculturation seeks to understand how people negotiate their identity in 
cross-cultural contact, and to understand the cultural changes that occur because of that contact. 
Added to this complexity is the notion that people, as single members of a group and as part of a 
larger group of immigrants, negotiate the internal influences of their multiple cultures differently 
(Berry, 2008).  This process occurs when groups of different cultural backgrounds and their 
members interact, which can happen through immigration (in this case, referred to as 
acculturation) or, increasingly, through digital and rapid-transit enabled globalization contact.  
Theorists have proposed that one can take up a stance according to how closely one aligns with 
each of one’s cultures.  
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For example, in research on the family structures and relationships between parents and 
children among immigrant groups from East Asia, Asian American adolescents were more 
likely, in general, to be willing to make sacrifices for their families, and in particular, for their 
parents (Lansford et al., 2016).  European Americans, on the other hand, were more likely to be 
willing to sacrifice for their siblings than for their parents, but showed less willingness overall to 
make sacrifices for their families.  Asian Americans who reported higher levels of assimilation 
were less willing to make sacrifices, although the value was maintained despite assimilation.  
There are three conclusions to be drawn from this research: one conclusion, also 
supported by other researchers, is that most Americans have maintained values from heritage 
cultures, even when their ethnic status in the United States has normalized to the mainstream 
(Alba & Nee, 2009), and heritage values should remain a dimension of analysis in understanding 
multicultural modern American youth.  The second point and third point are related, that a value 
of making sacrifice for one’s family, in terms of money, dating or schoolwork, is a part of a 
collectivistic mindset, and when children are faced with dueling cultural values such as their 
parents expectation to be sacrificed for versus their peers and perhaps their teachers, and the 
media’s expectation of doing what is best for oneself, one’s future, and one’s career, these 
dueling values may provoke intergenerational conflict over the way resources are managed, 
because societal organization is designed to manage resources, but only when the complexly 
balanced intact culture is followed.  If resources are meant to be shared back to the family from 
the child, it is often the case that the child can expect resources to be shared with them in turn 
(such as from their own children), while an individualistic resource management structure 
encourages curating one’s own resources because it is expected that nobody will contribute to 
them to help you later. 
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In other words, parents and children may navigate their multicultural existence 
differently, leading to conflict. Acculturation mismatch may then provoke conflict, which results 
in worse mental health and educational outcomes. A meta-analysis (Lui, 2014) demonstrated that 
acculturation mismatch did indeed correlate with intergenerational cultural conflict, which in 
turn was negatively correlated to good mental health outcomes and also negatively correlated 
with educational outcomes, although less strongly than mental health outcomes in Asian and 
Latin@ immigrants.  
While Asian and Latin@ are broad terms that encompass countries with a range of 
collectivistic tendencies, the researchers treated them all as collectivistic (Lui, 2014). However, 
one critique of this type of research is that, while it purports to examine the role of cultural 
values such as collectivistic, family-oriented values, it is also using immigrants as a comparison 
group for non-immigrants – in other words, studying the culture of people living outside the 
geographical zone in which the culture developed is like studying a particular species of frog 
from the Amazon rainforest in the jungles of Borneo by comparing it to a species of frog which 
evolved in Borneo. Sure, you are studying the frog, but its behavior is likely to be as much in 
response to the new ecology as it was to the way it evolved in its old ecology, and using the 
Borneo frog as a reference species leaves a lot of variables out of your control. Studies have 
replicated these findings across different immigrant/non-immigrant contexts, such as former 
USSR immigrants living in Israel with non-immigrant Israelis, or immigrant adolescents in 
Germany with non-immigrant Germans. However, this comparison, and the structural values 
immigrant families enact, could also be due to the act of migration, which requires one to rebuild 
capital, monetary, social and otherwise, in the destination location (Lansford et al., 2016). 
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One study which examined this shortcoming found that, across nine countries and thirteen 
cultures, there are generational differences without taking immigration into account (Lansford et 
al., 2016).  Parents’ attitudes are more highly correlated with one another than with their children 
across all thirteen groups and nine countries, which could be due to either assortative mating 
where people select mates with like values or to generational shift from a changing world. In 
terms of parenting behaviors, Lansford et al. found that, effectively, parenting styles accounted 
for within culture variation between families (warmth, control and neglect all led to within 
culture variability), but hostility and rejection only led to variability between cultures; overall a 
sizable portion of the variance was accounted for by between culture variations (Lansford et al., 
2016). Ultimately, family obligation is likely to be an important cultural value in understanding 
both acculturation and the underlying heritage cultural values that immigrants bring with them, 
with support for family obligation being contributed via both conditions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter summarized a theoretical perspective on multiculturalism called 
acculturation theory, which has two applications to our discussion of what shaped the voting 
decisions in the 2016 election: how our cultures form a part of our identities, and how our 
cultures shape our values. Our identities and our values are the two largest components of 
models from research that has attempted to unpack the underlying reasons people make their 
voting decisions. In the next chapter, we will expand the discussion of multiculturalism from a 
theory of how individuals’ identities and values are shaped by multicultural contexts to a 
discussion of contact theory, or how multiculturalism can result in intergroup tensions or 
harmonies.  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have integrated an identity perspective in the discussion of what 
psychological constructs predict voter preferences. In the next chapter, we will take this idea of 
identity and multiculturalism and compare it to acculturation theories, which study how 
immigrants with transnational ties and multi-cultural families negotiate how their different 
identities pull them in different directions. 
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8. Contact theory, multiculturalism and voting: does exposure to reduce prejudice?  
The research described in this report focuses on college students within one of the most 
diverse metropolitan regions in the world, New York City (NYC), who are attending a college on 
Staten Island, the most insular and conservative borough within NYC. In comparison with the 
rest of NYC, Staten Island has a high density of residents who identify as White and are likely to 
be politically right-wing. Students come from all over NYC to attend the college. Therefore, 
some live in highly diverse regions while others live in ethnically homogenous enclaves.  
Given the complexities of the factors contributing to voting preferences, a central issue 
which requires more investigation is the conflicting findings regarding the impacts of diversity 
on reducing authoritarianism and prejudice, with some research finding that exposure to 
minorities and diversity decreases prejudice (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2012) and some finding that it 
increases prejudice (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014; Galor & Klemp 2017; Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner & 
Wagner, 2013; Van Assche, Roets), possibly related to contextual factors, including the degree 
to which one ethnic group outnumbers other ethnic groups in a given region.  
According to contact theory, intergroup contact typically leads to reduced prejudice 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Indeed, intergenerational decreases in prejudice can be achieved by 
exposing adolescents to more diversity (Duriez & Soenens, 2009). A central prediction of 
contact theory is that greater neighborhood diversity will be associated with heightened 
acceptance of immigrants. If actionable measures to increase acceptance of immigrants, such as 
encouraging contact with diverse others, can be identified, then organizations can implement 
them (Berg, 2015). In the next section, I will describe the research context in which data for this 
dissertation was gathered. 
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The research context as an exemplar of multiculturalism and diversity 
I examined cross-cultural differences in people who live in an extremely multi-cultural 
environment – New York City. New York City has several features which make it particularly 
interesting for researching the structure of culture, how ethics and morals play into cultural 
differences, and how people navigate multiple identity categories in a multicultural environment. 
Apart from being – ecologically speaking - an extreme instance of multicultural contact, it also 
contains multiple ecological contexts: some areas are less urban, others are more so; some are 
less diverse and others more so; some are heavily liberal, while others are more conservative; 
some areas have very high socio-economic indices, while other areas represent extremely low 
socio-economic conditions, some areas are mostly white, while others represent cultures from 
around the globe or particularly different local US sub-cultures. 
This is urgently relevant to consider in the context of New York City. For example, 
immigrants in NYC make up 22% of the population in the state, in comparison with 13% 
nationwide, and second only to California (DiNapoli, 2016). In NYC, over 35% of the residents 
are zeroth generation immigrants (not born in the U.S.A), a number which is reflected in the 
membership of public colleges like CUNY, where the research was conducted. In contrast with 
some work on acculturation, which focuses on cultural contact between one dominant group and 
one immigrant group, NYC includes representatives from 150 nations, resulting in a resounding 
question of how people navigate this milieu, and how they form identities.  NYC represents a 
case of long term multi-cultural contact, and very few theories try to pinpoint what happens 
when people from one culture migrate and then live for a long time in contact with people from 
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another culture, and fewer still confront the complexities of multiculturalism at a level 
represented by NYC (Crisp, Stathi, Turner & Husnu, 2009).  
In addition to the intensity of the multiculturalism, much of NYC’s immigrant population 
is not newly arrived. Fully half of these immigrants, totaling 1.1 million people, are naturalized 
citizens.  Two thirds of NYC’s immigrant residents arrived in the United States before the year 
2000, almost 20 years ago. In fact, fewer than 5% of children under the age of 18 in NY are 
immigrants. Almost half of the American born children in NYC are first generation, meaning 
that at least one parent is foreign born (DiNapoli, 2016). 
The data were collected at College of Staten Island: Staten Island is a unique ecosystem 
within New York City. In comparison with the rest of New York City, Staten Island has a high 
density of residents who identify as White – 76.7% in 2015, up from 72.9% in 2010 – (“United 
States Census Bureau QuickFacts Richmond County (Staten Island Borough), New York”), are 
likely to be politically right-wing – 56.85% voted Donald Trump in Staten Island versus 18.4% 
citywide, (Ali, 2016). The combined percentage of residents over the age of 25 who have a 
college degree or an advanced degree is 35.7%, roughly equal to the percentage whose highest 
level of education is a High School Diploma or equivalent (34%). The most numerous cultural 
backgrounds represented on the Island are Italian, at 35.4% and then Irish at 14.2%, followed by 
German at 5.8% (“United States Census Bureau Selected Social Characteristics in the United 
States: 2005-2009 more information 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 
for Richmond County”) 
This research was conducted at the College of Staten Island (CSI). CSI has a unique 
population that differs from the residents of Staten Island: Students attend CSI from all over the 
city, leading to an admixture of residents from all five boroughs, particularly Staten Island, 
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Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. While Staten Island has a different demographic profile than 
the rest of New York, the particular circumstances at CSI mean that the College is neither 
representative of Staten Island, nor any other specific borough, but more representative of New 
York City overall, including Staten Island. Consistent with US Census data, 74.8% of surveyed 
students in Introductory Psychology at the College of Staten Island who identified as 
“caucasian/white” (31% of total) report being of either Irish or Italian descent or both (n=728), 
with the largest portion identifying as, at least partly, Italian (Schwartz & Guan, 2017).  Of the 
students who take Introductory Psychology at the College of Staten Island, only 46.09% (n=953) 
report living there, with the remainder commuting from all over the metropolitan New York area. 
While some New Yorkers live in enclaves where they primarily are surrounded by individuals 
from their own culture or a culture relatively like their cultural identity, CSI brings students from 
all over the city into multi-cultural contact as a microcosm of the processes which occur in New 
York City as a whole.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we discussed how contact theory predicts that exposure to more diverse 
others will reduce prejudice, at least under the right sort of circumstances. The background and 
context of the sample used to gather data for this dissertation was elaborated so that the reader 
can situate the theory in both a specific moment of deciding who to vote for in the 2016 election 
and a specific population and ecology: introductory psychology students at the College of Staten 
Island in New York City. 
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9. Method 
Participants and Materials 
This research collected self-report and survey data from undergraduate students 
participating in the research pool at the College of Staten Island. Participants completed an 
online consent form and an anonymous online survey. Measures have been selected, mostly from 
validated questionnaires, inventories and scales:  
Participants 
Undergraduate students at the College of Staten Island, of the City University of New 
York, received two research credits for completing an online survey. After participants 
completed an IRB-approved consent form, the survey was administered through Qualtrics survey 
software. 
Students attend CSI from all over the city, leading to an admixture of residents from all 
five boroughs, Long Island, and New Jersey. While Staten Island has a different demographic 
profile than the rest of New York City, the circumstances at CSI mean that the College is not 
representative of Staten Island but more representative of New York City overall.  
Table 1.  
Number and Percentage of Sample by Gender.  
 Male Female Gender Fluid/Other 
N = 948 348 (36.7%) 591 (62.3%) 9 (0.9%) 
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The percentage of participants who identified as female (table 1) was 62.3% (with 9 
participants identifying as gender fluid/other). While 90.4% of the participants were emerging 
adults between the ages of 18-24, the ages of participants ranged from 18-60 years old. 
Table 2.  
Age Distribution of Sample 
Age  Frequency (Percent)  
18-24 864 (90.4%) 
25-30 55 (5.8%) 
31-35 16 (1.7%) 
36-40 5 (0.5%) 
41-50 12 (1.3%) 
51-60 3 (0.3%) 
 
In the current sample (n=920), 28.9% of the respondents were primarily of European 
ancestry, 21.9% had roots in Latin America, and 12.7% were Muslim, Arab or Middle Eastern. 
The remaining 24.4% were of various other ethnicities and races including 5.3% West Indian, 
9.1% Black (two categories which overlap, and which were distinguished based on self-
identification). Of the total sample, 20% reported living in Staten Island, of which 49.62% were 
White (table 3 and figure 3). 
 
 
 
80 
 
Table 3 
 
Census Categories N=936 
  Frequency Percent 
Am. Indian/Alaska Nat. 1 0.1 
Asian 94 10 
Black 161 17.2 
Latin@ Not Otherwise Specified 183 19.6 
White 403 43.1 
Mixed Race 19 2 
Afro-Latin@ or Afro-Caribbean 14 1.5 
Latin@ with European or Arabic Ancestry 61 6.5 
 
 Table 4 presents the generational identities of participants in the sample, with almost 
twenty percent of the sample being composed of zeroth generation immigrants, and almost thirty 
percent being composed of first generation immigrants. The remaining half of the participants 
were composed of 1.5, second, 2.5 and third generation immigrants. Third generation immigrants 
should be thought of as 3+ since there is no data to determine how long their ancestors had been 
living in the US. 
Table 4 
Percentage of Participants by Number of Generations in the USA  
Place of Birth USA or Other Generation Frequency (Percent) 
Self not born in USA Zeroth 189 (19.8%) 
Self-born in USA, neither parent born in USA First 261 (27.3%) 
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Self-born in USA, one parent born in USA First 87 (9.1%) 
Self and parents born in USA, all grandparents 
not born in USA 
Second 78 (8.1%) 
Self and parents born in USA, some 
grandparents not born in USA 
Second 93 (9.7%) 
Self, parents, and all grandparents born in USA Third + 226 (23.6%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Census Categories (Race and Ethnicity), n=920 
 In addition to diversity in heritage culture and generation, the sample population had 
diversity of political preference as well. While participants who preferred Hillary Clinton 
outnumbered those who preferred Donald Trump by 2 to 1, almost half of the sample Preferred 
Racial Categories by percent, N=920
Am. Indian/Alaska Nat. Asian
Black White
Mixed Race Latin@ Not Otherwise Specified
Afro-Latin@ or Afro-Carribean Latin@ with European or Arabic Ancestry
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Not to Vote, almost outnumbering voters who stated a preference for Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton Combined. 
Table 5.  
Voting Preferences/Decision in 2016 Election (n=955) 
Candidate 
Frequency 
(Percent) 
Hillary Clinton 308 (32.25%) 
Donald Trump 162 (16.96%) 
Jill Stein 13 (1.36%) 
Gary Johnson 13 (1.36%) 
Preferred Not to Vote  459 (48.05%) 
Total 955 (100.0%) 
 
 The college of Staten Island also has a high degree of religions diversity, with only 
48.0% of the sample reporting some form of Christianity as their affiliation. 
Table 6.  
Religious Affiliations 
Religion 
Frequency 
(Percent) 
Christian (unspecified) 126 (13.7%) 
Catholic or other Orthodox (including Coptic) 230 (25.0%) 
Protestant 86 (9.3%) 
83 
 
Other Abrahamic Sect (e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Rastafarian) 
6 (0.7 %) 
Jew 26 (2.8%) 
Muslim 100 (10.9%) 
Secular/Atheist/None 152 (16.5 %) 
Spiritual/Agnostic/IDK 70 (7.6%) 
Buddhist 17 (1.8%) 
New Age (including Pagan, Wiccan, Hare Krishna, 
Satanism) 
5 (0.5%) 
Mixed 6 (0.7%) 
 
Materials  
Social desirability.  
The Brief Social Desirability Scale (Haghighat, 2007) consists of 5 items (3 are positively 
coded, e.g., “Would you smile at people each time you see them?” and 2 are negatively coded, 
e.g. “Would you ever lie to people”). It assesses susceptibility to the social desirability bias, or 
how likely people are to answer items in a way they believe the researcher desires. It has low 
reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .50). 
Measures of voting preference and eligibility to vote  
Participants answered closed-ended questions about who they voted for (or would have 
voted for if they were ineligible to vote at the time) and whether or not they were eligible to vote 
at the time of the election (see table 5). The original 7 categories included the four nationally 
balloted candidates: Hillary Clinton, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Donald Trump. They also included 
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three versions of “Preferred Not to Vote,” including “because disliked all options,” “because had 
no opinion,” and “other.” In the multinomial regression presented in table 10, 11, 12 and 13, the 
categories presented to participants were reduced from 7 to 3 (Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton 
and Preferred Not to Vote, where Johnson and Stein voters were eliminated from the analysis). 
Authoritarianism  
A four-item scale measuring parenting attitudes was used to measure authoritarianism 
(Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Drawing from attachment research on parenting 
styles, Feldman’s measure of authoritarianism identifies people’s worldview on authority and 
order through their self-reported parenting style. The scale has four questions with two options. 
The score is calculated by summing or average the forced-choice responses. While the scale 
often has had low reliability, it has had enormous success in predicting prejudicial attitudes 
towards minorities. The scale uses forced choice options which require participants to choose 
which they value more: fostering a sense of authority (authoritarianism) or fostering autonomy. It 
has low reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .57). 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
 Graham et al. (2011) have normed their Fairness/Reciprocity dimension by cross-
validating it with social dominance orientation, importance of being fair/just and endorsement of 
social justice attitudes. It represents the inverse of social dominance, but is intended to be used to 
capture political attitudes about social dominance and social justice. The Fairness/Reciprocity 
dimension of Graham et al.’s scale has low internal reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .66). 
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Perceived threat from Immigrants.  
In two separate items, participants were asked to rank, on a 5-point scale from A great 
deal to None at all, “How much danger or risk do the following issues put you in?” “Mexican or 
other Latino Immigrants,” and “Muslim or Arab Immigrants.” Higher scores indicate more 
perceived threat.  
Sexism 
To gain greater detail on one issue, that of sexism, I included a scale to measure their 
endorsement of two forms of sexism, hostile sexism and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 
1996). Hostile sexism assumes that feminists are using complaints about sexism, Title IX, etc., to 
intentionally manipulate the system for gain. Benevolent sexism, on the other hand, assumes no 
insidiousness but views women as fragile, weak and in need of protection and saving. The scale 
has moderate reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .71). 
Media literacy  
Literat 
Of the 12 original subscales published by Literat (2014) in her New Media Literacy Scale 
(NML), we selected 6 for relevance to the current work: Play, Distributed Cognition, Collective 
Intelligence, Judgement, Networking, Negotiation. Overall the scales had moderate reliability in 
the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .85). In addition, we included a separate scale that 
Literat used for purposes of validating the underlying constructs of the NML scale and which she 
called “Civic Mindedness.” Each subscale was composed of 5 items, and civic mindedness was 
composed of 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .68). 
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Table 7. 
Subscales from Literat New Media Literacy Measure (2014) 
Subscale name Literat definition 
Play the capacity to experiment with one’s surroundings as a form of 
problem-solving 
Distributed 
Cognition 
the ability to interact meaningfully with tools that expand mental 
capacities 
Collective 
Intelligence 
the ability to pool knowledge and compare notes with others toward a 
common goal 
Judgment the ability to evaluate the reliability and credibility of different 
information sources 
Networking 
the ability to search for, synthesize and disseminate information. 
Negotiation 
the ability to travel across diverse communities, discerning and 
respecting multiple perspectives, and grasping and following alternative 
norms 
 
Belief change Resistance 
Belief change was measured with a task designed to capture students pre-conceived 
opinions and their possible belief change after reading two websites: a) a site which supported 
misconceptions but had clear indicators of unreliability such as no attribution to author, no 
citations, clickbait ads, etc., and b) a Snopes.com page that specifically addressed false news (a 
“corrective article”).  Snopes.com is a site whose purpose is to debunk Internet myths and false 
news, to fact check and source references, and has many indicators of reliability, including 
author bios as well as author attributions and references. The first story was about genetically 
modified organisms creating super-pests and health problems. The second story claimed voter 
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fraud was perpetrated by undocumented voters in the 2016 presidential election. Both stories are 
widely circulated and debunked, but one is related to the current political climate while one is 
not. Students rated their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly 
Disagree at three-time points: before being exposed to any site (preconceived opinions), after 
being exposed to an unreliable site and after being exposed to Snopes.com debunking the myth. 
The variable “belief change” was calculated by subtracting their rating at the first time point they 
were exposed to that issues from their rating at the third time point they were exposed to that 
same issue. 
Identity.  
I included open-ended questions that allow students to describe themselves and their 
cultural origins in their own words, as well as short-answer open-ended questions that prompt 
students to give the most specific information they know about their families and family origins. 
For example, many cross-cultural studies ask about country of origin, but several countries with 
strong representation of zeroth generation (immigrants) students have intricately complex ethno-
linguistic diversity within the nation (see figure 2 for an example: a map of complex ethno-
linguistic diversity in Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin). 
Using an open-ended question, we asked participants to describe their ethnicity in their 
own words. Additionally, we asked participants to share the country or countries that thy or their 
ancestors came from.  Finally, we asked participants what are the cities, towns, regions or other 
more specific heritage origins that they or their ancestors were from.  All three of these questions 
were open ended and used to generate codes for identity (for reliability, see section on Identity 
Coding below).  The codes included: specificity of knowledge of heritage origin, specificity of 
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geographic origin in identity statements, and type of identity statement, as well as basic census 
categories.  
 At the opening of the survey, students received the following prompt:  
Please write 1-2 words that you feel best describes your ethnicity. For 
example:  You could use the name of people from the country where your 
ancestors came from - such as “Chinese” or “Chinese American,” OR a group of 
people that do not overlap with one country - such as “West Indian,” “African 
American,” “Han Chinese,” “Hausa.” 
 
Whatever was written in this box by participants was then piped throughout the 
survey so that, on any question where the question was specific to the participant’s 
ethnicity, their own words would be inserted.  For example, if a participant wrote “Italian 
American,” then on the question of “What percentage of your neighborhood is like you,” 
they would see “What percentage of your neighborhood is Italian American.” This 
question will be referred to as participants’ ethnic identity statement. 
In addition, participants were asked to state their religion in their own words 
(religious affiliation), their heritage countries (heritage country) in their own words, and 
the cities, towns or regions (heritage region) their ancestors came from in their own 
words. From these variables, qualitative coding systems were developed as described 
below. 
Census Categories 
 Using three categories — ethnic identity statement, heritage country and heritage region — 
I developed a coding scheme to establish how participants might have answered a standard 
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Census Category question. The nature of the data led to some minor modifications, since the 
census would force a participant to choose between Latin@ - White and Latin@ - Black, and an 
open-ended statement cannot do that. Additionally, a large percentage of participants in the 
sample seemed to consider themselves racially black, from a theoretical perspective of what 
“Race” is (Foner & Fredrickson, 2004), yet specifically identified using terms like West Indian, 
Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Latin@. I made the decision to treat identities of West Indian like those, 
on the census, of Latin@ - Black, since they represent a distinct group and identity from African 
Americans whose ancestors have been in the United States for 5 generations or more, but only 
when the specifically identified this way in their ethnic identity statement. If their ethnic identity 
statement represented their identity as simply “Black” and I could tell from the other variables 
that they were not African American, I left them as “Black” to respect their identity statements 
(see table 3 above). Many participants were from central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan. The census considers Arabs to be “White,” and so I decided to 
group countries that were west of Afghanistan as “White,” such that Iranians would be “White” 
and Pakistanis would be “Asian,” since many of the Pakistanis identified as Asian.  Finally, 
Latin@s who identified as Latin@ or Hispanic and additionally made a statement about being 
“White,” “Caucasian,” or including a heritage country in their identity statement whose historic 
population is now considered “White” were categorized as “Latin@ - White,” but it is important 
to note that the heritage countries in this category were partially European and partially Arab 
countries. 
For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 
20% of the data in this column, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .81. 
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Religious Categories  
 Thirty distinct religious identities were used in the data sample, which were coded into 
eleven codes. The thirty identities were: Christian, Catholic or other Orthodox, Coptic, Eastern 
Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Protestant, Baptist, Born again, Evangelical, Lutheran, Methodist, 
Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Seventh Day Adventist, Other Abrahamic Sect, Jehovah’s Witness, 
Mormon, Rastafarian, Judaism, Muslim, Muslim - Shia, Muslim - Sunni, Buddhist, New Age, 
Wicca/Pagan, Hare Krishna, Atheist, Secular, Agnostic, Spiritual.  
These thirty codes were grouped together into eleven codes. Some participants identified 
as only Christian, and after some debate as to what this might mean, they were grouped together. 
Some participants, as can be seen above, identified orthodox Christian institutions, so that 
became a code, grouping Greek, Eastern, Catholic and Coptic Orthodox churches together. The 
protestant religions, most of which emerged in the United States, were grouped together as 
Protestant. The only exceptions to this were Jehovah’s Witnesses, who occupy a complicated 
place among Christians, and so they were identified, along with Rastafarians and Mormons as 
“Other Abrahamic Sects.” Some Muslims specified whether they were Sunni or Shia, but many 
did not, and so Muslims were grouped together as “Muslim,” as “Jews” were grouped together as 
“Jews” regardless of statements of orthodoxy, reform, etc.  
The most challenging codes to apply were “Secular/Atheist” and “Spiritual/Agnostic.” 
For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 20% of 
the data in this column, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .95. 
Know Specificity 
 This variable was coded from heritage country and heritage region/city variables. Six 
codes were established, with “I Don’t Know” being coded as 0, and “Refuse to answer” as 5. The 
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other four codes were “Region,” “Country,” “Sub-National Region,” and “City/Town/Village.” 
Italian levels of specificity were complex because most cities are also regions, such that 
Napolitano can refer to someone from Naples or the surrounding area. In these cases, I chose to 
defer to the category of city. 
 Sicily, Fujian and Gujarat were common codes that were coded as sub-national regions as 
well. Puerto Rico was coded as country even though it is not technically an independent country, 
because sub-national region was meant for regions that are clearly contiguous with the rest of the 
country legally if not geographically (e.g. Sicily).  Many people knew the name of a heritage city 
but the city was a large metropolitan center, presenting a similar conceptual problem to those 
described in this paragraph already.  
The coded was assigned based on the most specific level of the participant offered. For 
example, if they said they were Irish and Italian and then said Bari (an Italian city-region) and 
Northern Ireland, they would still be coded as city because they named the city of Bari. 
For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 
20% of the data in the responses in this qualitative variable, and the value of Kappa for the two 
coders was .729, a moderate level of reliability. 
Types of IDs (race, place, religion) 
 Three dimensions of the ethnic identity statements were established: Place (as in heritage 
or host places), Race (defined here as self-identified visual characteristics that suggest some level 
of descent from a genetic population defined by major geographic features such as continents, 
oceans and mountain ranges), and religious affiliation. Only 1.7% of participants employed 
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religion in their ethnic identity statements. Place was conceptually divided into two components, 
heritage identities and host identities (i.e. using the word American in your identity statement).  
 
Table 8. 
Coding Scheme of  Types of Statements Used in Ethnic Identity Statements. (N=920) 
Code Percent 
Religion 0.4 
American + Religion 0.2 
Religion + Race 0.1 
Race (including Black, African American, White and Caucasian, mixed) 22 
American + Race (e.g. White American, Black American) 3 
Heritage Country (including former countries) 17.8 
American + Heritage Country or Region (e.g. Irish American, Arab 
American, or Hispanic American) 
 
24.5 
Tribe 0.9 
Region (pan-national, including Hispanic, Latino, West Indian, and Latin 
American) 16.1 
Region (Autonomous sub-national zone, including protectorates and 
reservations) 2.5 
City or other Sub-national Zone (non autonomous) 0.1 
Place + Religion (e.g. Russian Jew) 1 
Place + Race (heritage country or region, e.g. Afro Carribean and Haitian) 3.3 
Heritage Country + Heritage Region 1.8 
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Table 9.  
Occurrence of Dimension of Type of Specificity of Identity Self-Descriptors (Note that 
codes can co-occur) (N=920) 
 
 
Dimensions of type of specificity of identity self-descriptors Percent 
Place-based heritages 67.93 
Religion 1.74 
Race 28.37 
“American” as part of identity 27.72 
 
For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 
20% of the data in this column, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .77, a moderate 
level of reliability. 
Acculturation and Immigration Measures 
Generation (and recent immigrant versus multi-generational immigrant) 
 Participants were asked three questions, all of which were close-ended, about their 
residency history in this country. The first question asked whether or not they were born in the 
US. The second question asked whether one, both or neither of their parents was born in the US. 
The third question asked whether some, none or all of their grandparents were born in the US.  
The variable “immigrants” was created from combining Zeroth Generation participants 
with First and 1.5 Generation participants who had one or two parents who had immigrated to 
the U.S. in their lifetimes, suggesting close ties with the experiences of immigrants. All others 
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were coded as multi-generational immigrants (i.e. “non-immigrants,” including Second 
Generation, 2.5 Generation and Third Generation participants)1 (42.6% of the sample). 
Six individuals reported that they were not born in the US but both parents and all four 
grandparents were born in the US. These participants were coded as Zeroth Generation. Two 
participants reported that one parent was born in the US but they, themselves, were not born in 
the US. They were coded as Zeroth Generation as well. Four participants reported that one parent 
was born here but all four grandparents were born here. These participants were coded as 3rd 
generation. 
Acculturation Scales 
The validated scales draw from the literature on acculturation.  Research on acculturation 
seeks to understand how people negotiate their identity in cross-cultural contact, and to 
understand the cultural changes that occur because of that contact. I pulled from two validated 
scales, 1) Berry’s model of acculturation attitudes, which looks at immigrants’ negotiation of the 
tensions between their culture of origin and their current cultural environment (Berry, 1997; 
Berry, 2005; Berry, 2009; Berry, 2010; Berry, 2011) and 2) the Suinn-Lew Asian Self-Identity 
Acculturation Scale (SL-ASIA), which focus more on navigating identity but is particularly 
                                                 
1 Zeroth generation represents a person who was not born in the US. First generation represents a person who was 
born in the US, but both parents were born outside the US. Generation 1.5, represented a person who was born in the 
US, and one parent was also born in the US, but the other parent was born outside the use. Second generation 
represented a person who was born in the US along with both of their parents. Similar to 1.5 generation, 2.5 
generation represented someone who was born in the US along with both parents, but only some of their 
grandparents were born in the US.  Third generation (Conceptualized of as 3+) represented a person who had been 
born in the US along with both parents and all grandparents. I chose this scheme because 0 is the foundation of the 
number line, but is also fundamentally unique from other numbers. Conceptually, American law treats citizens and 
residents who were not born in the USA differently from citizens who were born in the USA, and culturally, this is 
likely to have an impact too, with Zeroth generation residents having much more direct transnational experience and 
contact than other Americans. However, I have no intention of implying that Zeroth generation Americans are not 
American, they are as American as other Americans as 0 is a number like 1, 2, and 3. 
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designed for Asians rather than phrased to include any immigrant group, like Berry’s (Suinn, 
Rickard-Figueroa & Lew, 1987).  
Berry 
Berry describes three methodologies for assessing this information, from scales to 
vignettes to a single continuous measure, all of which ask respondents how they acculturate, or 
how value their various cultural communities and contexts. Acculturation, in general, is 
described as having two dimensions out of which four patterns emerge. Dimension 1 can be 
described as the range of attitudes towards one’s heritage cultural identity, and dimension 2 
concerns the desire to have contact with members of the larger (current) society. These two, 2-
dimensional scales result, when crossed, in four possible outcomes, (1) assimilation, (2) 
integration, (3) separation and (4) marginalization. Assimilation refers to the individuals wish to 
participate in the larger society without maintaining the heritage society. Integration, on the other 
hand, embraces both heritage culture and larger society. Separation indicates a desire to focus on 
maintaining heritage culture without participation in the larger society, and Marginalization 
represents a rejection of both heritage culture and the larger society.  
Suinn-Lew 
The second source of a validated scale draws from the Suinn-Lew Asian Self-Identity 
Acculturation Scale (SL-ASIA). This scale was originally devised to evaluate how immigrants 
from East Asian and South East Asian countries acculturated, and the phrasing targets Asian 
Americans (Suinn et al., 1987). Many items are oriented towards Asian-specific things that may 
not be applicable to other regions from which people have emigrated to the USA (e.g. Question: 
Which identification does (did) your mother use? Answers: 1. Oriental/2. Asian/3. Asian 
American/ 4. Chinese American, Japanese American, Korean American, etc./5. American), so 
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these items were dropped.  Items that asked questions that were not represented by the Berry 
scale were adapted to use terms like “your cultural group” versus “another cultural group.” I tried 
not to imply that one culture was dominant, or prioritized, or that America had a monoculture. 
Open-ended questions asked at the beginning of this section can be used to pipe text based on 
students self-identified cultural identity and cultural “opposition” or “contrast” identity. 
Perry 
 Perry’s Acculturation measures include Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Colorblindness.  
Assimilation measures one’s attitudes towards immigrants, and a high score on this subscale 
would integrate a general attitude that immigrants are obligated to “Americanize” by sacrificing 
elements of their heritage culture, and that they are unwelcome unless they do so.  
Multiculturalism, by contrast, represents the idea that “America’s promise is as a nation of 
immigrants,” (Gonzalez, 2018) 
Measures of cross-cultural constructs  
In the context of understanding how different cultures may differentially shape the way 
people reason about moral decisions and reasoning, the source of authority is a very important 
concept to understand. The source of authority may be focused on many different levels, for 
example, “authority” may refer to the findings produced by empirical scientific findings. 
Authority may, for others, stem from a deity or a philosopher or an institution such as the 
Catholic Church. Authority may also be situated within an individual or within various levels of 
group structure, such as the immediate family, extended family, the extended community, 
society, or even humanity. Authority may be inflexible or flexible. Attitudes to authority may a) 
be related to moral reasoning and b) be related to culture. When authority is related to culture, it 
may be detectable by using scales for evaluating individualism and collectivism. While both 
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individualism and collectivism likely serve the same function of binding a community with 
cultural values, norms and prescriptions for interactions, they orient towards different foci of 
authority. Extreme individualism may be localizing the focus of authority internally to a single 
person, whereas collectivism localizes the authority at some level of the group, either the family, 
the community, the society or some other level. 
Neighborhood diversity.  
Participants were asked “What percentage of your neighborhood are ______,” with the 
blank auto-populated by piping in the self-reported ethnicity that the participant had written in. 
This variable is referred to below as “%Neighborhood Diversity.” Future research with the 
current data set will be able to determine the accuracy of these perceptions based on matching 
the data with census reports of neighborhood composition. 
Individualism/Collectivism 
I will include three measures of individualism/independence versus 
collectivism/interdependence. The first measure of personal-level Individualism and collectivism 
is Triandis and Gelfand. Triandis and Gelfand suggested a bi-dimensional approach, including 
“horizontal” and “vertical” dimensions (Triandis & Gelfand 1998).  
The second measure for individualism/collectivism is a published adaptation of Markus’s 
and Kitayama’s (1991; 2003) scale evaluating independence and interdependence (Singelis, 
1994). These terms are like “collectivism/individualism,” except that the authors were able to 
create a more sensitive description of interdependence drawn from an internal perspective of a 
member of an interdependent culture.  The features they associate with a self-construal of 
interdependence are belongingness, reliance, dependency, empathy, occupying one’s proper 
place, and reciprocity. 
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Country Code (Hofstede and Gelfand transformations) 
The third way we will be assessing individualism/collectivism is by using participants 
statements about their heritage countries to create a variable which predicts that the cultural 
means of individualism in each person’s combined heritage countries will predict something 
about their behavior. We used Hofstede’s research on his 6 cross cultural dimensions, plugging 
in the predicted rank number for a given country that a person claims as part of their heritage.  
For example, Hofstede ranks Italy as a “76” on his scale of individualism, where higher 
numbers indicate greater levels of individualism. If a given participant reported having Irish and 
Italian heritage, they would receive a 70 in the first column for Ireland, and then a 76 in the 
second column for Italy. Since no person stated more than 6 countries, that is the maximum 
number of columns. Our participant of Irish-Italian descent would simply have the remaining 4 
columns blank.  To calculate the person’s score on Hofstede’s Individualism Scale for the 
purposes of our study, we would take an average of 70 (for Ireland) and 76 (for Italy) and the 
person would then have a score of 73. This score would be used as a continuous variable. Since 
Hofstede has 6 dimensions, a score is calculated for each dimension, of Power Distance 
(Pow/Dist), Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MASC), Long Term Orientation (LTO), 
Uncertainty Avoidance (Uncert. Avoid.), and Indulgence (Indulg.).  
Fuligni Family Orientation 
Just as individualism and collectivism are broad, society-level, organizational strategies, 
the bonds and responsibilities one is expected to show to one’s family can vary by culture and 
are part of the cohesion and organizational functioning of that culture.  Fuligni’s scale has three 
components (2007), a measure of one’s sense of obligation and willingness to provide current 
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assistance to members of one’s family, to provide future assistance to one’s family, and respect 
for one’s family, particularly elders. 
DUREL Religiosity.  
I included a published measure of religiosity (Koenig & Büssing, 2010), because religion 
is an important part of most cultures, and many people define themselves in terms of their 
religiosity. Religion, prior to philosophy, was the dominant force that overtly and implicitly 
codified the ethics of believers. Philosophical writings often stem from the values of and writings 
on institutional religion or occupy the place of theistic ethical codes where “religion” does not 
take charge of moral behavior. In a bidirectional interaction, these philosophical-religious values 
impact the routines, rituals and daily expressions of the religion that constitute a large portion of 
the ideology present in all individuals of that society, whether they are believers or not. Societal 
emphasis on religion (an ecological factor) has been shown to mediate the impact of religious 
belief on moral behavior (Stavrova & Siegers, 2014). Therefore, I included a scale to evaluate 
religiosity. 
Graham - Moral Foundations Questionnaire 
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire, or MFQ, (Graham, et al., 2011) has five 
subscales, including Harm/Care, Purity/Sanctity, Authority/Respect, Ingroup-Loyalty, and 
Fairness/Reciprocity. It was intended to understand political differences between left and right 
ideologies in terms of moral attitudes, equating political ideologies with morality. 
Graham and colleagues have done extensive cross-scale validation work to identify and 
demonstrate which psychological constructs their five dimensions are tapping into and to situate 
their research in larger, interdisciplinary traditions. Harm/Care is associated with empathy, 
Fairness/Reciprocity is the converse of social dominance/social justice sense, In-Group Loyalty 
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is associated with loyalty, national security and family security, similar to collectivism, 
Authority/Respect is authoritarianism, and finally, Purity/Sanctity measures the emotion of 
disgust and self-reported religiosity. 
Big Five Aspects Scales “Intellect” 
An intermediate point of precision between the original Big Five and the Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory, which has 6 facets for each of the Big Five, the BFAS has two aspects for 
each of the big five (DeYoung, Quilty & Peterson, 2007).  Intellect is one half of the 
Openness/Intellect trait. These items were included because previous research had found that 
Openness to experience was a predictor of liberal or socially progressive political values (Hiel & 
Mervielde, 2004), and it seemed important to understand whether it was openness to general 
experiences/arts or something closer to a need for cognition (NFC) (Cacioppo, Petty & Feng 
Kao, 1984) 
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10. Results 
Analytic Approach 
 Multinomial Logistic regressions were used to compare how well different constructs 
predicted voters’ preferences for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Preferred Not to Vote. First, 
a multinomial regression model comparing predictors of voting preferences was run between 
participants who preferred Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and those who Preferred Not to Vote 
using Hillary Clinton as a reference category. Using one of the candidates as reference category 
allows a comparison of the preferences of participants who stated a preference for a candidate.  
Second, the same model was run again, rotating the reference category from Hillary Clinton to 
those who Preferred Not to Vote. This second version highlights the differences between those 
who actively stated a preference and those who, more passively, Preferred Not to Vote, an 
important consideration since the largest category was participants who Preferred Not to Vote. 
Two models were run, each of which is presented first with Hillary Clinton as the 
reference category and then with “Preferred Not to Vote” as the reference category: In the first 
model, the predictor variables were limited to what has been found in prior research (hostile 
sexism, authoritarianism, social dominance, fear of immigrants) in order to replicate earlier 
findings in a diverse and unusual sample. In the second model, several new predictors were 
added, based on emerging ideas about the role of culture in shaping values and moral decisions, 
and thus in voting preferences. Data were collected on many variables, so it was important to 
check for collinearity between variables used in the model, particularly between parallel 
constructs such as Triandis’ individualism and Hofstede’s individualism codes. No variables 
exceeded recommended limits for collinearity, even in a complex model such as this one. (Note: 
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model fit data does not change when the reference category is rotated, so model fit data is only 
presented once). 
Research Question 1 and 2: Voting Preference Predictors 
Replication of previous research on predictors of voting preferences? 
I hypothesized (1a) that constructs identified in previous research, including 
authoritarianism and hostile sexism, would replicate as predictors of voting preferences in the 
2016 election, and in a multicultural community. Two multinomial logistic regressions were 
performed to ascertain the effects of Hostile Sexism (Glick and Fiske, 1996), authoritarianism 
(Feldman & Stenner, 1997), and social dominance orientation calculated from Graham et al.’s 
Fairness/Reciprocity Dimension (2011) on the likelihood that participants preferred to vote for 
Hillary, Donald, or preferred not to vote.   
Table 10 
Multinomial logistic regression of prior predictors for voting preference 
(n=633) 
    B SE p Exp(B) 
Donald 
Trump 
Intercept -2.81 0.83 <0.01   
Sexism - Hostile 0.85 0.12 <0.01 2.34 
Feldman - 
Authoritarianism 0.13 0.08 0.12 1.14 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.94 
Preferred 
not to 
vote 
Intercept 0.77 0.60 0.20   
Sexism - Hostile 0.24 0.08 <0.01 1.27 
Feldman - 
Authoritarianism -0.04 0.06 0.51 0.96 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.95 
NOTE: The reference category is Hillary Clinton 
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The logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2(8) = 86.82, p < .0005. The 
model explained 10.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in voting preference. Of the 3 predictor 
variables, 2 were statistically significant predictors of whether participants preferred Hillary 
Clinton or preferred not to vote: low hostile sexism and low social dominance orientation. Of 
those same 3 predictor variables, 2 were statistically significant predictors of whether 
participants preferred Donald Trump over preferred not to vote: high authoritarianism, and high 
hostile sexism. High sexism, and high social dominance orientation were statistically significant 
predictors of a preference for Donald Trump over a preference for Hillary Clinton. 
Table 11 
Multinomial logistic regression of prior predictors for voting preference 
(n=633) 
    B SE p Exp(B) 
Hillary 
Clinton 
Intercept -0.77 0.60 0.20   
Sexism - Hostile -0.24 0.08 <0.01 0.79 
Feldman - 
Authoritarianism 0.04 0.06 0.51 1.04 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) 0.05 0.02 0.01 1.05 
Donald 
Trump 
Intercept -3.58 0.76 <0.01   
Sexism - Hostile 0.62 0.11 <0.01 1.85 
Feldman - 
Authoritarianism 0.17 0.08 0.03 1.18 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) -0.02 0.02 0.50 0.98 
NOTE: The reference category is Preferred Not to Vote 
New predictors of voting preferences: Deepening our understanding of the role of 
old and new culture. 
 Why are some people more authoritarian and sexist? Answers to this question provide 
both basic scientific knowledge about the nature of decision making and prejudice, but also 
actionable recommendations for how to redress these issues in our society. Starting from a 
standpoint that most drivers underlying voting preferences are shaped by the values of those 
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around us, or our culture(s), I make three hypotheses about the role of culture in the 2016 
election. 
1b: I hypothesized that certain roles and experiences, such as being non-white, being an 
immigrant, and being a woman, will align voter preferences with liberal policies. 
2a: I hypothesized that values from the heritage cultures of current Americans will shape 
people’s voting preferences, even in geographical separation from the heritage culture’s original 
environment. 
2b: I hypothesized that media literacy will play a role in voting preferences through 
people’s sense of agency in searching out solutions to current problems, and their capacity to 
accommodate corrective information to misinformation. 
A multinomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of 21 predictors 
on participant’s preferences to vote for either one of the main candidates or their preference not 
to vote at all. Participants who preferred Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton were significantly 
whiter, less recent immigrants, had higher hostile sexism, higher authoritarianism, higher social 
dominance, belief change resistance about GMOs being toxic2, higher Hofstede-based heritage-
culture individualism, and more fear of immigrants.   
 
                                                 
2 Belief Change Resistance - GMOs: Participants preconceived beliefs about GMOs were initially high, but dropped, 
on average, by .20 Likert scale points (n=915), after exposure to the corrective information. This outcome could be 
considered, generally, as belief change acceptance. In task 2, however, preconceptions were higher than after 
exposure to corrective information, also by .2 (n=915), in the opposite direction. This can be described as belief 
change resistance. The acceptance of corrective information for GMOs was statistically higher than the response to 
corrective information about undocumented immigrants voting in the 2016 election, t(935) = 6.213, p < .001. 
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Table 12 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Hypothetical Predictors for Voting 
Preference (reference category = Hillary Clinton) (N=633) 
    B SE p Exp(B) 
Donald 
Trump 
Intercept -6.17 1.85 <0.01   
Sexism - Hostile 0.79 0.16 <0.01 2.20 
Feldman - Authoritarianism 0.33 0.13 0.01 1.38 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) -0.12 0.04 <0.01 0.89 
Fear of Immigrants (Threat) 0.27 0.11 0.02 1.31 
Literat Civic Engagement 0.30 0.22 0.18 1.34 
Literat NML 0.50 0.40 0.22 1.64 
Political Knowledge 0.16 0.12 0.16 1.18 
Belief Change (Immig) -0.08 0.10 0.41 0.93 
Belief Change (GMO) -0.29 0.10 0.01 0.75 
Hofstede -  Individualism 0.03 0.01 <0.01 1.03 
Triandis - Individualism 0.19 0.12 0.12 1.20 
Triandis - Collectivism -0.02 0.13 0.88 0.98 
Kitayama - Independence -0.44 0.28 0.11 0.64 
Kitayama - Interdependence -0.12 0.29 0.67 0.89 
Haghighat - Social 
Desirability 0.29 0.65 0.66 1.33 
Neighborhood Homogeneity -0.01 0.01 0.14 0.99 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Not 0.20 0.30 0.51 1.22 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Yes       
Gender - Male 0.26 0.31 0.40 1.30 
Gender - Female         
Immig. Status (0-1.5 Gen) 0.99 0.37 0.01 2.70 
Immig. Status (2-3 Gen)         
White - Non-White -1.61 0.43 <0.01 0.20 
White - White         
Preferred 
Not to 
Vote 
Intercept 1.15 1.18 0.33   
Sexism - Hostile 0.27 0.10 0.01 1.30 
Feldman - Authoritarianism -0.09 0.08 0.24 0.91 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) -0.07 0.03 0.02 0.94 
Fear of Immigrants (Threat) 0.01 0.08 0.87 1.01 
Literat Civic Engagement -0.33 0.14 0.02 0.72 
Literat NML 0.18 0.26 0.50 1.19 
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Political Knowledge -0.07 0.08 0.37 0.93 
Belief Change  (Immig) 0.02 0.06 0.81 1.02 
Belief Change (GMO) -0.13 0.07 0.07 0.88 
Hofstede -  Individualism 0.01 0.01 0.37 1.01 
Triandis - Individualism -0.04 0.08 0.63 0.96 
Triandis - Collectivism 0.09 0.09 0.30 1.09 
Kitayama - Independence -0.16 0.19 0.40 0.86 
Kitayama - Interdependence 0.26 0.19 0.17 1.30 
Haghighat - Social 
Desirability 0.33 0.43 0.44 1.40 
Neighborhood Homogeneity 0.00 0.00 0.23 1.00 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Not -0.22 0.20 0.26 0.80 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Yes       
Gender - Male 0.02 0.21 0.92 1.02 
Gender - Female         
Immig. Status (0-1.5 Gen) 0.15 0.24 0.54 1.16 
Immig. Status (2-3 Gen)         
White - Non-White -0.34 0.24 0.16 0.71 
White - White         
NOTE: The reference category is Hillary Clinton 
 
The multinomial logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2(40) = 260.65, 
p < .0005. The model explained 38.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in voting preference. Of 
the 21 predictor variables 4 were statistically significant preferences for Hillary Clinton over a 
preference not to vote: Low hostile sexism, low social dominance orientation, high civic 
engagement, and high belief change acceptance of corrective information about GMOs.  
Table 13 
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Hypothetical Predictors for Voting 
Preference (reference category = Preferred Not to Vote) (n=633) 
    B SE p Exp(B) 
Hillary 
Clinton 
Intercept -1.15 1.18 0.33   
Sexism - Hostile -0.27 0.10 0.01 0.77 
Feldman - Authoritarianism 0.09 0.08 0.24 1.10 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) 0.07 0.03 0.02 1.07 
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Fear of Immigrants (Threat) -0.01 0.08 0.87 0.99 
Literat Civic Engagement 0.33 0.14 0.02 1.39 
Literat NML -0.18 0.26 0.50 0.84 
Political Knowledge 0.07 0.08 0.37 1.07 
Belief Change (Immig) -0.02 0.06 0.81 0.99 
Belief Change (GMO) 0.13 0.07 0.07 1.14 
Hofstede -  Individualism -0.01 0.01 0.37 0.99 
Triandis - Individualism 0.04 0.08 0.63 1.04 
Triandis - Collectivism -0.09 0.09 0.30 0.92 
Kitayama - Independence 0.16 0.19 0.40 1.17 
Kitayama - Interdependence -0.26 0.19 0.17 0.77 
Haghighat - Social 
Desirability -0.33 0.43 0.44 0.72 
Neighborhood Homogeneity 0.00 0.00 0.23 1.00 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Not 0.22 0.20 0.26 1.25 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Yes       
Gender - Male -0.02 0.21 0.92 0.98 
Gender - Female         
Immig. Status (0-1.5 Gen) -0.15 0.24 0.54 0.86 
Immig. Status (2-3 Gen)         
White - Non-White 0.34 0.24 0.16 1.40 
White - White         
Donald 
Trump 
Intercept -7.32 1.71 <0.01   
Sexism - Hostile 0.52 0.15 <0.01 1.69 
Feldman - Authoritarianism 0.42 0.12 <0.01 1.52 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) -0.06 0.04 0.16 0.95 
Fear of Immigrants (Threat) 0.26 0.10 0.01 1.29 
Literat Civic Engagement 0.63 0.21 <0.01 1.87 
Literat NML 0.32 0.37 0.39 1.38 
Political Knowledge 0.23 0.11 0.03 1.26 
Belief Change  (Immig) -0.09 0.09 0.29 0.91 
Belief Change (GMO) -0.16 0.09 0.08 0.85 
Hofstede -  Individualism 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.03 
Triandis - Individualism 0.22 0.11 0.04 1.25 
Triandis - Collectivism -0.11 0.12 0.36 0.90 
Kitayama - Independence -0.29 0.25 0.26 0.75 
Kitayama - Interdependence -0.38 0.27 0.15 0.68 
Haghighat - Social 
Desirability -0.05 0.61 0.94 0.96 
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Neighborhood Homogeneity 0.00 0.01 0.45 1.00 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Not 0.42 0.28 0.13 1.52 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16  - Yes       
Gender - Male 0.24 0.28 0.39 1.27 
Gender - Female         
Immig. Status (0-1.5 Gen) 0.85 0.35 0.02 2.33 
Immig. Status (2-3 Gen)         
White - Non-White -1.27 0.41 <0.01 0.28 
White - White         
NOTE: The reference category is Preferred Not to Vote 
 
Bernie Sanders 
In the sample collected for the current research, approximately 32% of participants who 
reported preferring Donald Trump in the general election also reported that they would have 
preferred to vote for Bernie Sanders if he had been an option in the general election when asked 
if there was a candidate from the primaries that they would have preferred. Of the participants in 
the sample who reported preferring Hillary Clinton, 85% of would have preferred Bernie. We 
can speculate that the remaining 15% of Hillary voters would likely have also voted the 
Democratic ticket, but even if that is not true, Bernie could have fared significantly better than 
Hillary did. A chi-square test of independence was conducted between voters who preferred 
Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump and voters who would have chosen Bernie Sanders rather than 
either main candidate had he been on the ballot, or not. All expected cell frequencies were 
greater than five. There was a statistically significant association between buyer type and type of 
property purchased, χ2(1) = 120.81, p < .001. 
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Table 14 
Percentage of Participants Who Would Have Preferred Bernie Sanders to the 
Candidates on the Final Election Ballot (N=486, including 26 likely voters for Gary 
Johnson and Jill Stein) 
  Trump Hillary Combined 
Did not prefer Bernie Sanders to 
available candidates 
104 (21.4%) 46 (9.5%) 150 (30.9%) 
Preferred Bernie Sanders to 
available candidates 
54 (11.1%) 256 (52.7%) 310 (63.8%) 
Total 158 (32.5%) 302 (62.1%) 486 
 
Predictors used to model the attitudes of participants who would have preferred 
Bernie Sanders over either Clinton or Trump. 
The binomial logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2(3) = 28.0, p 
< .0005. The model explained 8.2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in voting preference. Of the 
3 predictor variables 2 were statistically significant preferences for Bernie Sanders had he been 
on the ballot: Low hostile sexism and low authoritarianism.  
Table 15         
Binomial logistic regression of prior predictors for voting 
preference (n=815) 
  B SE p Exp(B) 
Constant 1.90 0.82 0.02 6.67 
Sexism - Hostile -0.32 0.10 0.00 0.73 
Feldman - Authoritarianism -0.24 0.08 0.01 0.79 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) 0.03 0.03 0.30 1.03 
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As with the regression models predicting a preference for Donald Trump, versus Hillary 
Clinton or a preference not to vote at all, a second binomial logistic regression model was run, 
with the full 21 predictors used about. The model was statistically significant, χ2(20) = 81.90, p 
< .0005. The model explained 17.0% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in voting preference. Of 
the 21 predictor variables 4 were statistically significant predictors of preferences for Bernie 
Sanders had he been on the ballot. As in the first model with prior predictors, low hostile sexism 
was predictive, as was belief change resistance to accepting corrective information about the 
myth that undocumented voters participated in the general election. Being ineligible to vote at 
the time of the election (due to being underage) and being a more recent immigrant (0, 1 or 1.5 
generation) were also significant predictors of a preference for Bernie Sanders, had he been on 
the ballot. 
Table 16 
Binomial Logistic Regression of Final Predictors for Voting 
Preference of Bernie Sanders (n=622) 
  B SE p Exp(B) 
Constant 3.48 1.21 <0.01 32.33 
Sexism - Hostile -0.25 0.10 0.01 0.78 
Feldman - Authoritarianism -0.11 0.08 0.17 0.90 
SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) 0.04 0.03 0.15 1.04 
Fear of Immigrants (Threat) -0.09 0.07 0.19 0.91 
Literat Civic Engagement 0.07 0.13 0.62 1.07 
Literat NML -0.04 0.25 0.88 0.96 
Political Knowledge 0.12 0.07 0.10 1.13 
Belief Change  (Immig) -0.15 0.06 0.01 0.86 
Belief Change (GMO) 0.07 0.07 0.27 1.08 
Hofstede -  Individualism 0.00 0.01 0.52 1.00 
Triandis - Individualism -0.07 0.07 0.37 0.94 
Triandis - Collectivism 0.01 0.08 0.90 1.01 
Kitayama - Independence -0.16 0.18 0.37 0.85 
Kitayama - Interdependence -0.07 0.18 0.71 0.93 
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Haghighat - Social 
Desirability -0.26 0.20 0.19 0.77 
Neighborhood Homogeneity 0.03 0.23 0.90 1.03 
Elig. To vote 11/09/16 -0.90 0.24 <0.01 0.41 
Gender 0.03 0.19 0.87 1.03 
Immig. Status -0.88 0.42 0.03 0.41 
White - Non-White 0.00 0.00 0.72 1.00 
 
Research Question 3: The role of heritage culture in the shaping of multigenerational 
transnational identities  
3a: I hypothesized that ethnic identity would play a long-term role in the identity of most 
Americans. 
3b: I hypothesized that in the absence of an ethnic identity, people would adopt an 
alternate identity, such as race. 
3a: I hypothesized that ethnic identity plays a long-term role in the identity of most 
Americans. 
Zeroth generation participants were most likely to report a city-level of specificity as 
their origin, and predictably, the specificity declined over generations, but surprisingly, 65% of 2 
and 3+ Generation participants could specify to at least the country, if not the city level what 
their heritage background is, suggesting that there are transnational ties maintained in American 
communities that may also maintain heritage organizational/value systems from the heritage 
culture. This raises a critical question about the national melting pot myth of Americanization. 
112 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of participants who knew their heritage origins by degree of 
geographic specificity 
3b: I hypothesized that in the absence of an ethnic identity, people would adopt an 
alternate identity, such as race. 
 Why do people choose to incorporate different constructs, such as race, heritage or 
“Americanness” into their identities? Do people start to forget their heritage identities after 
multiple generations in the US? Yes, some do (see figure 5). However, this number was less than 
expected.  
1%
33%
12%
47%
6%1
Region (pan-national (e.g. Latin America, North Africa) (0.7%)
Country (32.9%)
Sub-National Region (e.g. Puerto Rico, Province of China) (11.6%)
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Don't Know (5.9%)
Refuse to answer
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Figure 5: Proportion of participants who reported heritage country origins vs. race in 
their ethnic identity statements.  
Yet what happens when people lose ties to their transnational heritage cultures, how do 
they identify, instead of by ethnicity? When people reported not knowing their heritage, they are 
more likely to incorporate the race construct, but many people who identify by race are 
multigenerational Americans who have a clear concept of their heritage background.  
 
Figure 6: Proportions of people who reported knowing their heritage countries and used 
place-based or race-based identity statements (n=891). 
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Participants who reported not knowing their heritage origins were numerically more 
likely to self-identify using racial words (e.g. “White American” as opposed to “Italian 
American”). Although the US Census does not consider Latin@ a race, the data suggest that 
people who do not connect with specific countries in Latin America use the term Latin@ in a 
similar way to Americans who do not know heritage country and use the terms Black and White 
when participants are asked to define their ethnic identity in their own words and given a few 
examples to encourage specificity. 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of participants from different census categories who made identity 
statements based on race vs. place by whether or not participants know heritage country 
(n=49). 
When participants did not know their heritage country, they were twice as likely to 
identify by race (34 participants versus 14 participants). Conversely, when participants did know 
their heritage, they were almost thrice as likely to identify by heritage place/transnational 
heritage identities as by race (574 participants versus 192 participants).  
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Figure 8: Proportions of participants from different census categories who made Identity 
Statements based on race vs. place, when participants KNOW heritage ethnicity (n=842). 
Summary of Key Points 
 Different patterns of variables predicted participants’ preferences for different candidates. 
Participants who preferred Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton were significantly whiter, less 
recent immigrants, had higher hostile sexism, higher authoritarianism, higher social dominance, 
belief change resistance about GMOs being toxic, higher Hofstede-based heritage-culture 
individualism, and more fear of immigrants.  Preferences for Hillary Clinton over a preference 
not to vote predicted low hostile sexism, low social dominance orientation, high civic 
engagement, and belief change acceptance of corrective information about GMOs. For Bernie 
Sanders, low hostile sexism was predictive, as was belief change resistance to accepting 
corrective information about the myth that undocumented voters participated in the general 
election. Being ineligible to vote at the time of the election (due to being underage) and being a 
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more recent immigrant (0, 1 or 1.5 generation) were also significant predictors of a preference 
for Bernie Sanders, had he been on the ballot.  
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11. Discussion 
There are many assumptions about what drives voting preferences, which makes voting 
decisions a useful context in which to study how culture feeds into major decision-making 
processes. The public assumptions of what drives these decisions are often focused on 
demographics like education/SES/elitism to racism/prejudice (Schaffner, MacWilliams, Nteta, 
2018), but more attention is finally being paid to the underlying cultural drivers, which emerge 
through emotional expressions that guide our decision-making processes, such as when our view 
of how different groups should be integrated within a multicultural society is enmeshed with 
fear. The long-term contributions of heritage cultures and transnational connections of ourselves 
and our ancestors require greater attention as explanatory variables for our preferences in 
structuring our vision of the United States. 
The aptly named “Culture Wars,” between Conservatives and Liberals revolve around 
competing conceptualizations of what it means to be American, how the variety of identities and 
interpretations of being American can differ, and how our society should be structured to 
function as a cohesive whole. While political polarization in the USA may dominate the news 
cycles, there may be something more profound underlying the “Culture Wars,” and that is the 
possibility that culture is contributing to those wars through 1) the ecologies of living in urban 
versus rural environments may be shaping our cultural values and reinforcing polarization, and 
2) the multicultural composition of cities, with more representatives of diverse nations from 
around the globe, may fundamentally differ from the more homogenous populations in rural 
areas of America where 1-2 ethnicities predominate, a hypothesis that I hope to address in follow 
up studies with broader samples.  In addition, heritage cultures may also be polarizing urban and 
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rural voters away from each other’s points of view. It may be enormously fruitful to situate 
psychological constructs like authoritarianism as cultural variables which accurately predict 
voting preferences because they are cultural variables which replicate our attitudes towards who 
should hold authority and how it should be wielded across large (national election) and small 
(parent-child) scenarios. A further tension is that culture is not deterministic of who we are – our 
experiences and our genotype also contribute, which is why you find an occasional conservative 
emerging from a liberal context and vice versa. Although there can be interactions between the 
cultural environment and the individual makeup of a given person, in most cases those who grow 
up in a community with a dominant political ideology adhere to the values of their community 
and family. We don’t assume that people are innately determined to be Catholic or Protestant – 
we assume they learn it in their homes and, mostly, stick with the religion in which they were 
raised, although some people leave their church. Why would politics be any different? 
While previous research has identified a slew of individual predictors, not enough theory 
has been done to fit them together into a cohesive whole. If authoritarianism is cultural, then 
perhaps people adopt sexist attitudes by emulating the sexist behaviors of others in their social 
environment and on the media, meaning that sexism is cultural as well. Perhaps the predictive 
power of constructs such as social dominance (a desire to maintain stratified social hierarchies as 
they are) come from an anxiety of being in an unstructured environment where the rules of social 
interaction are not clearly prescribed and the propensity to make mistakes is high. This response 
to anxiety with a desire for structure which is characteristic of social dominance orientation may 
overlap with sexism (a desire to keep women in their traditionally determined roles) as it also 
does with authoritarianism, accounting for why they are all predictors of the same outcome (in 
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this case conservative preferences), even though they are not collinear. The term conservative 
indicates a desire to avoid change and maintain the status quo, which may be expressed through 
one or another of the three constructs being discussed. Duckitt and Sibley (2009) have done 
interesting work to propose how to differentiate between social dominance (concern for 
violations of the hierarchies within one’s society) and authoritarianism (concern for the 
maintenance of rules protecting the society from invasion from without), yet it is undeniable that 
the root of both is fear and an attraction to order and traditional forms of order, and more work 
must be done to validate Duckitt’s and Sibley’s across different contexts and to integrate it 
conceptually within a map of other constructs that underlie prejudice. 
 One neglected dimension of cultural values in voting decision contexts is how we carry 
attitudes inherited from our familial backgrounds forward in time from previous generations, 
something that can uniquely be studied in a multicultural environment. First, the number of 
heritage countries that participants in the sample report a connection to (n=112 out of 195 
countries in the world) allows for the use of culture as a continuous variable through the 
application of Hofstede’s rankings. Second, the geographical separation of members of a culture 
from their heritage cultural origins allows us to determine whether there is any continuity in 
culture after people have emigrated and lived in another space for a long time, even for 
generations. Thirdly, this multicultural context allowed us to determine how different cultural 
group memberships contribute to our voting preferences; cultural heritage is one dimension of 
culture, but where we live and the political ideologies of those around us are, in effect, another 
cultural group membership. In this dissertation, I am not intending to make a claim that heritage 
cultures fully capture our experience, just that our American culture is an additional culture in 
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which we are embedded, in tension with or in parallel with or on top of our heritage cultures. 
Hopefully future research can do more to build on Turner’s and Tajfel’s theory to better 
understand how multiple identities become expressed in our cultural values, norms and morals. 
Finally, in a world with increasing contact, Turner’s theory allows for a window onto what that 
contact means; if we live in a world where we have access to many other cultures through the 
internet, through travel, and through immigration, how will those other cultures shape us? Will 
they exacerbate prejudice or lead to plurality?  
This new conceptualization of the role of heritage cultures as another shaper of political 
preferences views heritage cultures as continuously transmitted across generations, running in 
parallel to, or possibly underneath, newer, “American” values and attitudes and is an alternative 
conceptualization of the role of our heritage cultures from the “melting pot” idea that American 
culture displaces our heritage cultures. To understand these differences, and how they relate to 
who we choose to vote for in elections, this dissertation explored two unspecified aspects of this 
alternative: 1) different cultural viewpoints for how society and responsibility ought to be 
distributed within a society, as expressed through voting preferences, and 2) the role of heritage 
cultures in our society, particularly in multicultural communities where contact between groups 
is likely.  
Replicating Predictors from Prior Research in a Multicultural Context 
I hypothesized (1a) that constructs identified in previous research, including 
authoritarianism and hostile sexism, would replicate as predictors of voting preferences in the 
2016 election. The findings do indeed replicate prior research, showing the utility of 
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authoritarian parenting attitudes, hostile sexism and social dominance orientation as strong 
predictors of voting preferences in the 2016 election.  
Hostile Sexism 
In addition, I hypothesized (1b) that certain roles and experiences, such as being non-
white, being an immigrant, and being a woman, would align voter preferences with liberal 
policies. This prediction was not entirely born out. While being non-white and being immigrant 
were predictive of voting preferences, being a woman was not, and sexism was. After the seismic 
impact of the “surprise” 2016 election outcome, many people questioned the role of gender and 
prejudice against women in Donald Trump’s success against Hillary Clinton. Sexism was an 
obvious candidate, exacerbated by the idea that some voters were attracted to Donald Trump’s 
comments about women, with the added challenge that his opponent was a woman trying to 
break the ultimate glass ceiling and enter a leadership role as one of the most powerful people in 
the world.  
Glick and Fiske’s scale of Ambivalent sexism separates sexism into two paradigms, one 
of benevolent and one of hostility towards women (1996). The hostile construct includes 
attitudes that women and feminists are a threat and are out to steal power from men through 
subterfuge. This version of sexism seems likely to be linked to a fear that the social order where 
men are dominant will be violated. Benevolent Sexism is an attitude that women are vulnerable 
and weak and need protection. It was possible that benevolent sexism would be related to 
people’s feelings in the election, particularly if they couldn’t envision Hillary Clinton as a leader 
because women are vulnerable, weak and need protection, but the lack of a relationship between 
benevolent sexism and voting preferences for Trump, Clinton or abstention suggest this is not the 
type of sexism at play in this context. Hostile sexism, then, which was a significant predictor of 
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voting for Donald Trump, seems to be the likely candidate, bringing us back to the idea of fear as 
a motivator in this election.  
Sexism is associated reflexively with men, yet the data in this dissertation dissociates the 
psychological construct from a person’s identity. This finding raises the question of the nature of 
sexism, just as it raises the question of how to understand predictors of voting preferences: 
Voting preferences have been understood, erroneously (Mutz, 2018), as logical outcomes of the 
self-interest of a given voter such that the rich would prefer low tax policy associated with the 
GOP, while African Americans, immigrants, and women would support Democrats whose 
policies purportedly aim to support access to opportunities for gaining equal access to basic 
necessities like jobs and health care. However, while the data here presented support the notion 
that sexism, especially a hostile form of it, was a component of voting preferences for Donald 
Trump, it dissociates this finding from the gender identity of the participant. The implication of 
the finding is that sexism is not a logical conclusion of protecting one’s privilege as a man. This 
means it is either a cultural value or a personality characteristic – the determination of which it is 
(it is possibly a bit of both) is left to future researchers, but with some urgency. It is also 
possible, and would be ideal, if sexism is entirely accounted for by cultural value transmission, 
because then it is more likely remediable – more work needs to be done to explore the nature of 
these constructs and to establish better theory for explaining what they are and why they exist. 
This work is needed for the basic purpose of understanding human behavior towards others, but 
the urgency arises when you consider the application of the theory: If sexism is a cultural value, 
then it is more likely amenable to manipulations than if it is a random personality characteristic. 
Thus, disentangling personality from culture should be a general goal of understanding 
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psychological constructs such as sexism for the practical purpose of moving into the future with 
high hopes of actively reducing stigma and prejudice against the historically oppressed. 
Authoritarianism, Fear of Immigrants and Latent Authoritarianism 
Prior literature has linked authoritarianism to fear of outsiders, and shown that it is a 
predictor of conservative voting preferences in multiple countries (Choma & Hanock, 2017; 
Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Duriez & Soenens, 2009; Feldman & Stenner, 
1997; Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 
2011; Kauff,  Asbrock, Thörner & Wagner, 2013; Perry, Paradies & Pedersen, 2015;  Van 
Assche, Roets, Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014), yet the type of psychological variable which 
authoritarianism constitutes is poorly understood. In seminal articles, it is explicitly referred to as 
a personality trait (Altemeyer, 1988), but it may be, at least partly, a culturally transmitted value. 
Perhaps the activation of latent authoritarianism is an activation of a subdued cultural pattern? Or 
perhaps authoritarianism is a new development in response to ecological pressures that are 
currently reshaping our society (and our political system) as Vox’s Amanda Taub claims (2016). 
When these events occur, Taub suggests, latent authoritarians then become authoritarian, 
and thus are more likely to vote conservatively. Because of the occurrence and timing of events 
like the Orlando shooting in June and the attacks in Nice in July, a theory of latent 
authoritarianism would predict higher authoritarianism within 6-9 months post an attack like 
those. Long term data analysis on authoritarianism may be able to detect changes in occurrence 
of authoritarianism in a period of months after an attack occurs, although that has not been 
analyzed here. However, if true, then that could have been one of the contributing factors to the 
outcome of the 2016 election that has received less attention than Mueller’s investigation into 
Russian election tampering through troll-bots on Facebook and other social media platforms. 
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In favor of the ecological pressures theory is the prediction that, if social change and 
physical threats coincided at the same time, both authoritarians who fear social change and latent 
authoritarians who are only activated by specific events (such as the spate of high profile terrorist 
attacks described below) would vote for a conservative leader they perceived as strong: one to 
stop social change, the other to address security concerns, albeit with drastic measures (Taub, 
2016). Latent authoritarians are less likely to be identifiable as authoritarians because their 
authoritarianism is contextual, triggered by events reported in the news. When Taub published 
the article on Vox.com, the memory of attacks such as on the Paris attacks on November 13, 
2015 (130 fatalities), or San Bernardino on December 14 of the same year, (14 dead and 22 
injured), had faded a bit, as research suggests that the public consciousness of such attacks 
gradually fade to normalcy over six to nine months (Collins, 2004).  
Vox published the article on March 1st, 2016, when many possible triggers in current 
events had already occurred. Subsequently to the Vox prediction, a series of new terrorizing 
events occurred in the United States and around the world, with high casualty rates.  
• On March 27th, 2016, attacks on families in a park on an Easter Sunday outing in 
Lahore, Pakistan killed 72 and injured 338 (Eleazar, 2016).  
• On June 12th, 2016 the Orlando nightclub shooting killed 50 (Alvarez & Pérez-
Peña, 2016).  
• On July 14th, 2016, a truck was used to terrorize Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, 
France (80 fatalities).  
Thus, we can summarize the climate leading up to the election as characterized by 
terrorizing events at a rate of at least one every few months, well inside the range of 6-9 months 
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to forget that Collins identifies (2004). Several critical terrorizing events preceded the election 
only by months, and others preceded it by a year or two.  
At the same time, a steady stream of social change events over the course of Obama’s 
administration could have challenged those in a position of privilege to feel fear from challenges 
to their hegemony, and to traditional social norms that provide a sense of safety through structure 
and predictability, values authoritarian parents prize. Social change, however, was dominating 
the headlines and airwaves in 2015/2016 in the form of debates over who can use which 
bathroom (Fausset, 2017) and the new mainstream attention directed at transgendered individuals 
such as Caitlin Jenner (Somaiya, 2015), both of which could be viewed as the culmination of a 
series of Obama-era progressive changes — e.g. the creation of DACA (Preston & Cushman, 
2012), the federal legalization of gay marriage (Liptak, 2015).  
If authoritarianism is not completely separable from social dominance orientation, where 
people prefer to adhere to existing/traditional social hierarchies, then sexism might be something 
partially accounted for by authoritarianism, and social dominance may or may not be a fully 
separate construct. While Donald Trump promised strong defense against terrorism and stronger 
border control, his opponent was the first female candidate of a major party in American history. 
Once fears are activated by current events, people who endorse authoritarian parenting styles 
may then resist any modification to their opinions or decisions based on evidence or reason 
because of the strength and power of their emotional needs (Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewska & 
Winiewski, 2017).  
The cultural resurgence of authoritarianism, occurring at the level of the populace, is then 
transferred up through the actions of voters to the level of government. The Trump 
administration provides a case study of this phenomenon, as the United States Customs and 
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Immigration Service, a federal agency, changed its mission statement in late February of 2018 to 
the following statement (Gonzalez, 2018), bold added to highlight authoritarian attitudes 
exemplified in the text: 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation’s lawful 
immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and 
fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while protecting 
Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values. 
The previous mission statement posted on the USCIS website, by contrast, was 
exemplified by inclusive and respectful language, highlighted in bold below. Keyword 
differences between the new (authoritarian) statement and the old (inclusive) statement are 
lawful/safeguarding/adjudicating/securing as compared with 
promise/customers/granting/citizenship/promoting/awareness. 
USCIS secures America’s promise as a nation of immigrants by providing 
accurate and useful information to our customers, granting immigration and 
citizenship benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding of 
citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration system. 
It is simple to say that some people or even some cultures are xenophobic, racist, bigoted, 
but this is a reductionist and essentializing thought pattern that does little to expose mechanisms 
which could explain the role of xenophobia in voting decisions in a way that allows meaningful 
resistance to those mechanisms. If we can better understand how media representations of 
immigrants and other marginalized groups allow them to become representative of the negative 
events, as average Muslims have become conflated with fundamentalist terrorist factions who 
happen to be Muslim, or deconstruct media representations of Latino immigrants as criminals by 
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deconflating poverty and ethnicity, we may be able to effect positive change in how 
marginalized groups are treated. 
A complimentary interpretation of the literature on authoritarianism, fear and latent 
authoritarianism could be that authoritarianism is partly influenced by individual differences in 
anxiety and susceptibility to fear, and partly influenced by the way certain cultural memes, such 
as the conservative claim that “Mexicans are criminals,” or “Muslims are terrorists.” Future 
research will need to address what type of fear, and what or who is provoking that fear, since it 
seems as if different fears lead to different psychological constructs. For example, appears that 
fear of immigrants has been suggested as a factor in latent authoritarianism and status threat in 
social dominance. An anxious person may desire scripts which empower them to control the 
stress of uncertainty, for example, in social interactions, or in navigating workplace politics. This 
anxiety may emerge in their parenting preferences for a structured environment that scaffolds the 
child’s behavior and the relationship between parent and child. After all, authoritarian parenting 
is defined as non-responsive to the child’s needs (at least the Western version of authoritarian 
parenting), so it is all about the parent, and their emotional dysfunction, possibly related to 
anxiety. The relationship between anxiety in the face of uncertainty and authoritarianism should 
be clear, but it does not mean that culture plays no role in authoritarian attitudes. Future 
directions could include comprehensive clinical assessments and a titrated approach to the levels 
of society at which authoritarian values are endorsed by authoritarians and latent authoritarians 
(Societal level? Parenting level? Community?).  After all, culture is essentially a giant schema-
structure designed to simplify the choices we make in navigating the complexity of human 
interactions, so interrelationships between personal differences in anxiety levels about structure 
and culturally transmitted endorsement of rigid adherence to structure would not be surprising. 
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Social Dominance Orientation 
In their dual-process model, Duckitt and Sibley (2009), dissociate SDO from 
authoritarianism by classifying authoritarianism as a fear of outsiders and SDO as a desire to 
maintain social hierarchies within a society. Duckitt and Sibley might predict that Obama-era 
political actions for progressive social change might activate social dominance orientations 
whereas terrorism is more likely to activate latent authoritarians. They would also predict that the 
two constructs are not identical, which aligns with the results in this work because both 
constructs predict voting patterns and yet are not collinear. Graham cross-validated the construct 
of social dominance with complimentary constructs at the opposite end of the spectrum of SDO, 
such as concern for fairness and justice, implying the social dominance is on a continuous 
spectrum, at the other end of which is fairness. Using Graham’s Fairness/Reciprocity dimension 
we were able to replicate previous research which identified both authoritarianism and SDO as 
predictors of conservative voting preferences, particularly pertaining to the 2016 Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom.  
Whiteness: Conflicting explanatory motivations: self-interest or fear and identity 
threat? 
While sexism and authoritarianism, two psychological constructs associated with 
prejudice, were strong predictors of voting preferences for Donald Trump in the sample, it is also 
true that participants’ preferences were under tension between different motivations. In the 2016 
election, the dominant demographic that caused seismic shifts to the political establishment 
appeared to be white, working-class Americans defying the party elders of the GOP and 
supporting Donald Trump in the primaries and again in the general election. However, a large 
number of white liberals also defected from the Democratic Party establishment, and voted for 
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Bernie Sanders in the primaries, although this defection did not lead to Sanders capturing the 
party nomination, as it lead to Donald Trump capturing the party nomination. One interesting 
aspect of this data set is that approximately 1/3 of the participants who reported preferring 
Donald Trump also responded that, if Bernie Sanders had been on the ballot, they would have 
preferred to vote for him.  
Could the insecurity about economic conditions and job prospects among white voters be 
expressed as both support for Bernie Sanders’s economic platform and as an authoritarian desire 
to reduce competition by driving away immigrants and excluding minorities and women from 
increasing their job prospects at the same time? While Mutz’s research (2018) suggests that 
economic self-interest did not drive voters’ preferences, the profile of participants who were 
attracted to Bernie Sanders as a candidate was quite different from the profile of participants who 
preferred Hillary Clinton. Table 15 presents a binomial regression model of the prior predictors 
used in the main analyses, with the dependent variable being a preference for Bernie Sanders or 
not. As in the first model with prior predictors, low hostile sexism was predictive of preference 
for Bernie Sanders, as was belief change resistance to accepting corrective information about the 
myth that undocumented voters participated in the general election. Being ineligible to vote at 
the time of the election (due to being underage) and being a more recent immigrant (0, 1 or 1.5 
generation) were also significant predictors of a preference for Bernie Sanders, had he been on 
the ballot. 
The sample of voters who preferred Bernie was composed of approximately 10 Clinton 
supporters for each Trump supporter. It may be that the Clinton supporters, being the majority, 
are driving the results. An important avenue for future research is to better explore the 
differences and similarities between attitudes held by Trump supporters who preferred Sanders 
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as compared with Clinton supports who preferred Sanders. There is a need to explain the 
psychological motivations that drove the white voters who defected from the GOP to vote for 
Donald Trump while accommodating an explanation for the white voters who defected from 
Hillary to vote for Bernie Sanders. Fear of economic insecurity may be one of the underlying 
fears that drive latent (and non-latent) authoritarians, but researchers have found that economic 
interests did not predict voting preferences for Trump, but a perception of threat to one’s 
privileged status as a man, or as white, were powerful predictors (Mutz, 2018). While a 
limitation of this dissertation is the lack of a variable assessing class or socio-economic status in 
our analyses, Mutz’s findings suggest they would not have played a role and support the 
possibility that cultural values and fear shape prejudicial attitudes like sexism and racism, and 
this is why demographics have failed to be predictive. Women can be sexist, and whiteness is not 
causative of racism. Some pundits have claimed that Bernie Sanders’s platform was successful 
because it was addressing economic concerns; this data suggest he could have attracted at least 
1/3 of Trump voters, possibly allowing a victory over Trump in the Electoral College. However, 
when we look more closely at a regression model of what predicted a preference for him, what 
seems to be happening is that non-whites with low authoritarianism, low sexism, and high 
fairness are the ones attracted to Bernie. Future research should explore the different patterns of 
values of voters who preferred Bernie and Hillary.  This is a thought worth pursuing in future 
research, and worth considering as the midterm elections of 2018 are a few months away at the 
time of publication of this document. 
New predictors of voting preferences: Deepening our understanding of the role of old and 
new culture. 
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 Culture and the habits of thought that culture shapes, are transmitted through person-to-
person contexts in our face-to-face interactions with parents, friends, colleagues and 
neighborhoods, but it is also transmitted through the internet and representations in the news 
media and entertainment media, and especially, all over the different forms of long-distance 
communication and media creation on the internet. 
Media Literacy 
At the start of this project, the context of the 2016 election involved a great deal of 
discussion of terms like “fake news,” “social media bots,” and “filter bubbles,” which indicated 
that social media and the internet had played an important role in the outcome of the election. 
The idea that voters who preferred one candidate may have been misled by misinformation on 
the internet into making their voting choice was a prominent topic of discussion, so the construct 
of media literacy was pulled in to evaluate that claim. I hypothesized (2b) that media literacy 
would play a role in voting preferences through people’s sense of agency in searching out 
solutions to current problems, and their capacity to accommodate corrective information to 
misinformation. 
First, three scales evaluated media literacy. Media literacy is the ability to navigate 
information on the internet (or other media) and evaluate its veracity and credibility using both 
internal (critical thinking) and external (information literacy) resources. The first scale, Weber’s 
(2013) political knowledge scale, simply assessed whether participants were aware of current 
political facts. Having basic background knowledge is critical to one’s ability to critically 
evaluate whether a new piece of information is suspicious. The second scale, New Media 
Literacy Scale (NML) attempted to measure, holistically, how participants approach the use of 
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the internet – do they feel agentic about using available resources to navigate to the information 
they want and to evaluate its usefulness for a given purpose, including weeding out 
misinformation (Literat, 2014)? Literat recognized, however, that a key component of this 
behavior is the agency or self-efficacy of the activity of searching and consuming, not just the 
ability to judge, and so she included a separate scale, which she called Civic Engagement, to 
attempt to separate out agency as a personality variable that contributes to one’s media literacy, 
by evaluating agency in civic behavior rather than in internet usage and information 
consumption. In so doing, her work serves the purposes of this dissertation ideally, because we 
included both scales.  
Literat’s full NML (New Media Literacy) scale was not predictive of voting preferences. 
Political knowledge (Weber, 2013) was predictive of voters who preferred Donald Trump 
compared to participants who Preferred Not to Vote, but did not predict preferences for Hillary 
Clinton compared to participants who Preferred Not to Vote.  
Literat’s Civic Engagement scale was predictive of both preferences for Trump and 
Clinton. This suggests a dissociation: knowledge from agency. Knowledge was not the driver of 
voting preferences despite public concerns that Trump supporters were simply uneducated and 
ignorant. Because civic engagement was predictive, we know that agency is a more likely 
candidate, and because it drove both Clinton and Trump supporters when compared to voters 
who Preferred Not to Vote, it seems that what it is predicting is the activity of making a choice 
and participating.  Along with civic engagement, whiteness was also predictive of preferences 
for both candidates, and taking these two pieces of information together, the implications are that 
minorities may feel disempowered to effect change, leading to abstention. Further research 
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should most definitely explore the relationship between agency, civic engagement, and voting 
activities, and trying to understand the specific roadblocks to empowering non-white voters to 
participate in voting. Preliminary qualitative assessment of open-ended responses suggested that 
many voters who Preferred Not to Vote felt disconnected from the information needed to make a 
good decision. Does this occur because of parental disconnection? Is a connection to information 
about politics related to economic stability? To neighborhood? These are important future 
directions to explore in this current data set. 
Overall, however, media literacy is an emerging construct with poor definitions and new 
measures that lack replications. In addition, a counter-hypothesis within our exploration of the 
contributions that new medias made to participants’ voting preferences could be that belief 
change resistance and status threat played a role in the assimilation of media information. A 
juxtaposition of media literacy (NML) with a task to measure belief change resistance (BCR), 
therefore, could help to disentangle the possible roles of social media and the internet in the 
election outcomes. 
 In two tasks measuring belief change, participants showed differing patterns of response 
to corrective information. In task one, participants were asked their preconceived notions about 
the internet myth that genetically modified food is toxic to consume, followed by exposure to the 
full internet myth, and then finally a debunking page on Snopes.com. In task two, participants 
were asked about their preconceived beliefs about the internet myth from the 2016 election that 
undocumented voters were able to cast 2.8 million votes, and that this explains why Hillary 
Clinton won the popular vote even though Donald Trump won the electoral college. The 
participants received the same two subsequent prompts: a prompt showing them the internet 
myth as presented by a fake news website, and the corrective information presented by 
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Snopes.com. Participants’ preconceived beliefs about GMOs were high, but dropped, on average, 
by .20 Likert scale points, after exposure to the corrective information, t(935) = 6.213, p < .001. 
This outcome could be considered, generally, as belief change acceptance. In task 2, however, 
preconceptions were higher than after exposure to corrective information, also by .2, in the 
opposite direction. This can be described as belief change resistance.  
 What is interesting is that these two opposing patterns fed into voting preferences in very 
different ways. In the Snopes task with the prompt about GMOs, participants who were able to 
accommodate the corrective information changed their minds after exposure to the Snopes 
corrective information. While changing your mind on this topic of GMOs was not predictive of 
preferring Hillary Clinton, failing to change your mind was predictive of preferring Donald 
Trump. Interestingly, the variable that was a significant predictor for Bernie Sanders was 
resisting corrective information which tries to convince others that undocumented individuals are 
“free-loading.” 
 One possible explanation for the contrast between participants’ belief change acceptance 
of the correction regarding GMOs is that the participants in this study didn’t really have an 
emotional “skin” in the discussion about GMOs in our food supply, and so their cooler, logical 
thoughts prevailed, allowing them to change their minds. However, for the topic of immigration, 
many participants may have strong feelings, as shown by the responses that made up the “fear of 
immigrants scale.” Thus, it is possible that the emotions of either experiencing being an 
immigrant or having a close relative who is an immigrant may have caused some participants to 
engage with the topic emotionally on the Snopes immigration task. Conversely, participants who 
have no connection to immigration stories may feel threatened by immigrants. Their fear of 
immigrants may have activated emotions which change how they responded to the Snopes 
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corrective information about immigrants relative to how they reacted to the corrective 
information about GMOs. It is unclear why participants who preferred Bernie Sanders would 
resist corrective information that undocumented voters had managed to contribute to the pool of 
voters who helped Hillary Clinton win the popular vote, although it raises some interesting 
questions about this population: It may be that Bernie supporters came from both strong left-
leaning and also moderately right-leaning ideological backgrounds, although the majority of the 
voters who preferred Bernie Sanders were likely strongly left-leaning. I hope to explore the 
attitudes of participants who liked Bernie Sanders in future research and, specifically, to identify 
whether he attracted elements of both sides in a de-polarizing way. 
In the search to understand the nature of predictors of voting preferences, I have sought to 
situate the act of voting as an expression of our vision for an ideal society, shaped by what we 
learn from our culture(s). I have argued that we should consider some component of constructs 
such as sexism and authoritarianism, which have been found in prior research and in the current, 
multicultural context, to predict voting preferences for conservatives, as cultural. In chapter 4, I 
discussed theories which have begun to explain how culture is shaped in ecological contexts, and 
how it is transmitted to new generations, but previous theories have not yet been updated to 
address the role of new medias in the dissemination of culture. I propose that culture, up until the 
internet age, was transmitted through families, through neighborhoods, but also through books 
and television and other media. Now, the internet is a new vehicle of transmission in the vein of 
books and media, and should not be viewed as a transmitter only of information, but of values 
embedded in that information.  
An exploration of culture and its role in shaping voting requires some investigation of 
how our interactions with that information are shaping us. The most obvious question is whether 
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misinformation led voters to vote for Donald Trump because they were uninformed. However, 
there are no significant differences in the ability of a measure of political knowledge to predict 
whether a participant preferred Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump.  
Since participants did not appear to be misled into voting for Donald Trump by an 
inability to identify false news, the next question is: how did the misinformation that was 
spreading rapidly throughout the internet (Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, 2018) shape their preferences? 
There is a great deal more work to be done on this, but previous work by researchers who study 
belief change resistance (Flynn, Nyhan & Reifler, 2017; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) suggest a 
possible explanation of how this information might have affected voters: the information didn’t 
affect them at all, it simply identifies those who had a pre-disposition to believe certain facts 
before they encountered the misinformation. It is likely that many voters had notions about 
immigrants, about minorities, and about women which were circulating in their families, 
communities and in the media landscape long before the election, most likely cultural values 
which are traditional, deeply embedded and possibly tied to the identities of some voters.  The 
values may have to do with the roles of men and women in society, the entitlement of European 
Americans to privilege, and the notion that exclusion of other groups would cement that 
entitlement and preserve those roles. Information that contradicts these cultural values would 
lead to resistance, marking the voters who hold the values, but not because they are gullible, 
uneducated or ignorant. Viewed in this light, belief change resistance could be viewed as a 
measure of how internet users might view information that contradicts their cultural values. 
Those who embrace corrections, altering their views would be open to changing their minds. 
Those who maintain their views would be resistant to change. Those whose belief in the false 
news/misinformation increases after receiving corrective information could be characterized as 
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contrarian. So what is belief change resistance? Is it a personality variable? Is it, like 
authoritarianism, tied to emotional responses and to cultural values? 
Participants who resisted accepting corrective information (high belief change resistance) 
— about the internet myth that genetically modified organisms (GMO) used to produce food are 
toxic to humans — were significantly more likely to prefer Donald Trump than Hillary Clinton. 
For those participants who began the task believing the myth about 2,864,974 undocumented 
voters, there was no change in belief. This belief resistance is in line with previous research, but 
the most interesting thing is that, on the topic of GMOs, which are currently very salient, 
participants were willing to accept the corrective information, and those that did so were less 
likely to have voted for Donald Trump. 
In the beginning of this project, I expected media literacy to be one construct, where the 
driving factors were “cold” (or something like it) cognitive processes of critical thinking, yet the 
analyses are leading me to consider the possibility that they are separate processes which operate 
independently. The idea that belief change resistance and media literacy are different constructs, 
driven by different thought processes, is supported by the existence of correlations between each 
of the two pairs of similar constructs: Belief change GMO correlated with belief change 
immigration and Literat NML measure correlated with political knowledge (Weber, 2013). In 
addition, BCR – GMO correlated with Literat and both political knowledge and Literat NML had 
significant first order correlations with BCR – Immig. (see Appendix D). The converging 
evidence of NML and BCR, therefore, present a more complex but more compelling narrative, 
where voters who preferred Trump were able to distinguish misinformation intellectually, but 
unable to do so emotionally. 
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The complex nature of belief resistance is extraordinarily important.  Hypotheses such as 
the idea that lack of education or ignorance drove the vote for Donald are unsupported. It seems 
that media literacy is not a unitary phenomenon, but is composed of multiple, dissociable 
processes such as having knowledge and processing new information under “cold” cognitive 
conditions where one’s emotions are not engaged. The experience of processing information that 
engages one’s emotions could be “hot” cognition (Unsworth, Heitz & Engle, 2005). The fact that 
participants in this study resisted corrective information about undocumented voter fraud is 
unsurprising but the fact that they accepted a corrective change on a less salient topic is hopeful, 
and possibly key to finding opportunities for persuasion. 
Hofstede rankings 
For all the attention to the new, shiny context of the internet and new media, it would be 
unhelpful to discount the role of our traditional cultural values and the tension between those 
traditions and new ways of thinking, or to ignore the possibility that the values we have inherited 
from our heritage cultures are deeply rooted and implicit. This was why we looked for research 
that provided a way to understand culture as a continuous variable. Two researchers had done 
work like this: Hofstede was the first, perhaps the best known, and with the largest number of 
countries in his data set. Gelfand and Triandis have attempted to deepen Hofstede’s work and 
address some of its major limitations. Together they created an individual differences scale 
intended not just to measure individualism better than Hofstede and to balance his construct of 
individualism with a polar opposite, collectivism. Individualism, however, shares a central 
feature with authoritarianism and social dominance and sexism: they are all cultural ideals about 
how we our society should scaffold intergroup interactions. Individualism, however, is focusing 
on the behavior and identity and self-construal of one person, while the former three focus on 
139 
 
inter-group relations and hierarchies. We have discussed some of the limitations of Hofstede’s 
work in chapter 3, and they are legitimate critiques, yet Hofstede’s rankings proved the only 
significant predictor of voting preferences. Why? Future research is needed to understand 
whether the Hofstede variable of individualism was predictive where Triandis and Gelfand’s was 
not because of the context (voting preferences in the election), the nature of the items in the 
different scales, or the nature of the analysis. These are ongoing debates in the field of cross-
cultural research. 
Another concern in cross-cultural research is the way values for individualism and 
collectivism may impact participant’s responses to survey items. Authoritarianism and 
individualism/collectivism share a purpose in providing a scaffold for how to interact with other 
members of our society and how those other members would expect us to respond under a 
variety of different conditions. Another construct that may has been previously defined as a 
personality variable but may actually be capturing implicitly defined cultural responses 
prescribed by our heritage cultures is social desirability. Our cultural norms train us through 
habitual exposure, to know when smiling is permissible and acceptable and the degree to which 
we should defer our needs to the needs of others. Social desirability (Haghighat, 2007) was 
designed to measure westerners’ individual differences in their tendency to respond to 
researchers’ prompts obligingly rather than honestly, but in an extremely diverse sample, it may 
inadvertently capture cultural differences in participants’ likelihood to answer obligingly rather 
than honestly. Thus, a major limitation of the data sample is also one of its greatest strengths: the 
diversity of the sample and the little we know about how other cultures respond to online surveys 
and self-report measures makes the interpretation of the data challenging. Making it all the more 
challenging is the fact that the participants all live in the New York City metropolitan area: If 
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limited research has been done to establish the psychometric affordances of how participants 
self-report in online surveys, even less has been done on how culture shapes the responses of 
participants whose cultural influences are transnational. While these limitations create a risk that 
the data here would not be replicated, I hope that the findings and the theory generated from this 
dissertation open new avenues of research and lead to similar work on multicultural, 
transnational influences of heritage cultures so that we can better understand how cultural values 
and habits shapes us and how they are transmitted, diachronically, across generations as well as 
how they are transmitted, synchronically, across a contemporaneous community. 
Hofstede’s items are not publicly available for a face-validity based comparison with 
those of Triandis and Gelfand or Singelis’s items based on Marcus and Kitayama’s work. 
However, it may be that Hofstede’s items tap a very different level of consciousness, focused on 
one’s relationship to one’s national-level society. This is likely given his theoretical perspective. 
Triandis and Gelfand’s work, along with Marcus and Kitayama’s, on the other hand, focuses 
much more on relations between oneself and one’s immediate surroundings – what 
Bronfenbrenner would call the micro-level ecology. It is entirely possible that different cultures 
prioritize individualistic and collectivistic behavior differently at different levels of interaction. 
For example, the US has the highest ranking in the world of individualism, yet there is a high 
degree of patriotism as well, especially among conservatives, and this is a very collectivistic 
value.  These findings, viewed from a position of Greenfield Theory of Social Change and 
Human Development, make a lot of sense since conservatives are increasingly bound by rural 
geographic settings and liberals by urban settings. Again, this suggests that Hofstede’s data may 
be biased towards having measure American individualism through a perspective of monoculture 
which happened to sample urban participants in creating the ranking. Indeed, the use of 
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Hofstede’s rankings to rank participants based on heritage cultures, and the utility of that method 
in predicting voting preferences goes against Hofstede’s main claims quite directly, and is 
something he explicitly rejects as a fallacy. An interesting aspect of Gelfand’s theoretical work is 
his sensitivity to reporting, in his data, detailed characteristics of the sample population he used 
to norm a “national” level of value (in this case, tightness and looseness; Gelfand et al., 2011). 
However, the data here seem to support one of Hofstede’s other main claims – that 
individual differences provide too much noise in data to assume that any given group of persons 
will represent cultural trends if the individual level data are used, for example, in a regression 
model, to predict a behavioral outcome, as was done here. In that case, the group-level means 
may prove more valuable, and in fact, that is what was found in this disseration. There are 
several explanations: one could be that the items are different, as mentioned above, another could 
be that individual level scales tap into explicit beliefs people hold about themselves, which could 
be dissociated from actual attitudes. Support for this perspective comes from literature on 
implicit bias, a field of research which has made invaluable contributions to the study of 
prejudice and the legitimization of the experiences reported by marginalized groups. Implicit 
bias literature also is grappling with contradictory evidence from group-level and individual-
level approaches to analyzing data, where the individual levels, similarly to the data in this 
dissertation, present too much variability or “noise.” This has led critics to question whether 
implicit bias is a real phenomenon, despite findings that implicit bias not only exists but is quite 
robust across regions of the US when measured at the group level (Payne, Vuletich & Lundberg, 
2017). 
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I hypothesized (2a) that values from the heritage cultures of current Americans would 
shape their voting preferences, even in geographical separation from the heritage culture’s 
original environment, and while many of the heritage value predictors were not strong enough 
for the complex regression model, individualism was. This is likely due to the nature of the 
construct of individualism, especially as measured by Hofstede, as a national level orientation to 
the nation and how each of a nation’s citizens should position their responsibilities to one 
another so that all members have similar expectations and the society maintains its cohesion. An 
interesting future direction, here, would be to collect data from other multi-cultural urban 
environments as well as from more rural, more conservative, more homogenous environments 
and to deconstruct the myth of American mono-culture by unpacking how ecological differences 
in population density, homogeneity, and cultural heritage may be related to voting preferences in 
other American contexts in light of Greenfield’s theory of social change and human development 
(2000). 
Identity and awareness of transnational connections  
Can these heritage cultures play a role in shaping the communities that help us decide 
how to vote? Apparently, they do, and enough so to warrant further research into transnational 
continuities between the similarities of communities’ culture between the heritage environment 
and the post-migration environment, such as the work done on Korean mothers in Los Angeles 
and Korea by Park et al. (2015).  Ethnicity is supposed to be a matter of identity and race 
externally applied to one by outsiders (2007), but I hypothesized that participants may be using 
race as an identity in the absence of other ethnic connections (3b). 
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Implicit bias raises another point, too, which is the awareness we have of our cultural 
values. Is it possible that culture can shape us in ways that aren’t salient to us?  What is the 
identity statement like for Americans who don’t know their ancestry?  One element analyzed in 
this data set was heritage backgrounds, and while many participants used heritage as part of their 
identity statement, people’s identities didn’t always fall neatly along the lines of race, ethnicity, 
religion or heritage regions, with most participants identifying themselves based on heritage 
places, whether regions, countries, or cities.  Only a third of the participants included 
“American” in their identity descriptions, even though almost eighty percent were born in the 
US, showing how transnational ties are also a strong component of identity formation. But most 
interestingly, for those who stated that they didn’t know where they were from, instead of self-
categorizing as an ethnic region (say Europe, Africa, Asia, etc.), they self-categorized under 
race-based terms like “White,” “Caucasian,” “African American,” “Black.”  Interestingly, 
although the census and most researchers define “Latin@” as an ethnicity or language group 
(Foner & Fredrickson, 2004), participants used Latin@ in the same way as they used race: as a 
substitute group for ethnicity when they did not know of or feel an identity connection to a 
country, region or place. This poses an important question about the role of experiences and 
identity in discriminatory behavior: when people align their group identity based on race, does 
that alignment involve prejudicial cognitions about other races, whereas when people align their 
identities based on national heritages and geography, perhaps their sense of others aligns with the 
others’ national heritages, which is harder to determine visually, and therefore, may lead to lesser 
focus on essentializing or determining expectations about character based on origin when it is 
often undetermined. 
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In line with my expectations, participants in the data set continued to possess detailed 
knowledge of their heritage countries, even cities, after multiple generations of their ancestors 
living in the United States, supporting the hypothesis that ethnic identity plays a long-term role 
in the identity of Americans (3a). If people have an explicit awareness of where they are coming 
from, shaped by the histories of the places where their ancestors lived, then how much more 
likely is it that implicit cultural values and explicit cultural rituals, such as cooking specific 
dishes or celebrating holidays, are also being transmitted?  The ongoing transmission of culture 
from generation to generation may have an incidental effect of being self-reinforcing, leading to 
people seeking out and creating enclaves with others from similar heritages in order to recreate 
ex-patriot communities. This results in America being a composite patchwork or mosaic, rather 
than a melting pot. Further research is needed to understand the historical movements of 
populations from various heritage backgrounds from region to region within the United States, 
some of which is being done by historians. For example, Colin Woodard, in his book American 
Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America, argues that colonial 
Americans began in enclaves, and then brought the cultures that developed out of their pre-
American heritages and the emergent cultural traditions from the ecological context of each 
colony with them during westward colonization (2011). 
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12. Implications and Conclusions 
Potential Implications of Findings 
The story of American Politics for the past fifty years has centered around a narrative of 
economic and cultural conservativism versus economic and cultural inclusion, yet the surprising 
alliances that emerged in the 2016 election suggest that permanent changes are underway (Taub, 
2016). The root causes of these changes may be linked to globalization, rapid international 
transit, instantaneous communication, access to information, infinite amounts of storage for 
human creations that are accessible to virtually anyone, and digital platforms that allow the 
shaping of new identities and the rousing of enormous mobs. The affordances of living in 2016 
may have reached a point where the changes to our ecology are restructuring our society. Yet we 
have more tools than ever before to understand what those changes are, and what the underlying 
drivers are, and have been. Is the heightened polarization in the US and around the world an 
inevitability? It is a bellwether of the disintegration of our society? 
Education has always been the answer of the academy to improving attitudes towards 
minorities and the oppressed, but most recent research, including this dissertation, find that 
education is unsuccessful when the model of transmission relies on information transmission and 
lecture, because it information transmission relies on acceptance of what is being taught and 
assumes that students will have no belief change resistance to controversial material. We must 
adjust teaching methods for this material for it to be able to effectively repair our society. While 
it may be true that critical thinking is an important ability, its lack doesn’t seem to be the 
explanation for the rise of populism, and the attitude that populists are ignorant can be 
destructive and increase polarization. This doesn’t mean that there is no hope, it just means we 
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must identify the roots of our disagreements and test methods of persuasion and rhetoric that will 
accomplish our goals. 
I believe that one of the patterns at the root of our disagreement is the misconception that 
prejudice stems from hate, when it is more likely to stem from fear: Fear which is driving 
authoritarianism and SDO and sexism. Progressive policies threaten current social order and 
deconstruct its hierarchies, activating social dominance tendencies through fear. Open borders 
and global perspectives reduce the solidity of our perceived boundaries with the rest of the world 
and also attacks the privilege of being a multigenerational American through rising populations 
of unfamiliar others whose behaviors don’t fit familiar schemas. Feminism adds to the pressure 
by demanding that a marginalized majority, women, should have equal access, and as Mutz puts 
it, people perceive each of these equations as a zero-sum game (2018), where the advancement 
of others is at cost to ourselves. An implication of this finding is that we seek ways to better 
understand how to present progressive policies in ways that communicate that it is not a zero-
sum problem, but a benefit to all through productive exchange. Fear can manifest in different 
dimensions of our identities, but if it is manifesting across many identities at once, it is 
unsurprising that you would see an outcome like this election. The good news is that more 
research (Napiers, Huang, Vonasch & Bargh, 2017) is generating practical ways of diminishing 
fearful outcomes and addressing status threat, but the bad news is that our collective human 
cultural heritage is unlikely to be eliminated by progress. What is more likely is a permanent 
scenario of tension between our cultural heritage and more progressive notions that will have to 
re-navigate continually.  
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Synthesis of three ecological theories of culture to form a new model of cultural continuity 
and cultural change. 
A model of how these multiple theories of cultural ecology might fit together 
advantageously, drawing heavily from Greenfield’s innovations but adding a mechanism for the 
individual to contribute ecological pressure to the shaping of culture can be seen in figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Merging cultural theories into a model of how our environments shape our 
voting decisions and our voting decisions shape our environments dialogically. 
 Each of the ecological theories included in the model have specific affordances and 
limitations, and the model is not intended to contradict any of the theories, but simply to show 
how their affordances are complementary, and it does so at the expense of some of the rich 
details provided by the theorists in their work, which is less than ideal. The model is intended to 
be used in conjunction with those primary documents, so that this detail is not lost to the future 
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researcher. The major contribution of this dissertation was achieved because of Hofstede’s 
rankings, which allow culture to be transformed from a nominal variable into an ordinally ranked 
one, however Hofstede’s work also has some severe limitations which have begun to be 
remedied by other researchers. For example, Hofstede’s work lacks any comprehensive 
theoretical explanations or definitions of culture and how it is transmitted. Bronfenbrenner 
provides some robust ecological ideas that also address cultural transmission and how it shapes 
development, by describing the levels of interaction through which a culture is transmitted to an 
individual. One of the unique strengths of Bronfenbrenner’s theory is that it provides an explicit 
mechanism for the individual to provide feedback to their culture – the individual is both shaped 
by the culture and shapes the culture. Yet Bronfenbrenner’s theory lacks a lot of the specific 
dimensions of how culture is shaped ecologically that Greenfield’s theory possesses. They 
complement each other in many ways. Greenfield has the richest theory, but because it is so 
complex and focuses on socioeconomic differences that are central drivers in accounting for 
cultural change, there are no mechanisms for the individual’s actions or contributions to feed 
back into the ecology and shape the culture.  
 The use of the Hofstede rankings in this research speaks to the validity of his work, but 
he would never have used his data in this way, and has limited explanations for how culture 
works at all. The Hofstede rankings are a critique of Greenfield’s work because she seems to 
view culture as a product of a specific ecological context, with no clear place in her theory for 
continuity and values that emerged from previous contexts. The diagram of her theory only has a 
mechanism for explaining how new contexts will change a culture, which is the strength of focus 
of her theory. Using Hofstede’s rankings as a variable in juxtaposition to Greenfield’s gives us 
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the opportunity to start discussing the mechanisms for continuity of culture, and not just the 
change.  
For example, MacWilliams’ proposition that prolonged ecological pressures on the 
African American community from asymmetrical exposure to violence and threat leading to a 
cultural tendency towards authoritarianism provides an example of the tensions between 
Greenfield’s work and the model proposed in figure 9, where an ecological pressure was 
hypothesized to cause cultural-level changes over time which have now become habitual and 
encoded in cultural behaviors and likely to perpetuate themselves as cultural traditions even in 
the absence of the ecology that produced them.  Conservation tendencies operate in tension 
against ecological pressures. This pull and push is the context in which the American political 
system ought to be analyzed in order to understand voting patterns more broadly. 
The model presented in figure 9 attempts to show how Greenfield’s, Bronfenbrenner’s, 
and Tajfel and Turner’s Theory can be integrated into a holistic structure which draws on each of 
their strengths, and to show the trajectory of cultural transmission envisioned in this particular 
context of making a voting decision. In some ways, it also answers critiques within the field, 
such as Marcus and Kitayama’s critique that measures of individualism have no room for self-
identity, by incorporating an identity theory into one of the levels. This also addresses a 
weakness of ecological theories, which generally lack a mechanism of conversion from 
experiences into psychological constructs in the mind of a person, because they focus on the 
environment at the expense of the internal construals. For example, Neisser’s 5 selves (1988) are 
complementary to Bronfenbrenner’s levels (Rosa & Tudge, 2013), and provide a mechanism for 
the person to process their cultural inputs. Tajfel and Turner (1979), however, provide the 
strongest identity theory to place in this lowest level of the diagram, because their theory 
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specifically deals with the social experience and how intergroup tensions lead us to position our 
identities. As a supplement, but not a replacement of Bronfenbrenner’s micro-level, I have 
specified face-to-face versus media exposure to cultural values, as it seems there are two general 
mechanisms by which we are exposed to such values. Bronfenbrenner envisioned our exposure 
selectively through face-to-face interactions, which I think is a weakness of his work, since at the 
time of his writing, book, radio and TV media formats, among others, were already an important 
mechanism of transmitting culture through news and stories. In fact, some researchers argue that 
the written word itself fundamentally altered human cognition, and I would argue that each new 
form of media that has emerged in human culture since the invention of writing has contributed 
to altering our cognition in similar, if less profound ways (Olson, 1996; 2016). Crucially, the 
emergence of social media is the most recent example of this, because just as the written word 
altered the affordances of memory and allowed us to offload burdens from human memory by 
recording information for posterity rather than transmitting orally, social media has re-aligned 
and democratized the nature of truth and facts by eliminating publishing bottlenecks related to 
the cost of printing and disseminating printed words. The lower cost of disseminating written 
words on the internet, and the networking offered by social media have combined to allow 
untrained non-professionals to generate content widely available, something which has never 
happened before in history. This has placed a burden on each individual to vet information for 
his or herself, creating a need for media literacy where before professionals such as book editors 
and newspaper editors and journalists were responsible for this vetting, and had received 
professional training and ethical guidelines for doing so. Therefore, we are in the midst of, in 
many ways, an ecological transformation of the nature of information that must, necessarily, 
reshape our culture, so that we may reshape our own cognition to accommodate the new 
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technology. After all, this is the purpose of culture: to allow humans to evolve within the 
lifespans of living individuals by changing their experiences and expected responses.  
 The model I am presenting here draws a specific affordance from Bronfenbrenner which 
could strengthen Greenfield’s theory of social change and human development, not to replace her 
theory but simply to supplement it: the possibility that individuals in a society can act as part of 
the ecology which shapes culture itself in a bidirectional or circular pattern of interaction. As part 
of the conceptualization of bidirectionality, which is represented in the large arrows feeding back 
up from the voting decision into the cultural shapers at the top, there is a smaller bidirectional 
system of tensions between the triangles underneath the cultural values, such as authoritarianism, 
sexism and individualism/collectivism, and the triangles above them. The triangles are 
intentionally oriented so that the base of the triangle faces the cultural values, so as to represent 
the weight or pressure being applied to the cultural variables. From beneath, norms, texts and 
laws act as pillars or brakes, which encourage cultural continuity and transmission, a feature 
notably absent from Greenfield’s theory. On top events, population density and economics are 
intended as examples of the variables Greenfield indicated as ecological shapers that drive 
cultural change. The tight bidirectional relationship between these two sets of triangles exerts 
opposing tensions on cultural values, one set holding them up in place while the other set bears 
down. This dissertation’s strongest contribution to the discourse around the nature of culture is 
the addition of the these variables into the concept of cultural change – the role of media and text 
in transmitting culture both as a pathway of transmission through the digital bubbles which shape 
what texts we are exposed to, as the availability of texts themselves, and the sharing of stories, at 
the level of directly counteracting the effects of ecological change through norms, laws, and 
texts. These norms, laws and texts are generated by individuals or teams of individuals, 
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disseminated, adopted, and then become habitual scaffolds of our schema of interacting with 
other people, which can be useful, but can also result in prejudicial attitudes which can lead to 
intergroup conflict. This is the most critical tension in my work, since it is impractical and highly 
unethical to throw out the texts generated by our ancestors, including documents such as the 
Bible or Quran as well as recent documents of purportedly less importance, yet nonetheless 
shape our attitudes, such as the children’s book Where the Wild Things Are. As much as we want 
to keep Where the Wild Things Are and excise some of the anachronism in the Bible or Quran, it 
is impossible to eliminate those texts and their ideas from modern culture without denying 
fundamental historical events. Yet without excision, we cannot eliminate the anachronistic ideas, 
which are doomed to reverberate through the future, at risk of being used in negative ways. This 
is the tension I hoped to expose by adding this layer of texts, norms and laws beneath cultural 
values, to act in opposition and tension with Greenfield’s exhaustive and profound list of 
ecological drivers of cultural change. 
Future Work 
Future work could examine avenues that may reduce authoritarianism or social 
dominance orientation by calming perceived threats. One possible avenue would be to present 
participants with readings or virtual reality games that allow them to enter the experiences of 
immigrants to increase empathy, while simultaneously decreasing fear of outgroup members. 
While media can produce false news, it is also a central mechanism of enculturation through 
storytelling. All the variables in this dissertation, particularly individualism/collectivism, 
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and morality remain poorly understood as either 
changeable (learned cultural values) or unchangeable (personality traits or individual 
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differences). Without further work to disentangle the mutability of these attitudes, it will be 
difficult to come up with plans to attenuate them, or at least their relationships prejudice and 
discrimination. Overall, our findings provide evidence that prejudice is partly culturally learned, 
indicating that there are actionable pathways to remedy the polarized situation our society 
currently inhabits.  
Both morals and ethics are understood to be fundamentally adaptive ways of maintaining 
cooperation among human groups for basic needs such as survival (e.g. food production, 
defense, reproduction) but which has morphed or been co-opted into a more uniquely human 
tool: social cooperation became codified in various societies according to cultural habits, and 
developed into an abstract, symbolic and arbitrary system of rites, beliefs and habits with the 
goal of preserving and passing forward important technological know-how while maintaining 
group cohesion. Language is a powerful tool for maintaining culture, or the habits and patterns of 
behavior and beliefs, over generations with only minor changes due to drift and changes in 
ecological pressures, where adults pass (at least parts of) the symbolic system to the next 
generation implicitly and explicitly. It is important to understand how flexibly parts of culture 
can change in multi-cultural contexts, especially with increasing globalization that is thought to 
be decreasing the variation among world cultures through media exposure and increased tele-
communicative contact – both a function of the digital, internet age. 
While the current research will not look at comparisons between groups in geographic 
separation, such as people from one country in that country versus people from one country in 
another country, I hope to establish a methodology that will be applicable for creating a profile 
that captures group concordances and is also capable of understanding variability within 
populations, and which can, ultimately, be used to understand cultural change. 
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However, this goal should also take into account a fundamental truth which Hofstede has 
ignored, but others, such as Gelfand, have at least tried to acknowledge: that a nation does not 
represent a monoculture. As psychologists, there is a great deal of work to be done to identify 
what culture is, and where it rests. Is it something that exists within the human mind?  Is there 
consistency of culture across all members of a cultural group? It is likely that there is no 
consistency, and that culture somehow manages to emerge as a pattern across a great number of 
individuals without guaranteeing much in any one person. Culture allows for the uniqueness of 
each individual. This variation emerges from personality traits, and also intersectionality within 
members of a group. For example, we are all American, but in addition, I am a woman, and a 
secular Jew.  
Furthermore, the variations of cultures across regions, predicted by ecological theorists 
such as Greenfield (2009) would also account for intra-national but group-level cultural 
variation. The role of this ecological factor is still poorly understood as well: where are the 
boundaries between a society: which is gemeinschaft and one which is gesellschaft? What 
exceptions may defy this categorization? 
Another way of looking at how people align themselves with various options for group 
membership has been provided by Turner & Reynolds (2003) with Self Categorization Theory 
(SCT) and Social Identity Theory (SIT).  Both SCT and SIT emerge from the idea that identity is 
complex and exists as a self-definition in opposition to other near groups, and that it is important 
to understanding collective behavior. For example, the creation of (even artificial) group 
categories can spur competition and discrimination between groups in SIT (Turner, 1999). One 
issue that is addressed by self-categorization theory is how social identity can result in a 
tendency to perceive an outgroup as homogenous and with uniform, less individual 
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characteristics (Turner, 1999).  Take this, combined with the perseverance of cultural traditions 
across multiple generations, and it goes a long way to explaining the stubborn persistence of 
sexist and racist cultural assumptions, as the pull of identity like race magnetically attracts us to 
our in-group while amplifying cultural norms of interpreting out-group homogeneity. 
On the other hand, learning more about the factors that lead to differences in moral and 
ethical beliefs within American sub-cultures can help us to understand the political situation in 
which we all live. It can also help us to form educational practices which better train students to 
apply their own moral systems, whether we agree with them or not, to critical thinking, scientific 
literacy and awareness of other social perspectives. Current efforts to create educational 
interventions aimed at increasing moral reasoning on specific issues, such as sexual harassment 
training or diversity sensitivity training have a poor record of improving sensitivity to other 
groups and changing the minds of attendees (Kearney, 2004). While training may increase 
participants’ ability to recognize discrimination and poor behavior, it doesn’t increase empathy, 
and some training procedures considered “best practices” have negative effects, increasing 
resistance (Perry, 2010). Finally, the alliances between minority groups such as Blacks and 
Latin@s and the Democrats are likely to be uneasy and fraught in the future, since both history 
and our data here show that people often vote in ways that are important to them emotionally but 
may not be in their best interest practically, with the strongest predictors being culture. Recent 
research has begun to show that both (growing) demographics have tendencies towards 
authoritarianism, and the tensions between cultural tendencies of authoritarianism and 
Democratic policies intended to protect oppressed minorities will likely become more apparent 
over the next few decades. 
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Cultural values that result in fear and prejudice may persist into the future, but more and 
more researchers, journalists and artists are harnessing the media to share stories of their 
experiences in order to alter standing perceptions and engage in dialogues about injustice. The 
#MeToo movement, which began a few months ago in October 2017 (Guerra, 2017), seems to be 
encouraging dialogue about sexual assault, sexual harassment in the workplace, and holding 
powerful individuals accountable for their predatory behavior. #MeToo demonstrates that we 
can, at least, add new habits and attitudes to our cultural toolbox through the vehicle of the 
internet and the power of sharing our stories publicly. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Summary of Existing Scales Used in Study 
 
Table 17 
Summary of Existing Scales              
  N Min Max Mean SD 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Big Five Aspects Scales “Intellect” 946 1.60 5.00 3.49 0.61 0.80 
Carré Empathy 946 2.05 5.00 3.60 0.52 0.83 
Carré Empathy (2 factor structure = 
Affective) 
946 1.00 5.00 3.42 0.64 0.78 
Carré Empathy (2 factor structure = 
Cognitive) 
946 2.22 5.00 3.82 0.59 0.78 
Carré Empathy (3 factor structure = 
Emotional Disconnect) 
946 1.00 5.00 3.44 0.86 0.83 
Carré Empathy (3 factor structure = 
Emotional Contagion) 
946 1.00 5.00 3.43 0.73 0.74 
Carré Empathy (3 factor structure = 
Cognitive Empathy) 
946 2.25 5.00 3.85 0.58 0.75 
Durel Organized Religious Activities 
(ORA) 
882 0 5 1.55 1.48 N/A 
Durel Intrinsic Religiosity Scale 881 1 5 3.20 1.28 0.92 
Durel Non-Organized Religious 
Activities Scale (NORA) 
882 1.00 8.00 2.67 1.71 0.89 
Fuglini Scale 942 1.00 5.00 3.57 0.82 0.95 
Fuglini Current Assistance Subscale 939 1.00 5.00 3.43 0.95 0.92 
Fuglini Respect Subscale 942 1.00 5.00 3.83 0.90 0.87 
Fuglini Future Assistance Subscale 934 1.00 5.00 3.54 0.99 0.81 
Haghighat Social Desirability 946 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.24 0.44 
Kitayama Independent  946 1.50 5.00 3.84 0.63 0.84 
Kitayama Interdependent  946 1.08 5.00 3.70 0.64 0.84 
Literat Civic Engagement Scale 946 1.00 5.00 3.75 0.80 0.68 
Literat Scale 946 2.37 4.97 3.92 0.44 0.85 
Literat Play Subscale 946 2.00 5.00 3.87 0.55 0.36 
Literat Distributed Cognition Subscale 946 2.00 5.00 3.89 0.54 0.34 
Literat Collective Intelligence Subscale 946 1.40 5.00 4.01 0.63 0.60 
Literat Judgment Subscale 946 1.80 5.00 4.16 0.62 0.75 
Literat Networking Subscale 946 1.00 5.00 3.59 0.85 0.76 
Literat Negotiation Subscale 946 1.00 5.00 3.99 0.76 0.83 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire = 
Harm/Care   
946 11.60 30.00 23.62 4.05 0.65 
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Moral Foundations Questionnaire = 
Fairness/Reciprocity  
946 11.80 30.00 23.41 3.94 0.66 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire = In-
group/Loyalty 
946 7.80 30.00 20.81 3.98 0.62 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire = 
Authority/Respect 
946 8.80 30.00 21.73 3.84 0.58 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire = 
Purity/Sanctity  
946 6.00 30.00 20.44 4.20 0.62 
Perry Assimilation 946 1.00 5.00 2.55 0.84 0.83 
Perry Multiculturalism 946 1.00 5.00 3.98 0.86 0.86 
Perry Color Blind 946 1.00 5.00 3.66 0.82 0.57 
Authoritarianism  946 0.00 4.00 2.14 1.30 0.57 
Sexism Benevolent  946 1.00 7.00 4.44 1.17 0.61 
Sexism Hostile 946 1.00 7.00 3.80 1.05 0.77 
Social Change Component 1 = Social 
Progressive 
565 -3.37 1.59 0.00 1.00 0.88 
Social Change Component 2 = Social 
Conservative 
565 -1.31 2.17 0.00 1.00 0.89 
Social Change Component 3 = Moderate 565 -3.75 1.79 0.00 1.00 0.76 
Threat - Fear of Immigrants (from Threat 
Scale Component 2)  
853 1.00 5.00 2.31 1.38 0.86 
Threat Component 1 = Focused 632 -3.00 1.87 0.00 1.00 0.89 
Threat Component 2 = Dispersed 632 -1.98 2.28 0.00 1.00 0.75 
Threat Component 3 = Fearless 632 -2.34 2.92 0.00 1.00 0.90 
Triandis Horizontal Individualism 
Subscale 
946 1.00 9.00 6.82 1.87 0.91 
Triandis Horizontal Collectivism 
Subscale 
946 1.00 9.00 6.48 1.62 0.89 
Triandis Vertical Collectivism Subscale 946 1.00 9.00 6.48 1.76 0.91 
Triandis Vertical Individualism Subscale 946 1.00 9.00 5.30 1.74 0.83 
Triandis = Vertical Dimension 
946 8.00 72.00 47.13 
11.1
7 
0.83 
Triandis = Horizontal Dimension 
946 8.00 72.00 53.21 
12.1
4 
0.90 
Triandis = Individualism Dimension 
(HI+VI) 
946 1.00 9.00 6.06 1.50 0.86 
Triandis = Collectivism Dimension 
(HC+VC) 
946 1.00 9.00 6.48 1.54 0.92 
Triandis = Social Dominance Orientation 
(Vertical-Horizontal) 
946 
-
38.00 
32.00 -6.08 
10.4
0 
0.91 
Triandis = IDV/COL (Individualism-
Collectivism) 
946 -7.38 6.00 -0.42 1.56 0.91 
Valid N (listwise) 428           
  
1
5
9
 
Appendix B: Heritage Identities in the Sample Population 
Figure 10: Heat map of how many participants claimed heritage from each country: Darker blue represents a higher percentage of 
participants who claimed at least partial descent from that country.
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Appendix C: Hofstede and Gelfand Rankings 
 
Table 18 
Hofstede and Gelfand Rankings paired with each country represented in the sample. (n=112) 
Countries in 
Sample 
Hofstede (range = 4-91) Gelfand 
Pow/ 
IDV MASC 
Uncert. 
Avoid. 
LTO Indulg. 
Tight/Loose 
Dist M = 6.5 
Albania 90 20 80 70 61 15   
Algeria               
Antigua               
Argentina 49 46 56 86 20 62   
Aruba               
Australia 36 90 61 51 21 71 4.4 
Austria 11 55 79 70 60 63 6.8 
Azerbaijan               
Bangladesh 80 20 55 60 47 20   
Barbados               
Belarus               
Belgium 65 75 54 94 82 57 5.6 
Belize               
Benin               
Bolivia               
Bosnia               
Brazil 69 38 49 76 44 59 3.5 
Burkina Faso 70 15 50 55 27 18   
Burma/  
Myanmar 
              
Canada 39 80 52 48 36 68   
Cherokee               
Chile 63 23 28 86 31 68   
China 80 20 66 30 87 24 7.9 
Colombia 67 13 64 80 13 83   
Congo               
Costa Rica 35 15 21 86       
Cuba               
Cyprus               
Czech Rep. 57 58 57 74 70 29   
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Dom. Rep. 65 30 65 45 13 54   
Dominica                
Ecuador 78 8 63 67       
Egypt 70 25 45 80 7 4   
El Salvador 66 19 40 94 20 89   
Estonia 40 60 30 60 82 16 2.6 
Ethiopia 70 20 65 55       
Finland 33 63 26 59 38 57   
France 68 71 43 86 63 48 6.3 
Garifuna               
Georgia               
Germany 35 67 66 65 83 40 6.5 
Ghana 80 15 40 65 4 72   
Greece 60 35 57 100 45 50 3.9 
Grenada               
Guatemala 95 6 37 99       
Guinea               
Guyana               
Haiti               
Honduras 80 20 40 50       
Hong Kong 68 25 57 29 61 17 6.3 
Hungary 46 80 88 82 58 31 2.9 
India 77 48 56 40 51 26 11 
Indonesia  78 14 46 48 62 38   
Ireland 28 70 68 35 24 65   
Israel 13 54 47 81 38   3.1 
Italy 50 76 70 75 61 30 6.8 
Ivory Coast               
Jamaica 45 39 68 13       
Japan 54 46 95 92 88 42 8.6 
Jordan 70 30 45 65 16 43   
Kazakhstan               
Korea 60 18 39 85 100 29 10 
Kosovo               
Latvia 44 70 9 63 69 13   
Lebanon 75 40 65 50 14 25   
Liberia               
Lithuania 42 60 19 65 82 16   
Macedonia               
Malaysia 100 26 50 36 41 57 11.8 
162 
 
Mali               
Malta 56 59 47 96 47 66   
Mauritania               
Mexico 81 30 69 82 24 97 7.2 
Montenegro               
Montserrat               
Morocco 70 46 53 68 14 25   
Nicaragua               
Niger                
Nigeria 80 30 60 55 13 84   
Norway 31 69 8 50 35 55 9.5 
Pakistan 55 14 50 70 50 0 12.3 
Palestine               
Panama 95 11 44 86       
Peru 64 16 42 87 25 46   
Philippines 94 32 64 44 27 42   
Poland 68 60 64 93 38 29 6 
Portugal 63 27 31 99 28 33 7.8 
Puerto Rico 68 27 56 38 19 99   
Russia 93 39 36 95 81 20   
Senegal 70 25 45 55 25     
Serbia 86 25 43 92 52 28   
Slovakia 100 52 100 51 77 28   
South Africa 49 65 63 49 34 63   
Spain 57 51 42 86 48 44 5.4 
Sri Lanka 80 35 10 45 45     
St Kitts               
St Lucia               
Sweden 31 71 5 29 53 78   
Syria 80 35 52 60 30     
Taiwan 58 17 45 69 93 49   
Thailand 64 20 34 64 32 45   
Trinidad And 
Tobago 
47 16 58 55 13 80   
Tunisia               
Turkey 66 37 45 85 46 49 9.2 
Ukraine 92 25 27 95 55 18 1.6 
United 
Kingdom 
35 89 66 35 51 69 6.9 
United States 40 91 62 46 26 68 5.1 
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Uzbekistan               
Venezuela 81 12 73 76 16 100 3.7 
Yemen               
Yugoslavia               
Zimbabwe               
NOTE: Countries in Italics are either not formally recognized internationally, no longer countries, 
or stateless peoples 
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Appendix D: Correlations Matrix of Associations between Variables Measuring Media 
Literacy 
 
Table 19         
Pearson Correlations Matrix of Associations between Variables Measuring Media Literacy (n=902) 
  Political Knowledge 
Literat Media 
Literacy 
Belief Change 
Resistence - GMO 
Belief Change 
Resistence - Immig. 
Political 
Knowledge  -        
Literat Media 
Literacy 0.02  -      
Belief Change 
Resistence - 
GMO -0.03 .066*  -    
Belief Change 
Resistence - 
Immig. .092** .068* -0.01  -  
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